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A
tlantic commissioned the report 
A strategic evaluation of public 
interest litigation in South Africa 
in 2008i (written by Gilbert Marcus SC 
and Steven Budlender) after seven years 
of support to human rights grantees, 
many of which had strategically and 
effectively used litigation to achieve 
lasting socio-economic change. The 
evaluation – which was not restricted 
to the work of Atlantic grantees, but 
surveyed the entire field of public 
interest litigation – was commissioned 
to distil which strategies, when 
combined with strategic litigation, 
had led to social change and might be 
emulated in the future.
The study was well received locally 
and internationally by public interest 
lawyers, the human rights sector 
more broadly, by academics and by 
i  www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/sites/default/files/
uploads/public_interest_litigation_sa.pdf.
other international donors working in 
the field of social justice. It has been 
included in the curricula of many law 
degrees, and has served as a reference 
in several seminars, conferences and 
exchanges among South African and 
foreign legal practitioners across the 
world.
Although formal grantmaking in South 
Africa has now ended, Atlantic remains 
keen to explore the impact of its 
grantmaking, and in particular how best 
to secure enduring social change.
In this context, Atlantic is proud to 
present a revised and expanded version 
of the 2008 report entitled Public 
interest litigation and social change in 
South Africa: Strategies, tactics and 
lessons. This work (written by Steven 
Budlender, Gilbert Marcus SC and Nick 
Ferreira) was commissioned to update 
and develop the initial report and 
thus provides new insights and covers 
post-2008 developments in the field of 
public interest litigation in South Africa.
The Atlantic Philanthropies 
and public interest 
litigation in South Africa
In 2013, The Atlantic Philanthropies (Atlantic) – an international 
foundation committed to investing its assets over a fixed period of time 
rather than in perpetuity – ended its grantmaking programme in South 
Africa. Over the course of its involvement in South Africa (since 1994) 
Atlantic invested over US$355 million. Much of this spend was focused 
on advancing social justice, with support to strategic public interest 
litigation as a consistent element.








Atlantic’s decision to launch its 
Reconciliation and Human Rights 
Programme in South Africa in 2002 
was motivated by the country’s 
successful and peaceful transition from 
apartheid to democracy in 1994, against 
seemingly intractable odds – a powerful 
demonstration of the proposition that a 
peaceful, negotiated path from conflict 
and injustice to co-operation and 
reconciliation is possible.
A key element in the trajectory to South 
Africa’s historic transition was the 
adoption of one of the most progressive 
Constitutions in the world. It provided 
a platform, for the first time, to extend 
a raft of human and socio-economic 
rights to vulnerable and disadvantaged 
South Africans – a compelling 
opportunity for Atlantic to stimulate 
social change by backing key human 
rights organisations in the country.
Atlantic went on to support a national 
network of community-based, legal 
advice offices and public interest 
non-governmental organisations that 
identified issues which lent themselves 
to precedent-setting litigation and class 
actions, thus impacting large numbers 
of people. This network is an important 
component of South African civil 
society. In supporting these groups, 
Atlantic drew on the experience and 
success of the Treatment Action 
Campaign and other social movements 
in promoting and achieving tangible 
social change.
The imprint of Atlantic’s support is 
evident in the many positive, socio-
economic Constitutional Court rulings 
since 1996 – from the Richtersveld 
rulingii where a community was 
awarded ownership of the mineral 
rights on land from which they had 
been forcibly removed under apartheid, 
to the instruction to government to 
roll out antiretroviral drugs to people 
with HIV,iii and the striking down of 
the Communal Land Rights Act 11 
ii  Alexkor Ltd & Another v Richtersveld Community & 
Others [2003] ZACC 18; 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC).
iii Covered extensively in Chapter 2.
of 2004,iv which prevented women 
in communal areas from owning 
or inheriting land. These and other 
rulings have been groundbreaking and 
transformative, improving the lives of 
millions of people.
Key components of Atlantic’s strategy 
to realise human and socio-economic 
rights in South Africa came to include:
•  applied research to inform policy 
and legislation and to provide 
baseline data against which progress 
can be measured;
•  community organisation and grass-
roots mobilisation;
• lobbying and advocacy;
•  litigation where advocacy and 
mobilisation fail; and
• networking and alliance-building.
This complex of strategies was in 
part informed by the findings and 
recommendations of the 2008 public 
interest litigation evaluation report.
iv  Tongoane & Others v National Minister for 
Agriculture and Land Affairs & Others [2010] 
ZACC 10; 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC). 
‘Justice under a tree’ – the logo of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa. 
The tree protects the people, and they 
look after the tree. Also, traditionally 
in South Africa, justice has taken place 
under a tree.
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The impact of 
Atlantic’s 
programme
Important advances have been made 
by grantees and partners in Atlantic’s 
programme across its four focus areas:
•  lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender people;
•  rural poverty;
•  refugees and migrants; and
•  organisations and initiatives that 
counter threats to democracy and 
advance constitutionalism.
In terms of the rights of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender people 
(LGBTs), the following – representing 
some of the most progressive advances 
in the world – has been achieved:
•  The country’s LGBT community 
has gained full citizenship, including 
the recognition of same-sex 
marriages, the decriminalisation of 
sodomy, the right of LGBT couples 
to adopt children, access by LGBT 
partners to each other’s pension, 
health insurance and other benefits 
on the same basis as heterosexuals, 
and the right of long-term partners 
to inherit the assets of the other 
upon death.
•  Discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation in the workplace 
has been outlawed.
•  Under the country’s refugee 
legislation, LGBTs faced with 
persecution in their own countries 
because of their sexuality are 
afforded asylum in South Africa.
•  Funding has been provided for 
emerging transgender and intersex 
support groups.
•  Government has passed legislation 
allowing individuals to register for 
identity documents in their chosen 
gender.
•  Gender reassignment surgery is 
available through the public health 
service at Groote Schuur Hospital 
in Cape Town.
Atlantic’s rural poverty grantees have 
used the law to alleviate the worst 
impacts of rural poverty through a 
network of advice offices and public 
interest law firms which provide 
free advice to the rural poor. Atlantic 
supported structures in six of South 
Africa’s nine provinces and is leaving 
behind a national network of best-
practice institutions and entities to 
carry on this work.
In protecting the rights of the rural 
poor, the advice offices have facilitated 
the following:
•  improved uptake of social grants; 
•  improved education on farms;
•  access to water, housing, electricity 
and other services;
•  prevention of illegal evictions from 
farms and litigation for security of 
tenure;
•  opposition to the Communal Land 
Rights Act (mentioned above) and 
other retrogressive legislation which 
discriminates against women in the 
former tribal trust lands; and
•  challenges to government’s granting 
of concessions to mining houses to 
exploit resources without adequate 
community consultation or 
economic benefit.
Grantees have accomplished or been 
instrumental in accomplishing the 
following: 
•  11 community-based advice office 
networks that provide legal advice 
and support to more than 60 000 
clients each year;
•  successful litigation compelling 
provincial government to remedy 
delays in the payment of social 
grants – a routine problem across 
the country until the establishment 
of the South African Social Security 
Agency (which centralised this role);
As one of the most progressive in the world, the South 
African Constitution provided a platform to extend a raft 
of human and socio-economic rights to vulnerable and 
disadvantaged South Africans – a compelling opportunity 
for Atlantic to stimulate social change by backing key 
human rights organisations in the country.
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•  a sophisticated campaign, 
spearheaded by the Black Sash, to 
incrementally increase eligibility 
for the Child Support Grant from 
those under the age of seven in 1998 
to all children under the age of 18 
by 2011. This has brought more 
than 10 million children into the 
social safety net. A similar campaign 
increased the number of children 
eligible for a Foster Care Grant 
from 40 000 in 1998 to just under 
half a million in 2011 – a response 
in part to the rising number of 
orphans, due to the HIV and AIDS 
pandemic;
•  a reduction in the level of rural 
poverty, improved health and 
nutrition, increased levels of 
enrolment in schools, and reduced 
levels of illegal child labour; 
•  approximately 15 million rural 
women benefiting from the decision 
of the Constitutional Court to strike 
down the Community Land Rights 
Act, which limited their right to 
access, own and inherit land;  
•  four communities regaining 
ownership of mineral-rich land 
taken from them during apartheid;
•  15 communities benefiting from 
rulings against the negative impacts 
of mining; and
•  communities across the country 
gaining access to clean and safe 
drinking water.
In the field of refugee and migrant 
rights, the work of Atlantic’s grantees 
has had the following impact:
•  the provision of legal advice and 
support as well as key social services 
to over 12 000 refugees seeking legal 
status to remain in the country;
•  litigation resulting in the provision 
of education for child refugees, 
and in access to health services 
and emergency shelters for asylum 
seekers; and
•  litigation forcing the closure of 
detention centres that failed to 
comply with human rights and 
minimum health standards.
Lastly, Atlantic also supported 
a number of new civil society 
initiatives that have materialised to 
counter threats to democracy and 
advance constitutionalism. They are 
characterised by extensive citizen 
engagement – in particular the 
emergence of a new and growing 
cadre of informed youth leadership 
– innovative advocacy strategies and 
effective strategic litigation. 
These grantees have been prominent 
in securing a number of precedent-
setting Constitutional Court rulings 
that prevent municipalities from 
evicting homeless people without 
providing alternative accommodation. 
In addition, the City of Cape Town has 
been compelled to provide adequate 
sanitation to residents of informal 
settlements. Also:
•  The Social Justice Coalition has 
partnered with the Mayor of Cape 
Town to develop a city-wide 
sanitation policy for informal 
settlements.
•  A national campaign against 
corruption was launched by the 
Council for the Advancement of the 
South African Constitution.
•  Corruption Watch, an initiative 
of Section27 and the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions, has 
been launched.
•  Several issue-based movements have 
emerged around service delivery 
and education, all characterised by 
popular participation, in particular 
by young people.




While Atlantic has supported some key 
instances of strategic public interest 
litigation in South Africa since 2002, 
this publication (as the 2008 report) 
also includes other critical initiatives 
and developments, thus presenting a 
comprehensive contemporary survey of 
public interest litigation in the country. 
It points to a rapidly developing field, 
and to complex and innovative strategies 
for social change, of which strategic 
litigation is but one.
We hope and trust that this publication 
will contribute to an increasingly rich 
and informed debate on how to use 
litigation to achieve lasting social change.
Martin O’Brien
Senior Vice President, The Atlantic 
Philanthropies
Gerald Kraak
Programme Executive: Reconciliation and 
Human Rights Programme (2002-2013), 
The Atlantic Philanthropies (South Africa)
Action by civil society, including litigation, 
has ensured that essential services have 
been provided to many communities – here, 
potable water.
Photograph: Legal Resources Centre ©
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In 2007, at the request of The Atlantic Philanthropies (Atlantic), two 
of the authors of this publication – Gilbert Marcus SC and Steven 
Budlender – conducted an evaluation of public interest litigation in 
South Africa to determine, primarily, which combination of strategies 
has been most effective in advancing social change, as well as the 
relationship of public interest litigation to various aspects of social 
mobilisation.
T
he evaluation report was 
published by Atlantic in 
2008 (A strategic evaluation 
of public interest litigation in South 
Africa,1 henceforth referred to as the 
2008 report). As mentioned in the 
Prologue, it was widely recognised 
by public interest lawyers and 
organisations from South Africa and 
beyond as being helpful to their work.2
In the years that have passed since 
the publication of the 2008 report, 
there have been significant further 
developments in the South African 




2  For a contrasting and critical view of the 2008 
report, see Jackie Dugard & Malcolm Langford, 
Art or science? Synthesising lessons from public 
interest litigation and the dangers of legal 
determinism, in South African Journal on Human 
Rights, Vol. 27, Part 1: 2011, pages 39-64.
•  a series of decisions by the 
Constitutional Court on socio-
economic rights;
•  a striking and remarkable increase 
in the prominence of issues 
concerning the right to basic 
education, both in the public arena 
and in courts; and
•  a move by more conservative 
organisations to embrace and 
make use of the tactics and 
strategies developed by progressive 
public interest organisations.
The period has also seen significant 
changes in the composition of 
South Africa’s Constitutional Court, 
including the departure of the last four 
Justices appointed in 1994 and the 
appointment of new Chief Justices.
In light of these developments, and 
at the request of Atlantic, the 2008 
report has now been substantially 
updated and revised. This 2014 
publication also contains a great deal 
of new material, dealing in particular 
with the developments set out above. 
It is thus intended to replace the 2008 
report, rather than supplement it.
As was the case with the 2008 report, 
we have written this publication by 
considering a range of information 
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sources. These included engagements, 
both formal and informal, with a 
range of role-players in the public 
interest litigation arena – comprising 
judges, practitioners and key activists. 
In order to ensure that the views of 
the organisations and individuals 
concerned could be robustly expressed, 
we undertook that comments made to 
us would not be attributed to particular 
respondents.
We have structured this publication into 
five main chapters:
Chapter 1: Changing trends in 
the South African public interest 
litigation environment
This chapter examines the changing 
trends in the South African public 
interest litigation environment, 
especially current challenges.
Chapter 2: Case studies of South 
African public interest litigation
This chapter involves a discussion of 
a number of particularly important 
case studies of recent public interest 
litigation that provide support for many 
of the conclusions we reach later.
Firstly, we have included the three case 
studies presented and discussed in the 
2008 report. They are:
•  the National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) case on 
the criminalisation of sodomy and 
subsequent litigation concerning 
gay and lesbian rights;
•  the Grootboom case on the right to 
housing; and 
•  the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) case on the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV.
Secondly, we present and discuss three 
additional, more recent case studies:
•  the Mazibuko case on access to 
water;
•  the Joseph case on access to 
electricity; and
•  the Nokotyana case on sanitation.
These three cases were selected as 
each of them represented an attempt 
to develop the socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence of the courts in, as yet, 
untested areas – water, electricity and 
sanitation, respectively. Moreover, while 
these cases had very different histories 
and outcomes, the Constitutional 
Court delivered judgments in all three 
of them within a short period – October 
to November 2009. The different 
outcomes of the cases can therefore 
not be attributed to changes in the 
composition of the Court, meaning that 
a study of their comparative approaches 
is all the more valuable. 
Chapter 2 ends with a seventh, 
collective case study, where we examine 
a number of recent cases on different 
aspects of the right to basic education. 
Again, this was a relatively untested 
area until a few years ago. Since then, 
however, there has been a significant 
increase in the prominence of litigation 
regarding this right. 
Chapter 3: Four key strategies 
for using rights to achieve social 
change
This chapter deals with key strategies 
that should be used in conjunction with 
a public interest litigation strategy in 
order for the latter to achieve maximum 
success in advancing social change. We 
identify three such strategies:
•  conducting public information 
campaigns to raise rights awareness;
•  providing advice and assistance 
outside of litigation to assist people 
in claiming their rights; and
•  making use of social mobilisation 
and advocacy to ensure that 
communities are actively involved 
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Chapter 4: Seven factors to 
maximise the prospect of 
ensuring that public interest 
litigation succeeds and achieves 
social change 
This chapter focuses on the factors 
that should generally be present in 
order to maximise the prospects of 
public interest litigation succeeding 
and achieving social change. We have 
identified seven such factors:
•  proper organisation of clients;
•  overall long-term strategy;




•  characterisation; and
•  follow-up.
Chapter 5: Procedural 
mechanisms which promote 
effective public interest litigation
When we presented the 2008 report 
to public interest litigators in other 
jurisdictions, we were struck by the 
fact that the South African public 
interest litigation environment is, 
from a procedural point of view, a very 
generous one.  
Consequently, this new chapter 
considers some of the procedural 
mechanisms in place in South Africa 
which promote effective public interest 
litigation. This is important for two 
reasons. 
Firstly, for foreign readers, it provides an 
insight into possible procedural reforms 
to be suggested in order to promote 
effective public interest litigation in 
their jurisdictions. 
Secondly, for South African as well as 
foreign readers, it highlights the need 
for litigators to take full advantage of 
these mechanisms when designing and 
engaging in public interest litigation.
We draw attention to three main 
procedural mechanisms:
• broad rules of standing;
•  a protective costs regime; and
•  significant opportunities for 
interventions by amici curiae. 
Three final preliminary points should be 
made in this introduction.
Firstly, we generally sought to use 31 
December 2013 as a cut-off date for the 
matters discussed in this publication. 
However, on occasion we have included 
brief references to events occurring after 
that date where this was necessary to 
give a full context for the issues being 
examined.
Secondly, in a number of the cases 
discussed in this publication, one or 
two of the authors were involved as 
counsel. In those cases, we have taken 
particular care to rely primarily on the 
views and perceptions of those authors 
not involved as counsel, as well as the 
respondents who commented on the 
cases in question.
Lastly, we would like to express our 
thanks to Emma Webber for her 
invaluable assistance in finalising this 
work, particularly the case study dealing 
with the right to basic education. We 
would also like to express our thanks 
to Martin O’Brien and Gerald Kraak 
of The Atlantic Philanthropies for their 
continual support and eternal patience 
as the publication was being prepared 
and finalised. Finally, we would like 
to thank Helle Christiansen for her 
excellent assistance in the copy-editing 
and proofreading of the publication, 
and for putting up with our endless 
changes.
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Changing trends in the 
South African public 
interest litigation 
environment




In respect of the period prior to 1994,3 
our respondents emphasised that (at 
least in theory) the mechanisms for 
public interest litigation were very 
limited. There was no Bill of Rights, 
almost complete parliamentary 
sovereignty, very strict prescription laws 
that favoured the state, and a judiciary 
which often followed the letter of the 
law even though it may have taken the 
view that the laws were unjust.
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding this 
3  The use of public interest litigation in this period 
is addressed in detail in Richard L Abel’s excellent 
work Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle 
Against Apartheid, 1980-1994, Routledge, New 
York: 1995.
repressive political climate, government 
displayed a paradoxical attitude to the 
role of law and the judiciary. Despite 
its flagrant violation of human rights, 
government purported to hold the 
judiciary in the highest esteem and 
professed respect for the rule of 
law. This attitude, combined with 
government’s attempts to use the law to 
entrench apartheid, ironically created 
opportunities for public interest lawyers 
to exploit gaps in the system. As Justice 
Edwin Cameron explains: 
These legal ploys were possible 
because, in its essence, apartheid 
was a project that used the law 
as its instrument. For most of its 
history, most of those enforcing it 
saw themselves as subject to the law 
and its constraints. This changed 
radically in the 1980s, when ‘dirty 
tricks’ campaigns were sprung, 
and murderous ‘third forces’ were 
unleashed.  
Until then, security policemen, 
bureaucrats, politicians and lawyers, 
including apartheid-minded judges, 
thought of themselves as operating 
within the values of an ethically sound 
and respected legal system. They 
knew apartheid was criticised around 
the world, and that most black South 
There has undoubtedly been a significant evolution of the South 
African public interest litigation environment, especially over the last 
few decades. In this regard, we consider it helpful to deal with four 
main periods:
• the period prior to 1994;
•  the period between 1994 and 2000;
•  the period between 2000 and 2010; and
• the period from 2010 onwards.
Changing trends in the 
South African public 
interest litigation 
environment
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Africans rejected it vehemently, but 
they told themselves that there was a 
logic and justice to it.
Because of this, the legal system 
offered space to thwart apartheid’s 
plans and grand designs. And hence 
the legal system often did operate 
as a brake. On occasion, the courts 
were a real constraint on what the 
apartheid apparatus was able to 
achieve. Apartheid bureaucrats found 
that implementation of their orders 
was sometimes slowed down. They 
found the courts served as a check on 
government and police action.
And it was the very legal trappings 
of apartheid, despite the evil they 
engendered, that laid the foundations 
for the constitutional system that 
followed.4
Moreover, given the importance 
of the issue and the interest of the 
international community and foreign 
donors, considerable funding was 
available to engage in public interest 
litigation. Consequently, groups like 
the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), 
the Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
(CALS) and Lawyers for Human 
Rights (LHR) – as well as various 
4  Edwin Cameron, Justice – A Personal Account, NB 
Publishers, Cape Town: 2014, page 57.
legal firms – engaged in a great deal 
of successful public interest litigation, 
focusing primarily on civil and political 
rights cases. It was as a result of this 
that public interest litigation became 
a critical tool to attack apartheid 
legislation.
Public interest litigation thus had a 
substantial advantage in that it had 
a clear target and focus. Its general 
purpose was to challenge the edifice of 
apartheid in its various manifestations. 
This allowed for carefully focused and 





Not surprisingly, a major shift took 
place in 1994 with the enactment of 
a supreme Constitution and Bill of 
Rights, as well as the creation of a liberal 
Constitutional Court. Our respondents 
emphasised the following issues in 
relation to the 1994-2000 period.
The coming into force of the interim 
Constitution in 1993, followed by the 
final Constitution in 1997,5 provided 
a wide array of mechanisms and 
machinery for effective public interest 
litigation. These included extensive 
fundamental rights – including socio-
economic rights – as well as generous 
standing provisions and wide remedial 
powers. 
In theory, therefore, the period between 
1994 and 2000 ought to have been the 
high point for public interest litigation, 
particularly public interest litigation 
leading to social change.  
However, notwithstanding this – and 
without wishing to discount the 
importance of a number of crucial 
constitutional victories during this 
period (for example, decisions 
striking down the death penalty and 
the criminalisation of sodomy) – 
our respondents stressed that the 
reality faced by many public interest 
organisations during this period was 
one of uncertainty and flux.
This was partly because there were 
relatively few lawyers who were well 
versed in the new Constitution and 
5  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 
of 1996. The Constitution was signed into law 
in December 1996 and came into effect on 4 
February 1997.
Current Justices of South 
Africa’s Constitutional Court 
(from the top, left to right): 
Chief Justice 
Mogoeng Mogoeng, 
Deputy Chief Justice 
Dikgang Moseneke, 
Justice Bess Nkabinde, 
Justice Chris Jafta, 
Justice Edwin Cameron, 
Justice Johan Froneman, 
Justice Johann van der 
Westhuizen, 
Justice Mbuyiseli Madlanga, 
Justice Ray Zondo and 
Justice Sisi Khampepe.
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issues arising from it, particularly given 
that law schools had only just begun 
to teach it to their students. Moreover, 
because both the Constitutional Court 
and socio-economic rights protection 
were entirely new, jurisprudence on 
these issues was virtually non-existent. 
There was therefore a great deal of 
uncertainty surrounding the kinds of 
cases that should be brought before the 
Constitutional Court, the mechanisms 
that should be used to do so and the 
likely responses of the Court.
Combined with this was the fact that 
many of the individuals who had been 
active and developed substantial skills 
in the public interest litigation sphere 
left the sector during this period, often 
to work for government in order to 
assist it in the early days of democracy. 
While this was not surprising, and 
indeed plainly necessary, the exodus 
of public interest litigators and social 
activists necessitated the development 
of a new generation to replace them.
In conjunction with the belief held by 
some at least that the new government 
would ‘do the right thing’ and needed to 
be given the space to do so rather than 
being antagonised by public interest 
litigation, this all meant that much 
of the constitutional jurisprudence 
of this early period focused on the 
effects of the Constitution on criminal 
law, rather than on socio-economic 
rights and social change. This was 
perhaps reinforced by the caution of 
the Constitutional Court during these 
early years – particularly, for example, 
the caution shown in the first case on 
socio-economic rights, Soobramoney 
v Minister of Health.6 There, the 
Constitutional Court held that despite 
life-and-death circumstances facing a 
man unable to obtain dialysis treatment, 
it could not come to the assistance of 
the applicant as government’s policy did 
not violate the right to health care.
Indeed, where public interest litigation 
went beyond issues of criminal law, 
it often focused on defending human 
rights gains – for example, defending 
attacks on abortion laws – rather than 
attacking government policies or 
legislation.
6  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 





The period from 2000 to 2010 saw 
a major shift in the nature of public 
interest litigation with a far greater focus 
on socio-economic rights, and public 
interest litigation during this period 
was, in many ways, groundbreaking.
A question raised by Atlantic in this 
regard was whether socio-economic 
rights received sufficient attention in the 
South African public interest litigation 
environment.
All our respondents agreed that 
this period was characterised by an 
increase (some termed it a “significant” 
increase) in socio-economic rights 
litigation. Nevertheless, virtually all 
respondents also emphasised that this 
was still insufficient and that there was 
not enough focus on socio-economic 
rights litigation, given how critical these 
rights are to addressing the persistent 
concerns of poor and marginalised 
South Africans.
In theory, the period between 1994 and 2000 ought to 
have been the high point for public interest litigation, 
particularly public interest litigation leading to social 
change. The reality faced by many public interest 
organisations, however, was one of uncertainty and flux.
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The inadequacies identified by the 
respondents in the socio-economic 
rights litigation that had taken place 
included:
•  a focus on certain socio-economic 
rights – for example, housing, health 
care and land – to the exclusion 
of others which had not yet been 
addressed;
•  inadequate attention being given to 
considering new issues that could 
have been the subject of public 
interest litigation; and
•  insufficient monitoring, awareness-
raising and related lobbying and 
advocacy initiatives.
Respondents stressed that the limited 
attention given to socio-economic 
rights was often due to the inability 
of communities that were the victims 
of violations of these rights to access 
courts and lawyers who could assist 
them in fighting for their rights. These 
comments make it clear that there were 
insufficient community-based or non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) 
actively involved in dealing with socio-
economic rights.
Respondents therefore all agreed that 
the role of public interest litigation 
organisations in the socio-economic 
rights sphere was critical. As one 
respondent commented:
A lot more needs to be done to 
strengthen the capacity of the existing 
public interest litigation organisations, 
both to survive and to improve on 
their work. These organisations are the 
main avenue for poor people to have 
access to social justice. Their collapse 
or possible weakening will deprive poor 
people of access to courts and possible 
entitlements that would come with 
going to courts.
However, respondents also cautioned 
against too strongly seeking to separate 
one area of public interest litigation 
from another. Thus, while it was 
possible to have organisations focusing 
on children’s rights, health rights, or gay 
and lesbian rights, many respondents 
took the view that it was essential 
that general public interest litigation 
organisations were also funded and 
supported in order to enable them to 
operate across a wide range of issues.
This view was expressed even by 
respondents engaged in specialised 
litigation organisations. One such 
respondent pointed to the fact that the 
International Commission of Jurists had 
tried to have a special dedicated fund 
for children’s socio-economic rights, to 
which any organisation could apply for 
funds. The respondent commented that 
in practice this did not work very well:
It proved difficult to spend the 
money, organisations tried to 
‘engineer’ cases, but this was not all 
that successful. I would not advise 
that donors should allocate funds 
specifically for socio-economic rights 
as a strategy to make more litigation 
happen in this field. A better solution 
is to promote networking between 
[NGOs] that work on the ground with 
people experiencing socio-economic 
rights deprivations, and litigation 
organisations.
We endorse the view that it is necessary 
to have a mix of high-quality public 
interest litigation organisations, 
some specialist in nature and some 
operating across different areas. As 
we demonstrate in Chapter 2, the 
examples of the Grootboom and TAC 
cases make it clear that it is a mistake 
to think that different areas of public 
interest litigation are entirely separate 
from each other. While Grootboom 
was notionally only about the right 
to housing, success in the subsequent 
TAC case would have been far more 
difficult had Grootboom not already 
Shanty town in Soweto, 2005.
Photograph: Matt-80/ 
www.wikimedia.org ©
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been decided. Similarly, the successful 
cases now being litigated on the right 
to basic education build substantially 
on the principles enunciated in the 
Grootboom and TAC cases. 
Our respondents emphasised three 
major challenges facing the South 
African public interest litigation sector 
in general at the beginning of the new 
millennium. These were:
• lack of funding;
•  lack of experienced, skilled staff; 
and
• the attitude of government.
Although these challenges remain 
relevant today, they came to the fore 
during the 2000-2010 period and we 
therefore address each of them in turn 
below.
Funding
Virtually all respondents emphasised 
that the advances in the last few years 
are presently threatened and may be 
undermined by the fact that there has 
been a substantial decrease in funding 
for public interest work. As one 
respondent commented:
With the passage of the new 
Constitution, many international 
funders assumed that South Africa’s 
human rights problems had been 
solved and drastically reduced their 
funding of public interest litigation 
and other civil society groups. As a 
result, many public interest litigation 
organisations have been forced to 
close down some of their regional 
offices or allow their staff attorneys to 
take on private and corporate cases 
rather than focus exclusively on the 
public interest.
Another respondent took a similar view 
but emphasised the massive resources 
available to the state:
The major challenge facing public 
interest litigation groups in South 
Africa today is a lack of resources, 
especially when compared to those of 
the state. The state is better organised 
and retains a battery of lawyers, 
whereas many public interest litigation 
organisations are underfunded and 
thus understaffed. […] International 
funders have become increasingly 
disinterested in public interest litigation 
in South Africa, and the wealthy in 
South Africa have yet to become a 
major source of charitable giving.
Similar sentiments arose in a number 
of other responses. However, the views 
expressed – at least in respect of the 
resources available to the state – need to 
be carefully qualified in our view. While 
it is true that, as a whole, the public 
interest litigation area might be under-
resourced and under-skilled relative 
to the state, there are a number of core 
public interest litigation organisations 
that perform extraordinarily well 
and indeed seem to outdo the state 
consistently.
ProBono.Org (established in 2006) 
is an example of a newer organisation 
which has managed to unlock resources 
for public interest law by enlisting the 
support of the private legal profession. 
Moreover, the number of attorneys 
providing pro bono support to public 
interest litigation organisations has 
increased significantly over the past 
years.
In general terms though, there is no 
doubt that a lack of funding remains a 
major issue in respect of public interest 
litigation in South Africa. This is 
notwithstanding the sterling work done 
by Atlantic – mentioned by surveyed 
grantees and non-grantees alike. As a 
result of this lack of funding, there are 
relatively few public interest litigation 
organisations in South Africa at present. 
These organisations are generally 
The period from 2000 to 2010 saw a major shift in the 
nature of public interest litigation with a far greater focus 
on socio-economic rights, and public interest litigation 
during this period was, in many ways, groundbreaking.
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stretched to capacity and would be able 
to achieve a lot more with additional 
funding.
A related issue that Atlantic asked us 
to evaluate was whether other funders 
would step in as Atlantic phased out 
its support to the South African public 
interest litigation sector in 2013 as part 
of its planned spend-down. In respect of 
the organisations surveyed that received 
funding from Atlantic, it appears that 
virtually none of them relied solely on 
Atlantic for funding support – a variety 
of other funders are on board.
Despite this, all our respondents 
made it clear that there will almost 
certainly not be other funders that can 
step into Atlantic’s shoes, at least not 
satisfactorily.
Respondents pointed particularly to the 
fact that other funders – for example, 
the Foundation for Human Rights 
and the Legal Aid Board (now Legal 
Aid South Africa – LASA) tended to 
only fund matters on a case-by-case 
basis. Moreover, LASA primarily funds 
criminal matters and provides only very 
limited funding for civil litigation. It 
is essential that other funding models 
support the public interest litigation 
sector in general and encourage the 
growth and development of this sector.
Consequently, the views expressed 
were that Atlantic’s exit will create 
a substantial gap. A number of 
respondents emphasised the critical 
role that Atlantic has played in 
providing upfront money for litigation. 
They stressed that there was often not 
enough time to fundraise at the time 
of intervening in a particular case. 
Therefore, without a predetermined, 
allocated budget, it would often be 
impossible for successful interventions 
to take place.
The continued funding difficulties 
facing public interest organisations 
are, in our view, a cause for significant 
concern. Without sufficient funding and 
support, public interest organisations 
will find it increasingly difficult to 
enforce rights and, still more, to do so in 
a manner which produces lasting social 
change.
This point emerges powerfully from 
Charles R Epp’s work, The Rights 
Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and 
Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspective.7
Epp studied in detail the growth of civil 
7 University of Chicago Press: 1998.
rights in four jurisdictions: the United 
States (US), Britain, India and Canada. 
He concludes that the most significant 
determinant of the development of a 
‘rights revolution’ is the existence of 
adequately resourced support structures 
for legal mobilisation – namely rights 
advocacy organisations and rights 
advocacy lawyers. As Epp explains:
The basic lesson of this study is that 
rights are not gifts: they are won 
through concerted collective action 
arising from both a vibrant civil society 
and public subsidy. Rights revolutions 
originate in pressure from below 
in civil society, not leadership from 
above.8 
Even more importantly, Epp goes so far 
as to conclude that the existence of such 
support structures for legal mobilisation 
is more critical to achieving a rights 
revolution than virtually any other 
factor, including the text of the 
Constitution and the attitude of judges:
Neither a written Constitution, 
a rights-supportive culture, nor 
sympathetic judges is sufficient for 
sustained judicial attention to and 
8  Charles R Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, 
Activists and Supreme Courts in Comparative 
Perspective, University of Chicago Press: 1998, 
page 197.
Advocate Stuart Wilson (top left) 
consulting with tenants facing 
eviction from tenements in the 
Johannesburg inner city in the 
mid-2000s.
Photograph: Jürgen Schadeberg ©
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support for rights. Protection of civil 
liberties and civil rights depends, in 
addition, on a support structure in civil 
society. Without a support structure, 
even the clearest constitutional 
rights guarantees are likely to 
become meaningless in the courts; 
but a vibrant support structure can 
extend and expand the feeblest of 
rights. Participants in constitutional 
democracy would do well to focus their 
efforts not only on framing or revising 
constitutional provisions, and not only 
on selecting the judges who interpret 
them, but also on shaping the support 
structure that defends and develops 
those rights in practice.9
Thus, Epp concludes that even though 
India in many ways had an ideal 
environment for a rights revolution – 
including a generous Constitution and, 
at various stages, an activist judiciary 
– the absence of sufficient support 
structures for legal mobilisation meant 
that India has not witnessed a rights 
revolution to the extent of Canada, the 
US and Britain. In the case of the latter, 
for example, a rights revolution came 
about in spite of Britain appearing to 
have an inhospitable environment for 
such a revolution to occur.
9 Epp op.cit., page 205.
Epp’s study constitutes a powerful 
argument for the continued 
funding and support of civil society 
organisations engaged in rights 
advocacy and litigation. Most critically, 
if his approach is correct, it suggests 
that although South Africa now has an 
extremely generous Constitution and 
generally progressive judges, this will 
be insufficient to achieve the fulfilment 
of rights, unless there is proper funding 
and assistance for support structures.
The only issue that Epp does not 
adequately interrogate in our view is 
precisely which strategies such rights 
advocacy organisations and rights 
advocacy lawyers should use in order to 
achieve lasting social change. We deal 
with this issue in Chapters 3 and 4.
Lack of experienced, 
skilled staff 
Linked to the problem of funding 
and financial resources was a second 
difficulty emphasised by a number of 
our respondents – that of recruiting 
and retaining quality staff, particularly 
staff who understood that public 
interest litigation was not like ordinary 
lawyering, and who therefore had 
more than simply legal skills. This was 
substantially, although not exclusively, 
viewed as a problem of resources, with 
public interest litigation organisations 
finding it difficult to attract or retain 
sufficient staff members in light of 
competition from private law firms, 
government and the corporate sector. 
As one of our respondents commented:
There is definitely a sense that the 
international funding environment is 
drying up, so public interest litigation 
organisations are operating with less 
human and financial resources which 
impact on our ability to effectively run 
cases.
Another respondent expressed similar 
views:
Skills shortage also plays a major 
role within these organisations. There 
is a high staff turnover because 
the best brains have either joined 
government or continue to be poached 
by government and its Chapter 9 
Institutions.10 So, sustainability within 
this sector is a major threat to growth 
in this field.
10  Refer Chapter 9 of the Constitution (State 
Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy): 
The Auditor-General, the Commission for Gender 
Equality, the Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities, the Independent Electoral 
Commission, the Public Protector and the South 
African Human Rights Commission.
There is no doubt that a lack of funding remains a major 
issue in respect of public interest litigation in South 
Africa. There are relatively few public interest litigation 
organisations in the country at present, and they are 
generally stretched to capacity.
13Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Changing trends in the South African public interest litigation environment Chapter 1
In the bulk of public interest cases, 
the organisations concerned choose 
to brief outside counsel from the Bar 
to argue the case and, most often, also 
to draft or settle the court papers. This 
is unsurprising given that in the vast 
majority of High Court cases in South 
Africa all types of litigants use outside 
counsel from the Bar to represent them. 
Moreover, this can often be an effective 
way of ensuring that additional skills 
and experience are available to public 
interest organisations for purposes of 
specific cases. However, we emphasise 
that this is not an adequate substitute 
for having experienced, skilled staff 
located within the organisations 
concerned. This remains critically 
important if public interest litigation is 
to achieve its full effect.
Attitude of 
government
Some of our respondents also raised 
another obstacle to effective public 
interest litigation – the attitude of 
government.
In addition to difficulties in getting 
government to comply with court 
orders, respondents highlighted the 
apparent strategy of certain government 
departments to settle matters at the 
last moment, thereby avoiding legal 
precedents being set that would inform 
future public interest litigation and 
allow proper jurisprudence to be built.
This was of particular concern to some 
respondents who felt that it could 
not be taken for granted that South 
Africa would necessarily have judges 
sympathetic to public interest litigation 
positions beyond the next few years. As 
one respondent explained:
There is a risk that the courts might, 
in the future, become less open to 
creative remedies, and might cut 
back on judgments that take strong 
constitutional rights positions that fly 
in the face of public opinion. I therefore 
see the next decade as a crucial one in 
laying down precedents that will leave 
a public interest ‘footprint’ in South 
African jurisprudence.
■ 
The period from 
2010 onwards – 
the beginning 
of a backlash?
As mentioned, many of the challenges 
highlighted above in relation to the 
2000-2010 period continue to apply 
at present. However, notwithstanding 
the continuity of these challenges, we 
consider that public interest litigation 
in South Africa has entered a fourth 
period, beginning more or less at the 
end of the last decade. 
One feature of this period has been 
the rapid rise of litigation around the 
right to basic education. This is plainly 
a welcome development and is covered 
separately in Chapter 2.
Yet, our respondents also pointed to 
several other emerging factors that 
have started to make things more 
difficult for progressive public interest 
litigators, and which indicate that the 
public interest litigation successes 
since 1994 have begun to produce a 
counter-mobilisation by opponents of 
Community advice offices and 
paralegals play a crucial role in 
assisting poor and marginalised 
communities to access 
rights and services.
Photograph: National Alliance 
for the Development of 
Community Advice Offices ©
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progressive social change.
This is not unique to South Africa. 
Other constitutional democracies that 
have experienced thriving phases of 
progressive public interest litigation have 
found that a backlash or conservative 
resistance often follows an initial period 
of successful public interest litigation.
In particular, other countries have 
experienced:
•  the adoption and deployment of the 
techniques used in progressive public 
interest litigation by interest groups 
seeking to prevent or undo social 
change; and 
•  a backlash or resistance on the part 
of government to the social change 
sought through progressive public 
interest litigation.
Before we turn to recent developments 
on this score in the South African 
context, it is helpful to contextualise 
these issues by considering the manner 
in which they have played out in other 
jurisdictions. In this regard, perhaps the 
clearest example (and thus our focus) is 
the US in the period after the ‘golden age’ 
of progressive public interest litigation, 
namely the civil rights era.
The birth of public interest litigation 
in the US is widely attributed to 
the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) and its Legal Defense Fund 
(LDF). In the 1930s, the NAACP 
started planning to use litigation to attack 
segregation – a plan that culminated in 
the landmark decision striking down 
racial segregation in Brown v Board of 
Education11 some 20 years later.12
In the US, from the middle of the 1960s, 
numerous organisations were formed 
to bring litigation on behalf of left-wing 
or liberal causes. Cases were brought on 
issues including prison reform, foster 
care, special education programmes, 
access for the disabled, public housing, 
air, water and noise pollution, and 
more.13
The tactics used by these litigants for 
social change did not go unnoticed by 
those on the other side of the political 
spectrum:
Inevitably, the successes of cause 
litigation by the left prompted the 
emergence of conservative interest 
group litigation.14
11  Oliver Brown, et al. v Board of Education of 
Topeka, et al. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12  See Epp op.cit., page 39, and Brian Z Tamanaha, 
Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of 
Law, Cambridge University Press: 2006, page 158.
13 Tamanaha op.cit., page 160. 
14 Tamanaha op.cit., page 161.
In the mid-1970s, a host of conservative 
public interest litigation firms were 
formed, many of them funded directly 
or indirectly by corporations and 
seeking to advance the agendas of 
various powerful actors.15
In the 1980s and 1990s, conservative 
litigants took to the courts to oppose 
affirmative action, promote school 
choice, advocate the sanctity of private 
property, fight government regulation, 
oppose gay marriage and legalised 
abortion, include creationism in school 
curricula, and promote and defend the 
erection of religious symbols on public 
property. As Tamanaha points out:
Conservative cause lawyers 
unabashedly borrowed litigation 
strategies pioneered by the LDF, 
taking care to find appealing clients, 
and searching around the country for 
opportunities to bring test cases that 
are likely to prevail.16
The rise of conservative public interest 
litigation was given impetus by an 
increasingly right-wing judiciary 
15  For example, the Washington Legal Foundation 
uses litigation to pursue causes such as reducing 
government regulation and opposition to price 
controls. It is substantially funded by corporate 
interests, including foundations set up by the 
major pharmaceutical firms. See Tamanaha, 
op.cit., page 171. 
16 Tamanaha op.cit., page 162.
One feature of the period from 2010 onwards has been the 
rapid rise of litigation around the right to basic education. 
However, several emerging factors have also started to make 
things more difficult for progressive public interest litigators.
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resulting from the appointments made 
by former Presidents Ronald Reagan, 
George HW Bush and George W Bush 
(no doubt at least partly in response to 
successful progressive public interest 
litigation) which meant that courts 
became friendlier to conservative 
groups litigating in the public interest. 
In several areas, legislation undoing 
previous advances was also passed.
The issue of same-sex marriage 
illustrates the above. After several 
failed attempts in the 1970s, courts 
in Hawaii, Vermont and Alaska ruled 
in the 1990s that same-sex couples 
had a constitutional interest in being 
able to marry. These were important 
courtroom victories, but they prompted 
an immediate counter-mobilisation 
by opponents of same-sex marriage 
in those states but also in other states 
in the US, concerned that they might 
have to recognise same-sex marriages 
concluded in other states.17 The 
reaction comprised amendments to 
state Constitutions to prohibit same-
sex marriage, the passage of ‘defence 
of marriage’ acts prohibiting same-sex 
17  Ellen Ann Andersen, Out of the Closets and Into 
the Courts: Legal Opportunity Structure and Gay 
Rights Litigation, University of Michigan Press: 
2005, page 180.
marriage in 35 states,18 and the passing 
of federal legislation exempting states 
from the requirements of the full faith 
and credit clause insofar as it pertained 
to recognising same-sex marriages 
concluded in other states. The decisions 
served as a rallying call for conservative 
activists against gay marriage.
A similar counter-mobilisation followed 
the 2003 Goodridge decision in 
Massachusetts.19 However, this counter-
mobilisation appears ultimately to have 
been unsuccessful, as demonstrated 
by the 2013 decision of the US 
Supreme Court in US v Windsor20 and 
subsequent state cases that have used 
this decision to strike down bans on 
same-sex marriage.21
In summary, the golden age of 
progressive public interest litigation 
in the US was swiftly followed by a 
counter-mobilisation on the part of 
conservative forces:
Liberals have painfully learned that 
instruments can be used in your favor, 
18 Andersen op.cit., page 218.
19 Andersen op.cit., page 235.
20  United States, Petitioner v Edith Schlain Windsor, 
in Her Capacity as Executor of the Estate of Thea 
Clara Spyer, et al. 570 U.S. 12 (2013).
21  David S Cohen & Dahlia Lithwick, It’s Over: 
Gay Marriage Can’t Lose in the Courts, Slate 
Magazine: 14 February 2014. 
or against you, with equal facility. 
The tide has turned against liberals so 
much that a once-favored tool – cause 
litigation – has come to look like a 
fearsome weapon for the other side.22
Several of our respondents indicated 
that South Africa has begun to 
experience a similar phenomenon. 
We address the recent emergence of 
conservative public interest litigation 
and of government resistance to 
progressive public interest litigation in 
turn.
The use of public 
interest litigation 
by organisations 
opposed to social 
change
An increasing number of South 
African organisations have begun to 
use the tools and methods of public 
interest litigation in order to advance 
a conservative agenda. We will briefly 
discuss four examples.
22 Tamanaha op.cit., page 163. 
Artwork from ‘Art for Activism’ 
workshops organised by Gay 
and Lesbian Memory in Action 
in 2011 and 2012.
Photograph: Gay and Lesbian 
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The affirmative action 
cases
The trade union Solidarity boasts a 
membership of more than 150 000 
(mostly white) workers. It has a legal 
department with more than 30 staff 
members, including attorneys and 
advocates, and provides a range of legal 
services to its members.23 Solidarity has 
fought a number of affirmative action 
cases in court as part of a deliberate 
and concerted campaign to limit the 
implementation of affirmative action 
legislation by public sector employers.
Perhaps the most high-profile of 
these cases is that of Renate Barnard, 
a police officer who was denied 
promotion on two occasions solely 
because she is white. She applied 
and was interviewed for the post of 
superintendent, obtaining a score 
of 86.67% from the interviewing 
committee and a recommendation that 
she be appointed. On receiving the 
panel’s advice, however, the Divisional 
Commissioner recommended that the 
post remain unfilled because appointing 
a white candidate would aggravate 
the problem of a lack of demographic 
representivity in the relevant section 
23 www.solidaritysa.co.za.
of the South African Police Service 
(SAPS). On a second occasion, Barnard 
again received the highest score, and 
this time the Divisional Commissioner 
recommended her appointment. The 
National Commissioner, however, 
refused to appoint her and withdrew 
the post.
Solidarity challenged the decision on 
behalf of Barnard in the Labour Court. 
The Labour Court found that it was 
inappropriate to apply the numerical 
goals in the SAPS’ employment equity 
plan rigidly, and that:
[…] the need for representivity must 
be weighed up against the affected 
individual’s rights to equality and a fair 
decision made.24 
The Labour Court went on to find that 
recognition had to be given to the rights 
of the affected person to dignity and 
equality in making affirmative action 
decisions. The Court found that Barnard 
had been discriminated against and that 
the SAPS bore an onus to demonstrate 
that the discrimination was fair. The 
failure to appoint Barnard was found 
to be an irrational implementation of 
the SAPS’ employment equity plan 
24  Solidarity obo Barnard & Another v South African 
Police Services [2010] ZALC 10; 2010 (10) BCLR 
1094 (LC), paragraph 25.1.
because the SAPS had not given due 
consideration to her personal work 
history and circumstances. The Court 
ordered the SAPS to promote Barnard 
with retrospective effect.
The matter was then appealed by the 
SAPS to the Labour Appeal Court. 
On 2 November 2012, the Labour 
Appeal Court overturned the findings 
of the Labour Court. It held that the 
appointment of Barnard would have 
aggravated the over-representivity of 
white employees on level nine, and that 
it would have been a step backwards and 
a direct violation of a clear constitutional 
objective.
Barnard was granted leave to appeal 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
overturned the decision of the Labour 
Appeal Court.25 The Supreme Court 
of Appeal found that the SAPS had 
not discharged the onus of showing 
that its discrimination on the basis 
of race was fair. The Court held that 
the SAPS’ employment equity plan 
should not be mechanically and rigidly 
applied and that it should not constitute 
an absolute bar to the appointment 
of white candidates. The matter was 
then appealed and has been heard 
25  Solidarity obo Barnard v South African Police 
Service [2013] ZASCA 177; 2014 (2) SA 1 (SCA).
Other constitutional democracies that have experienced 
thriving phases of progressive public interest litigation have 
found that a backlash or conservative resistance often follows 
an initial period of successful public interest litigation.
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by the Constitutional Court. At the 
time of writing, the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court had not yet been 
handed down.
Solidarity has at least another nine cases 
pending against organs of state in similar 
circumstances. The Barnard case is part 
of a concerted effort by the union to get 
the state to implement the Employment 
Equity Act 55 of 1998 in a particular 
way.26 Solidarity’s General Secretary 
Dirk Hermann says:
If they appeal, it opens up a path for 
us to a constitutional judgement as 
well [...]. We have a battle to bring the 
public service back to the parameters of 
the Employment Equity Act. We believe 
that transformation must be within the 
parameters of the Constitution … [i]t’s a 
step to the future … it’s a protection of 
the [South African] Constitution.27
Though the union’s other cases are 
tailored to their own facts, it is clear 
that Solidarity views them as part of an 
attempt to determine:
[…] whether affirmative action in South 
Africa is reasonable or not [and as 
26  See for example: Affirmative action ‘on its head’: 
Solidarity, Times Live: 23 March 2011; Solidarity 
vs affirmative action – a war of attrition, Daily 
Maverick: 19 November 2010. 
27  Affirmative action ruling handed down, Mail & 
Guardian: 27 February 2010. 
a question of] whether the ideology 
of absolute representivity should be 
implemented at the expense of service 
delivery.28 
It has said that affirmative action in 
South Africa is “sick to the core” 29 and 
called for a national summit to discuss 
the issue, failing which a constitutional 
challenge would be considered.
The AfriForum v Julius 
Malema hate speech case
AfriForum is a civil society initiative of 
Solidarity. It is a non-profit advocacy 
body, and its stated purpose is to 
counter the withdrawal of minority 
racial groups from South African 
society. It aims to give minorities a voice
[…] in a society where minorities are 
increasingly being ignored.30
The organisation says that it campaigns:
[…] for the protection and 
consolidation of civil rights, as 
contained in the South African 
Constitution and international 
conventions.31 
28  Affirmative action ‘on its head’: Solidarity op.cit.
29  Solidarity vows to fight affirmative action in 




AfriForum approached the Equality 
Court and complained that Julius 
Malema, the then leader of the African 
National Congress (ANC) Youth 
League, had sung or chanted certain 
words at various public functions, 
translated as meaning ‘shoot the Boer/
farmer’ or ‘shoot the Boers/farmers, 
they are rapists/robbers’. AfriForum 
sought an order that these utterances 
constituted hate speech and an interdict 
preventing Malema from inciting 
hostility towards any ethnic group. It 
alleged that the words could reasonably 
be construed as demonstrating a clear 
intention to be hurtful or harmful to 
particular ethnic groups, as inciting and 
as promoting and propagating hatred.
The Transvaal Agricultural Union 
of South Africa (TAU-SA), whose 
primary objective is the protection of 
the property rights and safety of South 
African farmers, was granted leave to 
intervene as a complainant. The ANC 
intervened as a respondent.
During the course of the trial, there 
were discussions regarding a possible 
settlement. AfriForum withdrew the 
matter as against the ANC, but wished 
to proceed against Malema personally 
– possibly in an attempt to isolate him 
politically. 
Renate Barnard at Labour Court 
proceedings.
Photograph: Solidarity Media ©
18 Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Chapter 1 Changing trends in the South African public interest litigation environment
That this was part of AfriForum and 
TAU-SA’s litigation strategy appeared to 
be confirmed by the cross-examination 
of Malema, which was at times quite 
bizarre. Malema was cross-examined on 
numerous strange and irrelevant issues, 
including his attitude to communism 
and Leninism, the nationalisation of 
the mining industry and banks, land 
redistribution and compensation, the 
likelihood of Africa producing child 
soldiers, and the propensity of black 
people to become excitable and sing 
songs at political gatherings. The tone 
of the cross-examination also seemed 
to corroborate the supposition of a 
political isolation strategy on the part of 
AfriForum and TAU-SA. It frequently 
descended into petty squabbles – for 
example, an interchange between 
Malema and counsel for AfriForum 
about which of them was ‘playing to 
the gallery’, concluded by Malema’s 
masterful reference to counsel’s 
response to the application to open the 
hearing for television broadcast:
I never wanted the gallery in the first 
place. It is you who said to My Lord 
you want cameras to run before you 
give your speech. I never said that.32
In sum, AfriForum and TAU-SA’s 
strategy appeared to be to embarrass 
Malema, rather than to ventilate the 
issues arising from the cause of action. 
In the view of many of our respondents, 
however, this strategy backfired 
spectacularly. Instead of undermining 
Malema politically, the trial gave him 
a platform and allowed him to portray 
himself as the target of a racial vendetta. 
Malema was articulate and persuasive 
as a witness and able to give coherent 
voice to the historical and political 
32  Transcript of Proceedings in AfriForum v Malema, 
20 April 2011, page 1022, lines 9-12.
considerations underlying the singing 
of the song and its meaning and history. 
Crowds gathered outside the Equality 
Court, and members of the ANC 
and its Youth League gave speeches 
tapping into familiar anti-apartheid 
narratives of political resistance in 
the face of unjust legal persecution. 
Even after judgment was handed 
down against Malema, this did not 
appear to weaken him politically. On 
the contrary, the judgment provoked 
renewed criticism from members of the 
ANC and government that the courts 
are undemocratic, untransformed and 
dominated by a racist minority.
AfriForum’s decision to institute this 
litigation and the manner in which it 
was conducted was in many ways a 
strategic miscalculation. Rather than 
isolating or weakening Malema, it 
ensured his continued prominence 
in the media and allowed him to cast 
himself in the mode of successor 
to struggle stalwarts such as former 
President Nelson Mandela. The 
presence of prominent ANC activist 
Winnie Madikizela-Mandela by his 
side for the duration of the trial was 
the most obvious sign that this was the 
message the trial sent. Addressing a 
crowd of supporters after the hearing, 
she said:
We thank AfriForum for bringing us 
here to baptise our president, the 
future president of South Africa.33
The litigation also gave the song in 
question a prominence it had never had 
before and provided an incentive for its 
rebellious singing at political gatherings 
as a way of thumbing one’s nose at 
reactionaries, and indeed at the courts.
33  Cross-examination of ‘future president of SA’ 
ends, Mail & Guardian: 21 April 2011.
On the other hand, the litigation 
increased AfriForum’s prominence 
on the national political stage. During 
the 18 months in which the matter 
received major press coverage, the 
size of AfriForum’s donor base tripled. 
AfriForum also viewed the litigation 
as a way to put the issue on the agenda 
and to provide some leverage for 
government to take their complaints 
seriously.
On 12 September 2011, the Equality 
Court handed down judgment.34 The 
extent of its order was extremely wide-
ranging. The Court found that the song 
constituted hate speech and gave an 
order that appears to prohibit the use of 
the words and the singing of the song 
by any person in any circumstances 
whatsoever. Malema and the ANC were 
granted leave to appeal.
Shortly before the matter was due 
to proceed in the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, the parties reached a 
settlement. While the full rationale 
for the settlement is beyond the scope 
of this publication, it seems that the 
parties were at least partly influenced 
by the fact that the Supreme Court 
of Appeal itself appeared intent on 
avoiding the case. The judges concerned 
not only wrote to the parties asking 
expressly about settlement, but 
some also complained informally to 
colleagues or members of the Bar 
about the absence of such a settlement. 
This, in our experience, is effectively 
unprecedented.
The ultimate settlement, however, was 
an uneasy one and did not definitively 
resolve the issues concerned. On 
the one hand, the ANC and Malema 
34  Afri-Forum & Another v Malema & Others [2011] 
ZAEQC 2; 2011 (6) SA 240 (EqC).
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conceded that certain struggle 
songs may be hurtful to minority 
communities and agreed to ‘encourage’ 
supporters to act with restraint to 
avoid such hurt. On the other hand, 
AfriForum conceded that it was crucial 
to recognise and respect the rights of 
communities to celebrate and respect 
their cultural heritage. Nevertheless, 
despite the uneasy nature of the 
settlement, the issue has thus far not 
resurfaced.35 
The Agri South Africa case
Agri South Africa (Agri SA) is an 
agricultural union that promotes the 
interests of commercial farmers in 
South Africa. It approached the courts 
for an order that government’s efforts 
to create a new regime of mineral rights 
through the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 
(MPRDA) constituted an expropriation 
of property. If so, government would 
potentially be required to pay enormous 
sums in compensation to holders of old-
order mineral rights.36 Agri SA:
35  Malema was subsequently expelled from the 
ANC and formed his own opposition party, the 
Economic Freedom Fighters, which won a number 
of seats in Parliament in the May 2014 elections.
36  Witnesses for the state testified that the total 
amount of compensation could be as much as 
R90 billion, but the High Court dismissed this 
evidence as inaccurate. 
[…] instructed their attorneys […] to 
find a suitable test case and to obtain 
cession of the relevant right-holder’s 
right to compensation.37 
Agri SA obtained cession of the right 
to compensation for the purported 
expropriation of certain coal rights from 
a company and instituted an action 
claiming compensation from the state.
Before the passing of the MPRDA, 
the owner of land was also in principle 
the owner of the minerals beneath 
the surface of the land. In terms of 
common law and legislation, however, 
it was possible to separate mineral 
rights from ownership of the land. 
Immediately before the MPRDA came 
into force, holders of old-order mineral 
rights had numerous common-law 
rights, including the right to search 
for minerals, to sever such minerals 
if found, and the right of ownership 
of those minerals. These rights were 
transferable and could be sold or used 
as security. The holder was under no 
obligation to exploit the minerals.38
The MPRDA was enacted to make 
37  Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and 
Energy [2011] ZAGPPHC 62; 2012 (1) SA 171 
(GNP), paragraph 15. 
38  Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and 
Energy [2011] ZAGPPHC 62 op.cit., paragraph 29. 
provision for equitable access to 
and sustainable development of the 
country’s mineral resources. It was 
designed in part to address the fact that 
the holders of old-order mineral rights 
were almost all white. To address this 
unjust distribution of mineral wealth 
and ensure that such rights do not lie 
dormant, the MPRDA made the state 
the custodian of all mineral rights in 
the country. It gave the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy the power to 
grant prospecting and mining rights 
and fundamentally altered the previous 
regime of private law mineral rights.
The Pretoria High Court found that the 
MPRDA radically changed the nature 
of old-order rights and that it did away 
with some of those rights entirely.39 
It followed that the MPRDA had 
expropriated the mineral rights held by 
Agri SA. Despite the fact that the Act 
did not grant the rights taken from Agri 
SA to the state, it did extinguish those 
rights and gave the Minister the power 
to grant rights with substantially the 
same content. The Court found that it 
therefore constituted an expropriation, 
and that the state was required to pay 
Agri SA R750 000 in compensation.
39  Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and 
Energy [2011] ZAGPPHC 62 op.cit.
Winnie Madikizela-Mandela 
(left) and Julius Malema at 
‘hate speech’ court proceedings 
against Malema in April 2011.
Photograph: The Biggerpicture 
& Reuters ©
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This decision was then held by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal to be 
wrongly decided.40 In April 2013, the 
Constitutional Court agreed with 
the Supreme Court of Appeal that 
the High Court judgment had been 
incorrect.41 The Constitutional Court 
held that the MPRDA did not result 
in an expropriation (as opposed to a 
deprivation) of property. In doing so, 
the Constitutional Court stressed the 
objects of the MPRDA to facilitate 
equitable access to the mining industry, 
promote sustainable development of 
South Africa’s mineral and petroleum 
resources and advance the eradication 
of all forms of discriminatory practices 
in the mining sector. It also stressed 
that Section 25 (the property clause) 
in the Constitution should not be 
interpreted in a way that would threaten 
the possibility of maintaining a sensitive 
balance between existing private 
property rights and the pursuit of 
transformation, which the Section was 
designed to facilitate.
40  Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South 
Africa [2012] ZASCA 93; 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA).
41  Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and 
Energy [2013] ZACC 9; 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC).
Amicus interventions
Progressive public interest litigation 
litigants often have to contend with 
interventions by conservative interest 
groups. For example, the Justice 
Alliance of South Africa ( JASA) is 
a frequent participant in litigation. 
JASA is a coalition of corporations, 
individuals and churches
[…] fighting for justice and the highest 
moral standards in South African 
society.42 
It intervened in two recent matters in 
an effort to aid government to defeat 
constitutional challenges by progressive 
organisations.
The first was the Print Media case,43 
concerning a constitutional challenge 
to a statute giving extraordinarily wide 
censorship powers to a statutory board 
in respect of magazines. The second was 
the Teddy Bear Clinic case,44 concerning 
a constitutional challenge to a statute 
criminalising consensual sexual behaviour 
between children under the age of 16.
42 www.justicealliance.co.za. 
43  Print Media South Africa & Another v Minister of 
Home Affairs & Another [2012] ZACC 22; 2012 
(6) SA 443 (CC).
44  Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children & 
Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development & Another [2013] ZACC 35; 2014 
(2) SA 168 (CC).
Both JASA interventions were 
ultimately unsuccessful in that the 
Constitutional Court upheld both 
constitutional challenges. However, in 
the Teddy Bear Clinic case in particular, 
JASA’s intervention caused delays and 
required the organisations challenging 
the law to commit significant additional 
time and resources to combatting the 
argument and evidence adduced by 
JASA.
Concluding observations
It is clear that conservative 
organisations in South Africa 
increasingly view litigation as a viable 
means for advancing their political 
interests. AfriForum expressly styles 
itself as a civil rights movement, 
dedicated to protecting the interests of 
what it sees as a marginalised minority. 
It has adopted the rhetoric and 
techniques of public interest litigation 
and constitutional rights to pursue 
this agenda. AfriForum explicitly drew 
inspiration from the litigation strategy 
of the TAC (refer Chapter 2).
This development parallels what 
occurred in the US, where:
[…] the right has taken its cues from 
the left – constructing its own cultures 
of victimization and resistance and 
There is nothing necessarily progressive or egalitarian 
inherent in a culture of rights. Courts and the language 
of rights can be even more effective at preventing 
transformation than assisting it.
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deploying them both legally and 
politically.45 
There is nothing necessarily progressive 
or egalitarian inherent in a culture of 
rights. The US experience demonstrates 
that courts and the language of rights 
can be even more effective at preventing 
transformation than assisting it. The 
formalism of South Africa’s legal 
tradition and the incremental common 
law heritage of judges mean that courts 
are often also quite conservative. As 
Scheingold points out:
[…] rights have historically had more 
to do with the protection of property 
and privilege than their redistribution. 
Accordingly it should come as no 
surprise that rights can readily be 
inflected with non-egalitarian meaning 
– in both the legal and political 
arenas.46
We do not cavil at the right of 
conservative groups to exercise their 
rights of access to courts, or to enter 
cases as friends of the court. We simply 
note that a new front of public interest 
litigation is being opened and that 
progressive organisations need to be 
45  Stuart A Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: 
Lawyers, public policy, and political change, 2nd 
Edition, University of Michigan Press: 2004, page 
xxxiii.
46 Ibid. 
aware of this if they are to respond 
appropriately.
In this regard, it is notable that 
conservative organisations did not 
succeed in the Agri SA, Print Media 
or Teddy Bear Clinic cases. However, 
this was only because the progressive 
organisations involved in each case took 
the issue very seriously and actively 
sought to counter the approach of the 
conservative organisations. Thus, in 
the Agri SA case, CALS intervened as 
an amicus curiae in all three courts in 
support of the state. The other two cases 
saw the intervention of progressive 
organisations as amici curiae to support 
the progressive organisations already 
involved as the main litigants.
In our view, therefore, the following 
factors emerge from the above 
discussion for consideration by 
progressive public interest litigants:
•  Progressive organisations must be 
alert to the kinds of litigation being 
brought by conservative groups and 
must be ready to intervene as amici 
where appropriate. Where possible, 
it is essential that progressive 
organisations attempt to dissuade 
courts from making regressive 
rulings, or moderate the impact of 
such rulings.
•  Progressive organisations in 
these kinds of cases may find 
themselves in a more defensive 
posture than they are accustomed 
to. They may be required to defend 
legislation and policy in some 
cases. Particularly in light of the fact 
that the state often fails to defend 
legislation sufficiently by adducing 
proper evidence, it will sometimes 
be desirable for progressive 
organisations to lead evidence as 
amici.
•  Strategically, the above may help 
ease tensions with government 
because it means that the state 
and progressive civil society 
organisations will sometimes line 






Recent public statements by senior 
government officials indicate that 
some members of the executive 
perceive public interest litigation as 
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an obstacle to the legitimate aims 
of elected officials. For example, 
several senior ANC politicians have 
blamed unfavourable judgments on 
‘untransformed’ courts, and accused the 
judiciary of playing an oppositional role 
in South African politics.47
In April 2014, while sitting on the 
Judicial Service Commission ( JSC), 
a senior member of government thus 
commented that she found it :
[…] a bit disturbing [that candidates 
wanted to be appointed judges] while 
espousing very fervent human rights 
activist tendencies.48
Another senior member of government 
and of the JSC has argued that civil 
society and opposition parties have 
used litigation to constrain the exercise 
of power by Parliament and the 
executive.49
These public statements have been 
accompanied by public attacks on the 
bona fides of public interest litigants by 
47  See for example: Constitutional Court used as 
opposition to ANC govt: Mantashe, Times Live: 
18 August 2011; Malema takes aim at judiciary, 
Independent Online: 14 September 2011; 
What Mathole Motshekga really said – ANC, 
Politicsweb: 2 October 2011. 
48  Few Magistrates make the grade with JSC, 
Business Day: 10 April 2014.
49  THE BIG READ: ANC’s fatal concessions, Times 
Live: 1 September 2009.
the ANC. For example, the Office of 
the ANC Chief Whip said the following 
in a statement about the resignation 
of Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo, after 
a successful challenge by civil society 
groups to a provision allowing the 
President to extend the tenure of the 
Chief Justice:
It is, in our view, questionable whether 
the decision by the parties responsible 
to mount a [Constitutional Court] 
challenge was taken in good faith. No 
similar legal challenges were taken 
when the same process was followed 
previously regarding the extension of 
the terms of office for former Justices 
Arthur Chaskalson and Pius Langa.50
In June 2013, when faced with 
significant pressure from protests 
organised by the progressive 
organisation Equal Education (EE), the 
Minister of Basic Education responded 
with an extraordinary statement:
[…] to suddenly see a group of white 
adults organizing black African 
children with half-truths can only be 
opportunistic, patronizing and simply 
dishonest to say the least.51 
50  ANC Chief Whip’s office on Justice Ngcobo’s 
decision, www.anc.org.za: 28 July 2011.
51  Equal Education is disingenuous: Minister 
Motshekga, Statement issued by the Ministry of 
Basic Education: 18 June 2013.
In sum, there appears to be an increased 
degree of hostility on the part of 
government towards public interest 
litigation and progressive public interest 
organisations. This is a very serious 
concern. Public interest litigation is only 
effective when court orders obtained 
are properly implemented, and in most 
cases this requires implementation by 
government respondents. The increased 
degree of hostility by government 
towards public interest litigation means 
an increased risk of non-compliance 
or, potentially even worse, ‘malicious 
compliance’ – that is, deliberately 
complying with court orders to the 
minimum extent possible and in a 
manner that prevents the true purpose of 
a court order being achieved.52
For public interest litigation to be as 
effective as possible, the attitude of 
government should thus be taken into 
account in the conception and execution 
of cases, and public interest litigants may 
wish to consider the following:
•  There may be non-legal reasons 
to run or decide not to run a case. 
Public interest litigants have limited 
political capital, and difficult 
52  Comment by Mark Heywood at the 4th Public 
Interest Law Gathering, held at the Wits School of 
Law, 23 July 2014.
Recent public statements by senior government officials 
indicate that some members of the executive perceive 
public interest litigation as an obstacle to the legitimate 
aims of elected officials.
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decisions may need to be made 
about which cases that capital should 
be expended on.
•  Given the increasing pressure put on 
the courts by government, it is always 
desirable to give the court as much 
political cover as possible in the 
conceptualisation and presentation 
of a case. This is an additional 
pragmatic consideration in favour 
of seeking narrow rather than broad 
relief, and proceeding incrementally 
where possible.
•  Where possible, it is preferable 
to attempt proactively to engage 
government outside court – for 
example, through negotiations and 
input into legislative processes.
•  In crafting the relief sought, account 
must be taken of the likely response 
by the relevant government 
respondent, and of how the relief 
can anticipate and prevent non-
compliance or malicious compliance. 
This is dealt with in greater detail in 
the case study on litigation on the 
right to basic education in Chapter 2.
Conclusion
The overriding lesson of the new 
developments in the arena of public 
interest litigation presented in this 
chapter is the importance of realising 
that South Africa cannot avoid a dispute 
over the meaning of its Constitution. 
This is a public fight for legitimacy.
In this debate, progressive forces have 
enjoyed the ascendancy since the advent 
of democracy. We have a progressive 
Constitution, which has been guarded 
by a largely progressive Constitutional 
Court, the legitimacy of which has not 
yet been seriously questioned.
Yet, to many of our respondents it 
appears that the pendulum has begun 
to swing in the other direction. In 
addition to trying to win their cases, 
progressive public interest litigators now 
need to litigate with a view to winning 
hearts and minds. They cannot allow 
public interest litigation to be portrayed 
as a narrow, elitist domain of power, 
the primary purpose of which is to 
‘subvert democracy’. It is important that 
progressive public interest litigation be 
widely understood for what it is, namely 
a mechanism for holding power to 
account in the interests of the powerless. 
Even more than before, progressive 
organisations need to realise that 
perceptions matter. The racial 
composition of organisations and 
their attitudes matter. The tone of 
engagement with government matters, 
as does the language used in affidavits 
and arguments presented to the courts. 
And more than ever, we must realise 
that litigation is just one part of a 
broader social change strategy that 
needs to be allied with broad-based 
political activism.
The manner of doing so has been 
demonstrated particularly well by 
EE and the LRC in their litigation 
regarding binding minimum norms 
and standards for school infrastructure. 
We deal with this litigation in much 
more detail in Chapter 2. For present 
purposes, we emphasise that EE and 
the LRC were at pains to ensure that 
the case was not only fought in court 
but also covered extensively and very 
positively in traditional media and 
on social media. In particular, the 
video Build the Future made by EE is 
a powerful and compelling example 
of the approach that can be taken 
and is essential viewing for anyone 
considering such a campaign.53 Indeed, 
the Minister of Basic Educations’s 
somewhat extraordinary statement 
53  Available on YouTube. Other EE videos that merit 
viewing are: #FixOurSchools: Norms & Standards 
for School Infrastructure Now! (also on YouTube); 
and Equal Education’s Campaign to Build the 
Future (available at www.atlanticphilanthropies.
org).
Indwe Advice Office in the 
Eastern Cape.
Photograph: National Alliance 
for the Development of 
Community Advice Offices ©
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referred to above can likely best be 
understood as an attempt to avoid the 
considerable build-up of pressure on 
the Minister that the campaign had 
produced.
In closing, the sustainability of what 
Charles Epp has called a ‘rights 
revolution’ depends on securing 
legitimacy beyond an elite group of 
legal practitioners:
The continuation of nascent rights 
revolutions beyond their initial 
phases has also depended on broad 
support outside the judiciary. In each 
of the countries in this study, the 
judicial rights agenda has grown in a 
sustained way only to the extent that 
it has been supported by continued, 
organized efforts in civil society. 
And those efforts, centred in rights-
advocacy organizations, government-
provided legal aid, and the racial 
and sexual diversification of the legal 
profession, have been strong only to 
the extent that they have reflected 
either collective support or broad 
undercurrents of democratization.54 
54 Epp op.cit., pages 199-200.
This implies that it is not enough for 
progressive groups only to succeed in 
litigation. They also have to become 
better at education, at public relations 
and at making their arguments 
accessible and compelling.
Residents from the Khutsong township on Gauteng’s West Rand 
demonstrate outside the Constitutional Court in September 
2007 against government’s re-zoning of their community into 
the much poorer North West province.
Photograph: Antonio Muchave ©
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T
he first three of these case 
studies were dealt with in the 
2008 report, though we have 
supplemented some of the observations 
made there. The case studies concern 
three of the most significant pieces of 
public interest litigation during the 
period 1994-2008. They are: 
•  the National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) case on 
the criminalisation of sodomy and 
subsequent litigation concerning 
gay and lesbian rights;
•  the Grootboom case on the right to 
housing; and 
•  the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) case on prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV.
The next three case studies that we have 
chosen involved litigation on socio-
economic rights in, as yet, untested 
areas – water, electricity and sanitation.  
Moreover, each of these cases resulted 
in a decision by the Constitutional 
Court handed down within a short 
period – October to November 2009. 
They are:
•  the Mazibuko case on access to 
water;
•  the Joseph case on access to 
electricity; and
•  the Nokotyana case on sanitation.
As we explain below, despite being 
decided by a single court within a very 
short period of time, these cases had 
sharply divergent outcomes. A study 
of their comparative approaches and 
results is thus all the more valuable.
Lastly, our seventh case study 
concerns litigation on the right to 
basic education. At the time of the 
2008 report, there had been very 
little noteworthy litigation in South 
Africa regarding this right, despite 
the significant inadequacies regarding 
the provision of basic education that 
have existed for many years. Since 
then, however, there have been a 
large number of public interest basic 
education cases at High Court level. 
Four of the key pieces of litigation in 
this area are considered collectively in 
our seventh case study.
Case studies of South African 
public interest litigation
We have considered a very large number of examples of South African 
public interest litigation in reaching our conclusions set out in the 
following chapters. We refer to a number of these cases in due course.
Nevertheless, the conclusions that follow are particularly well 
illustrated by seven specific case studies. We have deliberately chosen 
case studies that cover public interest litigation in seven different 
substantive areas: gay and lesbian rights, housing, health care, water, 
electricity, sanitation and education.
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Perhaps the most ambitious and 
extensive public interest litigation 
programme embarked on by a 
particular interest group in South Africa 




Initially, the litigation was undertaken 
by the NCGLE, an umbrella body that 
included among its members more 
than 70 organisations and associations 
representing lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT) people in South 
Africa. Later, litigation was undertaken 
by gay and lesbian individuals, as well 
as by successor organisations to the 
Coalition such as the Lesbian and Gay 
Equality Project (LGEP).
The scale of this litigation was 
unparalleled. In the period 1994-2007, 
no fewer than seven separate matters 
on gay and lesbian issues reached the 
Constitutional Court on issues ranging 
from adoption to same-sex marriage. 
Notably, not only did every case result 
in victory for those seeking to enforce 
gay and lesbian rights, but all seven 
judgments were also unanimous on the 
merits. The single dissenting judgment 
issued related to what constituted an 
appropriate remedy – not to the merits.
With the benefit of hindsight, these 
results may appear obvious and 
predictable given that Section 9(3) 
of South Africa’s Constitution, unlike 
virtually all other Constitutions, 
expressly outlaws unfair discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation. 
However, in truth, the successes 
attained in this area and the now 
seeming inevitability of the cases 
can directly be attributed to the 
extraordinarily careful strategy adopted 
by gay and lesbian groups in South 
Africa.
The starting point, of course, was 
persuading the drafters of the 
Constitution to include a constitutional 
prohibition on unfair discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation. Such 
inclusion was by no means inevitable, 
given the lack of equivalent protection 
in most other jurisdictions and the 
variety of issues vying for attention 
during the constitutional drafting 
process.
The gay and lesbian rights cases make 
clear that the successes of litigation 
in this sector depended substantially 
on the mobilisation and advocacy 
strategies adopted by gays and lesbians 
from the outset – that is, at the stage 
of constitutional development. This 
included political pressure brought to 
bear by ANC members belonging to 
the LGBT community or sympathetic 
to the gay and lesbian cause, and 
Participant in Pride celebrations, 
Johannesburg 2007.
Photograph: Nadine Hutton ©
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creating public awareness as well as a 
substantial academic discourse around 
gay and lesbian issues. These strategies 
meant that when litigation began, those 
involved did not need to rely on skilful 
legal arguments or litigation strategies 
to persuade the Constitutional Court 
to locate such rights under the rubric 
of privacy, liberty or dignity, as in other 
jurisdictions. Rather, the rights were set 
out in express terms in the Constitution 
as a result of the political victory 
that had been achieved during the 
constitutional development process.
The sodomy case
Following this political victory, the first 
public interest case on gay and lesbian 
issues was brought by the NCGLE in 
1998. This was the case of National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
v Minister of Justice,55 in which the 
Constitutional Court confirmed the 
High Court’s decision to declare 
unconstitutional statutory and common 
law criminal prohibitions on sodomy.
The fact that the sodomy case was the 
opening chapter of South African public 
interest litigation on gay and lesbian 
55  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
& Another v Minister of Justice & Others [1998] 
ZACC 15; 1999 (1) SA 6.
issues was not accidental.
The criminal law prohibiting sodomy 
was regarded by many as a great affront 
to the dignity of gays and lesbians and 
was plainly a vestige of apartheid-era 
attitudes towards them. It was thus a 
case that would manifestly provoke 
massive support not only in the gay and 
lesbian community, but also among 
liberal judges and liberal members of 
the public.
Moreover, there were clear 
precedents in foreign jurisdictions 
for court decisions striking down 
the criminalisation of sodomy – for 
example, Dudgeon v United Kingdom56 
and Norris v Republic of Ireland.57
Thus, while it was clear that the case still 
presented its difficulties – compounded 
by the fact that the Minister of Justice 
initially chose to oppose the order of 
invalidity sought – it was nevertheless 
the clearest gay and lesbian issue on 
which litigation could take place, 
and one that was likely to inspire the 
members of the Constitutional Court 
to set forth in detail the legal position 
regarding gays and lesbians and the 
need for them not to be unfairly 
56 (1982) 4 EHRR 149.
57 (1991) 13 EHRR 186.
discriminated against. It was for these 
reasons that the NCGLE chose this as 
its first case.
While the choice of the issue was 
plainly correct, and while the prospects 
of success were very good, one must 
not overlook the fact that a series of 
strategic decisions had to be made 
regarding how to structure the case.
Firstly, the NCGLE had to decide 
whether to challenge the law in a 
proactive and abstract fashion, as 
opposed to in a defensive fashion when 
someone was charged with sodomy.  
In general, a proactive and abstract 
constitutional challenge can raise 
significant complications. Indeed, 
the Constitutional Court recently (in 
Savoi v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions58) reaffirmed that this is 
the case, holding that while an abstract 
challenge is permissible:
[t]his does not […] make it irrelevant 
that this challenge is brought in 
the abstract. Courts generally treat 
abstract challenges with disfavour. 
And rightly so. […] Abstract challenges 
ask courts to peer into the future, and 
58  Savoi & Others v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions & Another [2014] ZACC 5; 2014 (1) 
SACR 545 (CC).
Perhaps the most ambitious and extensive public 
interest litigation programme embarked on by a 
particular interest group in South Africa post-1994 is that 
undertaken by gay and lesbian groups.
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in doing so they stretch the limits of 
judicial competence. For that reason, 
the applicants in this case bear a 
heavy burden – that of showing that 
the provisions they seek to impugn are 
constitutionally unsound merely on 
their face.59
Nevertheless, the NCGLE ultimately 
decided that it could not justifiably 
refuse to bring a challenge until 
someone was charged. It considered 
that the effects and stigma created by 
criminalisation were so severe that 
the challenge had to be brought on a 
proactive, abstract basis.
Moreover, bringing the challenge in 
this way would allow the NCGLE 
a far greater degree of control 
over the litigation, its timing and 
characterisation than would have been 
the case with regard to a defensive 
challenge.
The NCGLE was presumably also 
influenced by the obvious strength of 
the merits of the case, and the fact that 
both the Dudgeon and Norris decisions 
mentioned above had been brought 
successfully in a largely abstract fashion. 
Secondly, a related question was 
59  Savoi & Others v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions & Another op.cit., paragraph 13.
whether it was necessary or appropriate 
for there to be an individual gay or 
lesbian person as an applicant, who 
would have to go on oath and say that 
he or she had committed an offence. 
The NCGLE took the view that in light 
of the broad standing provisions in 
South Africa’s Constitution (an issue 
dealt with in Chapter 5) this was not 
necessary.
Thirdly, another issue that arose was 
whether the constitutional challenge 
should be confined to the rights to 
dignity and equality, or whether the 
right to privacy should also be invoked. 
This was a matter of some controversy 
as there were concerns that relying 
on the right to privacy might send the 
wrong signal. As explained in 1992 by 
later Justice Edwin Cameron (then 
a leading public interest lawyer and 
openly gay man):
[T]he privacy argument has 
detrimental effects on the search 
for a society which is truly non-
stigmatizing as far as sexual 
orientation is concerned. On the one 
hand, the privacy argument suggests 
that discrimination against gays and 
lesbians is confined to prohibiting 
conduct between adults in the privacy 
of the bedroom. This is manifestly not 
so. On the other hand, the privacy 
argument may subtly reinforce the 
idea that homosexual intimacy is 
shameful or improper: that it is 
tolerable so long as it is confined to 
the bedroom – but that its implications 
cannot be countenanced outside. 
Privacy as a rationale for constitutional 
protection therefore goes insufficiently 
far, and has appreciable drawbacks 
even on its own terms.60
In the end, the NCGLE decided to 
pursue the privacy argument as well as 
the equality and dignity arguments. It 
did so because the Dudgeon and Norris 
cases provided strong support for a 
finding of unconstitutionality on the 
basis of the privacy argument, and that 
it would therefore be unwise to jettison 
this argument. However, the NCGLE 
specifically drew the attention of the 
Constitutional Court to the concerns of 
Cameron set out above – meaning that 
the privacy argument was unlikely to be 
the sole basis for the judgment.
In a comprehensive and extensive 
judgment, the Constitutional Court 
unanimously struck down a series of 
60  Edwin Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the 
Constitution: A Test Case for Human Rights, in 
South African Law Journal, Vol. 110: 1993, page 
455.
Former Minister of Justice 
Dullah Omar opposed the 
decriminalisation of sodomy, 
forcing the National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality to 
go to the Constitutional Court.
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criminal prohibitions contained in 
statutory and common law regarding 
the crime of sodomy. Moreover, it did 
so in ringing tones, condemning the 
manner in which gays and lesbians had 
been treated in South Africa, stressing 
their consequent vulnerability and 
the need for the law to protect them, 
and exhorting equal treatment for all, 
irrespective of sexual orientation.
One can only imagine how different 
the situation may have been had the 
first gay and lesbian public interest 
case concerned, for example, same-sex 
marriage.
This was not a remote prospect. At 
roughly the same time as the sodomy 
challenge was being launched, a foreign 
gay couple approached a leading 
South African human rights advocate 
and asked him to represent them in 
challenging the provisions of the law 
that prevented gay couples from getting 
married. The advocate indicated his 
concerns about bringing such a case at 
that time and also doing so on the basis 
of the wishes of a foreign couple, rather 
than a South African couple (which 
may have been more attractive to the 
court). He duly referred the couple to 
the NCGLE.
The NCGLE in turn explained to the 
couple that it had a careful and co-
ordinated litigation strategy to achieve 
gay and lesbian equality steadily, but 
incrementally. The intention was 
to begin with victories that were 
easier to obtain and leaving more 
controversial and difficult issues, 
such as gay marriage, for later. The 
NCGLE explained that a defeat on 
the marriage case could have negative 
repercussions for a whole range of other 
gay and lesbian issues. The foreign 
couple recognised the value of this 
approach and, most critically, did not 
seek to undermine or second-guess 
the legitimacy of the Coalition. They 
therefore opted not to bring their 
application.
This demonstrates how fundamental 
it is that public interest organisations 
command sufficient legitimacy in the 
area in which they operate. Had there 
been no organisation equivalent to the 
NCGLE, or had the Coalition lacked 
sufficient legitimacy to persuade the 
couple to withdraw their case, the 
couple may well have proceeded to 
bring the same-sex marriage case at 
a time when, in our view, it may have 
faced real difficulties.
Indeed, at that stage, there were 
virtually no court decisions anywhere 
in the world suggesting that a refusal 
to allow a same-sex marriage violated 
the right to equality, and while it is 
possible that the application would 
have succeeded in any event, the issue is 
open to some considerable doubt.
Instead, the NCGLE was able to 
proceed with its sodomy case and 
obtain the emphatic judgment to which 
we have already referred. This led to a 
series of cases brought by the NCGLE, 
or by gay and lesbian individuals.
Subsequent cases
The next case brought by the NCGLE 
was National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home 
Affairs.61
This case concerned provisions in 
South African immigration laws which 
only allowed husbands or wives of 
South African residents to obtain rights 
to immigrate to South Africa. Thus, 
the legislation excluded same-sex life 
partners of South African citizens from 
obtaining the same benefits.
The case was a significant advancement 
61  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Home Affairs [1999] ZACC 17; 2000 
(2) SA 1 (CC).
The gay and lesbian litigation demonstrates how 
fundamental it is that public interest organisations 
command sufficient legitimacy in the area in which 
they operate.
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on the sodomy case. It went beyond 
establishing that gays and lesbians 
could not be criminally condemned 
for their actions. It was the first step in 
establishing that same-sex life partners 
ought to be afforded equivalent benefits 
to those granted to married heterosexual 
couples.
However, on the back of the sodomy 
judgment, the case proved relatively 
straightforward. Indeed, the government 
of the day, having opposed the matter 
in the High Court, withdrew a few days 
before the hearing in the Constitutional 
Court, meaning that there was no 
opposition to the order sought.
Again, the Constitutional Court 
had little hesitation in unanimously 
declaring that the law was invalid and, 
crucially for future cases, resolved the 
statutory difficulty itself by adopting a 
remedy of reading the words ‘or same-
sex life partner’ into the legislation 
after the word ‘spouse’. This was to have 
significant effects in the future.
In the years after the immigration 
decision, three cases were brought by 
gay and lesbian individuals seeking to 
achieve equality in specific areas. All 
were successful.
In Satchwell v President of the Republic 
of South Africa,62 a lesbian High Court 
judge challenged the constitutional 
validity of statutes and regulations 
which stated that only judges’ spouses 
could obtain a series of pension and 
other benefits from the state, thereby 
excluding life partners of gay and 
lesbian judges from these benefits. The 
Constitutional Court struck down 
the relevant provisions and read in 
the words ‘or same-sex life partner’ 
to remedy the defect and to provide 
immediate relief to affected gays and 
lesbians.
In Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development,63 another 
lesbian High Court judge and her 
partner successfully challenged the 
statutory prohibition on gay and lesbian 
couples jointly adopting children. Up 
to that point, gays and lesbians could 
adopt, but only individually, never 
as a couple. Notwithstanding the 
emotions sometimes raised by the issue 
of gay adoption, government did not 
pursue any objection to the case and 
a unanimous judgment was delivered 
declaring the statute invalid and 
62  Satchwell v President of the Republic of South 
Africa [2003] ZACC 2; 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC).
63   Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population 
Development [2002] ZACC 20; 2003 (2) SA 198 
(CC).
rectifying it in the same way as in the 
immigration case.
In J & Another v Director-General, 
Department of Home Affairs,64 a 
lesbian couple undergoing artificial 
insemination challenged legislation 
that did not provide for registration 
of persons in permanent same-sex life 
partnerships as parents of children 
conceived. The Constitutional Court 
unanimously declared the legislation 
unconstitutional and remedied it in the 
same manner as previously.
Same-sex marriage 
cases
In light of all of these victories, it 
rapidly became clear that the principal 
issue on which legal finality had not 
yet been obtained was the question of 
gay marriage. It should be noted that 
not all members of the gay and lesbian 
community felt that the achievement 
of gay marriage was necessarily 
desirable and certainly not the ultimate 
prize. However, for many people, it 
represented a vital step.
Crucially, from a litigation strategy 
64  J & Another v Director-General, Department of 
Home Affairs [2003] ZACC 3; 2003 (5) SA 621 
(CC).
Judge Kathy Satchwell (left) with 
her partner Lesley Carnelley.
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perspective, there was growing 
recognition by Constitutional Court 
judges – developed over the course of 
the various decisions and sometimes 
even manifested in comments from the 
bench – that a major difficulty arose 
from the state’s failure to deal with gay 
and lesbian relationships holistically, or 
to allow them the same general benefits 
as accrued to married heterosexual 
couples. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal had gone so far in Du Plessis 
v Road Accident Fund65 as to develop 
the common law of delict by extending 
the spouse’s action for loss of support 
to partners in permanent same-sex 
relationships.
Initially, however, it was not the 
NCGLE or its successor organisations 
that took the first move in challenging 
the prohibition on same-sex marriages. 
This was instead done by an individual 
lesbian couple in the case of Fourie v 
Minister of Home Affairs.66  
In its original form, this case was 
not without its difficulties. Indeed, 
it initially failed in the High Court, 
with the judge concluding that the 
65  Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund [2003] ZASCA 
86; 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA).
66  Fourie & Another v Minister of Home Affairs 
& Others [2004] ZASCA 132; 2005 (3) SA 429 
(SCA).
applicants’ case was doomed because 
they had only attacked the common law 
definition of marriage (which excluded 
gay and lesbian partners) and not the 
Marriage Act 25 of 1961, which would, 
in any event, prevent gays and lesbians 
from getting married.
Whatever the correctness of the 
High Court’s view on this issue, its 
judgment demonstrated the difficulty 
of such a complex case being launched 
by individuals rather than by an 
organisation such as the NCGLE, 
which had great experience in litigating 
these kinds of matters and access to the 
top constitutional lawyers.
Nevertheless, on appeal, the case 
gave rise to a Supreme Court of 
Appeal judgment holding that the 
common law definition of marriage as 
excluding gay and lesbian partners was 
unconstitutional.
However, while government may 
have acquiesced in findings of 
unconstitutionality in other gay and 
lesbian cases, it was not prepared to let 
this matter rest. Instead, it mounted a 
substantial appeal to the Constitutional 
Court seeking to have the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
overturned.
By that stage, however, the LGEP 
(effectively a successor to the NCGLE) 
had marshalled its resources and had 
launched a separate application in 
the High Court seeking to attack the 
relevant provisions of the Marriage 
Act. This timely intervention meant 
that the issue could be dealt with as a 
whole in the Constitutional Court and 
avoided the technical difficulties that 
had bedevilled the Fourie applicants 
in the High Court. It also meant that 
the Constitutional Court was not faced 
merely with individuals who were 
complaining about their desire to marry, 
but also with a credible organisation 
demonstrating that this was a widely 
held view among gays and lesbians.
Ultimately, despite the vigorous 
government appeal and the intervention 
by a number of Christian groups 
opposed to same-sex marriage, the 
Constitutional Court held unanimously 
in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie67 
that it was unconstitutional for 
common law and for legislation to 
prohibit same-sex marriage. The only 
dissent related to the appropriate 
remedy, with one judge suggesting that 
the declaration of invalidity should take 
67  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie [2005] ZACC 
19; 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC).
From a litigation strategy perspective, there was growing 
recognition by Constitutional Court judges that a major 
difficulty arose from the state’s failure to deal with gay 
and lesbian relationships holistically.
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effect immediately, while other judges 
suggested that it should take place over 
a longer term to allow Parliament to 
correct the defect itself.
That all 10 sitting judges of the 
Constitutional Court (including some 
who could legitimately be described 
as relatively conservative) were able 
to reach a unanimous decision is 
remarkable. In our view, this must be 
attributed to a significant degree to the 
careful litigation strategy embarked 
on by the NCGLE over the preceding 
eight years. This strategy succeeded in 
establishing and entrenching principles 
regarding the need for equal treatment 
of gays and lesbians in all contexts so 
emphatically that it made it virtually 
impossible for the Constitutional Court 
to do anything else but follow through 
to the logical conclusion that allowing 
for same-sex marriage (in one form or 
another) was necessary.
What remained was to lobby Parliament 
to persuade it to amend the law to 
allow gay marriage as required by the 
Constitutional Court order within 12 
months.
This, however, turned out to be a 
difficult process. Public hearings held 
on proposed legislation produced 
vigorous public dissent on the issue, 
and some members of Parliament were 
apparently deeply uncomfortable with 
the suggestion that gay marriage should 
be allowed.
Nevertheless, armed with the powerful 
Constitutional Court precedent and the 
threat that at the end of the 12-month 
period, the Court’s order of invalidity 
would come into effect, the Civil Union 
Act 17 of 2006 was passed, giving gays 
and lesbians the right to obtain virtually 
all the benefits of marriage without 
actually calling a gay or lesbian union a 
‘marriage’.
The Act is certainly not perfect and 
some members of the gay and lesbian 
community have significant objections 
to it. What cannot be doubted, however, 
is that it represents a massive advance 
on many countries in the world in that 
the Act confers virtually all the benefits    
of marriage on same-sex couples.68
68  In an additional case, Gory v Kolver NO & 
Others [2006] ZACC 20; 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC), 
the Constitutional Court upheld another victory 
for gay and lesbian litigants. It held that it was 
unconstitutional for the inheritance laws of 
South Africa to confer inheritance benefits on 
heterosexual spouses, but not on same-sex life 
partners. 
Lessons
In our view, the litigation of the 
NCGLE, its successors and individual 
gays and lesbians provides a virtual 
blueprint regarding successful public 
interest litigation in terms of achieving 
legal change. When (in Chapter 4) we 
set out the seven factors that we believe 
to be critical in maximising the prospect 
of public interest litigation succeeding 
and achieving social change, practically 
all of them were present in this 
campaign. They include particularly:
•  the presence of a well-organised 
litigant who was a repeat player in 
constitutional litigation;
•  an overall long-term strategy to 
achieve a goal step by step; 
•  an organisation that not only 
co-ordinated litigation around 
these issues, but generally had the 
legitimacy to ensure that the correct 
cases were brought at the right time; 
and
•  an impeccable sense of timing.
However, the very same example also 
demonstrates that even the best planned 
and executed litigation which succeeds 
in achieving legal change may have far 
more limited effects in terms of social 
change.
Demonstration in favour of gay 
marriage in 2006.
Photograph: Nadine Hutton ©
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On the one hand, the social change 
resulting from the litigation in this 
area is obvious. Gays and lesbians have 
experienced massive tangible benefits 
– they can have sex lawfully, they have 
immigration rights, can adopt children, 
derive pension and inheritance benefits, 
and they can enter into civil unions.
On the other hand, there remains 
a massive gulf between this legal 
recognition and the attitude of many 
ordinary South Africans. As one of 
our respondents in the gay and lesbian 
sector explained:
Litigation strategies must be coupled 
with community-based activism and 
popularisation of legal advocacy 
to allow a deepening of public 
engagement with the issue of socio-
economic rights. Rights are not only 
won through the courts, for they are 
only as lasting and meaningful as the 
extent to which they can be accessed. 
In our sector, an over-reliance on legal 
means to facilitate social change has 
meant that we now have a large gap 
between the policy and the personal 
reality on a range of rights issues.
The respondent emphasised this point 
repeatedly throughout the engagement 
with us:
A growing gap exists between our 
Constitution, our law and public 
opinion [...] The translation of techno-
legal argument into a colloquial 
argument should be a strategy that 
forms part of any litigation aimed at 
facilitating social change […] The law 
may well create a vehicle for change 
and expand the parameters for such 
change, but the nature and extent 
of transformation will be driven by 
the people and communities that 
are impacted by litigation efforts. 
Also, access to social justice will 
be facilitated by public processes 
and expanded services, not by 
legislative change alone. The power 
of administrative bureaucracies needs 
also to be taken on as part of the 
advocacy strategy to affect impact as 
a result of litigation. In many respects, 
the law is ahead of the populous and 
so the weightiness and legitimacy of 
political leadership and the legislature 
are critical in transformation that is 
meaningful and sustainable.
The gay and lesbian litigation examples 
thus demonstrate a key issue dealt with 
in this publication: Even where legal 
victories result in legal change and 
tangible benefits for those concerned, 
they do not necessarily achieve 
sufficient social change if they are not 
done in conjunction with additional 
social mobilisation and advocacy 
strategies.
This is demonstrated partly by the 
process around the Civil Union 
Act. If there had been greater public 
support for gay marriage at the time 
the legislation was being debated, it 
may have been possible to persuade 
Parliament to simply amend the 
Marriage Act to allow gays and lesbians 
to marry under that Act, rather than 
creating the separate Civil Union Act. 
Moreover, there would have been far 
less pressure to allow civil servants the 
right to refuse to perform civil union 
ceremonies on ‘conscientious objection 
grounds’, something that made its way 
into the Civil Union Act and which is of 
concern to many in the gay and lesbian 
community.
In the years following the 2008 report, 
none of the legal victories in this area 
have been overturned or retarded. 
However, very regrettably, the situation 
on the ground has not improved 
and, if anything, appears to have 
worsened. This has been compounded 
by significant structural and funding 
challenges facing organisations 




case on the 
right to housing
Our second case study – the 
Grootboom case – is perhaps the best 
known of South Africa’s cases on socio-
economic rights.69
In some ways, the Grootboom case 
could not present a greater contrast 
with the gay and lesbian litigation 
discussed above. While the gay and 
lesbian litigation took place on the basis 
of a carefully formulated strategy over 
eight years and through multiple cases, 
the Grootboom litigation was a single 
case brought under circumstances of 
great urgency to deal with people in a 
truly desperate situation.
Though the basic facts of the case and 
the legal principles enunciated are 
relatively well known, there has been 
little or no assessment of the underlying 
facts and circumstances that led to the 
litigation. Indeed, even the outcomes 
69  This section draws substantially on Steven 
Budlender’s unpublished 2004 LL.M. paper at 
the New York University School of Law, Giving 
Meaning to the Right to Housing: The Grootboom 
Litigation in South Africa. This paper was based 
on personal interviews conducted in August 2000 
by Dr Elsa van Huyssteen and Steven Budlender 
with community members, lawyers and other 
role-players in the Grootboom case.  
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of Grootboom have generally been 
insufficiently considered. 
It is necessary to sketch these facts, 
circumstances and outcomes properly 
in order to place the Grootboom 
litigation in accurate perspective and 
adequately draw lessons from it. This 
is particularly so given that (as noted 
earlier) our brief made it explicitly 
clear that one of the issues Atlantic 
sought our input on was the reasons 
for the difference in outcome in the 
Grootboom and TAC cases.
Background
The Grootboom case arose in 1998 in 
the Wallacedene area in Cape Town, 
where approximately 4 000 residents 
lived, almost all of them in informal 
housing/shacks and in appalling 
conditions. More than a quarter of the 
residents had no income at all, and 
more than two-thirds earned less than 
R500 a month. There was no water, 
sewage or refuse removal and only 5% 
of the shacks had electricity. Most of the 
shacks were extremely small.
In September 1998, heavy winter 
rainfall had left part of the Wallacedene 
area waterlogged. In one part of the 
area, there was a foot of water in the 
shacks, causing repeated illnesses and a 
general worsening of the already terrible 
conditions. This part was known as 
Mooi Trap (‘step carefully’) because of 
all the water. Given a housing waiting 
list of at least seven years, the residents 
faced the prospect of remaining in 
intolerable conditions for an indefinite 
period. As a result, some of the 
residents of Mooi Trap moved out of 
Wallacedene and erected their shacks 
on vacant, privately owned land nearby 
– land that had been earmarked for low-
cost housing. They claimed that they 
did not know that the land was privately 
owned and that they only became aware 
of this when the first eviction order 
was served on them. The total of 390 
adults and 510 children who ultimately 
moved to this land named it New Rust 
(‘new rest’). These 900 people were 
to become known as the Grootboom 
community.
The owner of the land responded 
by instituting eviction proceedings 
against the Grootboom community. 
An eviction order was granted on 8 
December 1998 in the local Magistrate’s 
Court. The Grootboom community 
did not have a lawyer and was not 
represented at the hearing. They were 
given a date by which they had to 
leave the land, but did not do so. They 
maintained that they had nowhere to 
go as the space they had previously 
occupied in Wallacedene had now been 
occupied by other people.
No eviction took place, apparently 
due to the landowner’s lack of funds, 
but in March 1999, he once again 
took the community to court to have 
them evicted. This time, the presiding 
Magistrate engaged in an unusual move 
by phoning a local attorney whom he 
knew – Julian Apollos – and asked him 
to represent the community.  
The community’s 
response to the 
eviction proceedings
With the community now having 
a lawyer, there was a need for an 
important strategic decision. What 
would the community’s response to the 
eviction proceedings be? They could 
oppose the eviction and argue that the 
requirements of the governing statute 
– the Prevention of Illegal Evictions 
Act 19 of 1998 – had not been met. 
They could launch proceedings against 
the local municipality (Oostenberg) 
or other levels of government, arguing 
Irene Grootboom.
Photograph: Ambrose Peters ©
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that their constitutional rights were not 
being upheld. They chose to do neither. 
Instead, they entered into an agreement 
that they would vacate the land by 
19 May 1999. The agreement also 
provided that there would be mediation 
between the community and the 
Oostenberg Municipality, and that the 
Municipality would conduct a study in 
an attempt to identify other land that the 
community could occupy temporarily or 
permanently.
This decision is intriguing and warrants 
close attention. There were two main 
reasons for the decision.
Firstly, Julian Apollos apparently took 
the view that there were no legal grounds 
to object to the eviction. However, it 
seems that this assessment may well 
have been incorrect. The Constitutional 
Court, in its later judgment, stated that: 
[…] nor is it clear whether the eviction 
was in accordance with the provisions 
of the Prevention of Illegal Evictions 
Act.70 
In retrospect, there was at least an 
arguable case that this Act meant 
that the community could not be 
70  Government of the Republic of South Africa & 
Others v Grootboom & Others [2000] ZACC 19; 
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), paragraph 10.
evicted without some alternative 
accommodation being provided, 
especially because so many members of 
the community were children.
Secondly, Apollos took the view that 
the mediation and the study by the 
Municipality would be done in good 
faith, and that there was a very good 
chance of resolution. This proved 
overly optimistic. It turned out that 
the Municipality had already done a 
study of the area and had concluded 
that there was nowhere else that 
could be allocated to the community. 
The mediation failed because the 
Municipality’s only response was that 
the community should return to its old 
land in Wallacedene. As mentioned 
earlier, the community was of the view 
that this was impossible, because the 
space they had previously occupied had 
now been occupied by other people.
The decisions taken by Apollos and 
the community clearly signalled that 
they were not intent on legal action. 
Rather, like most other South African 
communities faced with eviction, they 
believed that they had few legal rights 
and that their best strategic option was 
to use the law to put off the eviction 
for as long as possible. In doing so, 
they wanted to use their only strategic 
advantage – the fact that they were 
on the land – to secure some form of 
settlement from what they hoped would 
be sympathetic authorities. There was 
certainly no suggestion at this stage that 
the law or the Constitution could or 
should be used against the Oostenberg 
Municipality. Indeed, Apollos and 
the community were relying on the 
goodwill of the Municipality. To 
instigate litigation would thus have 
been potentially very damaging to their 
chances of being allocated other land by 
the Municipality.
Ultimately, however, they had 
underestimated their legal rights and 
overestimated the goodwill of the 
Municipality, and (with hindsight) the 
decision to agree to vacate the land was 
to prove a damaging one. By mid-May 
1999, mediation had reached a dead 
end, and the community was still on the 
land with no place to go. On 18 May 
1999, one day before the community 
was due to leave, the Municipality 
forcibly evicted the community. As the 
Constitutional Court later described it, 
the eviction:
In some ways, the Grootboom case could not present a 
greater contrast with the gay and lesbian litigation. While 
the latter took place on the basis of a carefully formulated 
strategy over eight years and through multiple cases, the 
Grootboom litigation was a single case brought under 
circumstances of great urgency to deal with people in a 
truly desperate situation.
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[…] was done prematurely and 
inhumanely: reminiscent of apartheid-
style evictions. The respondents’ 
homes were bulldozed and burnt and 
their possessions destroyed. Many 
of the residents who were not there 
could not even salvage their personal 
belongings.71
The community was now truly 
homeless. There was no space for them 
to return to in Wallacedene and their 
building materials had been destroyed. 
They were forced to simply camp on 
the sports field adjacent to Wallacedene 
with whatever plastic sheeting and 
other materials they could find. Within 
a week of the eviction, the winter rains 
began, rendering any shelter that the 
community had virtually worthless.
The launch of court 
proceedings
A week after the community had 
been evicted, Apollos wrote to the 
Oostenberg Municipality describing the 
intolerable conditions under which the 
community was living and demanding 
that the Municipality meet its 
constitutional obligations and provide 
temporary accommodation for the 
71 Ibid.
community. The letter explained that 
if this was not done, the community 
would launch a High Court application 
to compel government to comply 
with its constitutional obligations. 
The Municipality responded that it 
had supplied food and shelter for 
the community at the Wallacedene 
community hall, which bordered the 
sports field. It also explained that it 
was approaching the Western Cape 
provincial government for assistance in 
dealing with the problem. However, the 
community was dissatisfied with this 
response since the community hall in 
question could only house 80 people, 
who were at any rate not allowed to stay 
there at night.
As a result, on 31 May 1999, Apollos 
launched an urgent application on 
behalf of the community in the Cape 
High Court. They sought an order:
(i) Directing first respondent, 
alternatively one or more of the 
other respondents, forthwith to 
provide adequate and sufficient basic 
temporary shelter and/or housing for 
the applicants and their children in 
such premises, and/or on such land, as 
is/may be owned and/or leased by one 
or more of the respondents, pending 
applicants and their children obtaining 
permanent accommodation;
(ii) Directing first respondent, 
alternatively one or more of the other 
respondents, forthwith to provide 
adequate and sufficient basic nutrition, 
shelter, health and care services and 
social services to all of the applicants’ 
children.72
It was the first time the community had 
asserted any of its constitutional rights 
with regard to shelter and housing. 
Indeed, it may have been the first time 
any community in South Africa had 
asserted such rights. Despite the fact 
that the right to housing had been in 
the Constitution for over 18 months 
at that time, and despite the fact that 
many communities had been faced 
with eviction and forced to live in 
conditions just as terrible as those of 
the Grootboom community, to our 
knowledge there had been little or no 
litigation by communities claiming this 
right.
Taken at face value, the strategic 
decision to embark on litigation is in 
itself unremarkable. Negotiations had 
failed, the community no longer held 
the advantage of being on the disputed 
72  Grootboom & Others v Oostenberg Municipality & 
Others [1999] ZAWCHC 1, Introduction.
Children at the Zolane 
Community Centre in the 
Nyanga township, Cape Town 
2008.
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land and they no longer trusted the 
Municipality. But this view obscures a 
broader question – what was it that put 
this community in a position to demand 
their rights when virtually no other 
community had done so?
It appears that there were three key 
factors:
•  the community had legal 
representation;
•  there was an unusually high level of 
community organisation; and
• politics.
The first factor – that Apollos was asked 
to represent the community by the 
Magistrate and agreed to do so with 
no likelihood of fees being paid – was 
crucial. It was Apollos who suggested 
litigation, drafted the court papers and 
secured the advocates to argue the case. 
Without his involvement, the litigation 
would not have occurred.
The presence of Apollos also relates 
to the second factor – the high level 
of community organisation. When 
the community first met with Apollos 
during the eviction hearings, he had 
to deal with more than 150 adults 
simultaneously. He refused to do 
so and insisted that the community 
elect a five-person committee to deal 
with him. They did, and it was then 
that Irene Grootboom and Lucky 
Gwaza emerged as the leaders of the 
community. This committee was to play 
a key role in directing the strategies 
of the community, in providing the 
information and background necessary 
for the court application and in 
keeping the community involved in 
and informed of the court application. 
The committee was assisted in this 
regard by Doris Neewat, a former ANC 
councillor who lived nearby and had a 
law degree, but who was not a practising 
lawyer.
However, it is the third factor – politics 
– which is the most intriguing. It is not 
discussed at all in court records or in 
the Constitutional Court judgment that 
prior to launching the court application, 
the community tried to take the matter 
into its own hands. A few days after 
being evicted, the community organised 
a march to the offices of the Oostenberg 
Municipality. They were encouraged to 
do so by Doris Neewat. The marchers 
forced their way into a council meeting 
and demanded that something be done 
about their plight.
Although the municipal councillors 
were unmoved by the community’s 
actions, they did respond in one way 
that was to prove important. They 
phoned a prominent provincial ANC 
politician and asked him to sort out 
the situation. He immediately held 
discussions with the community 
leaders, and with Apollos and Neewat.
Far from resolving the situation, 
however, it was during these discussions 
that the community decided to embark 
on legal action against the Municipality. 
While it is clear that the community saw 
this as a way of gaining access to some 
relief and possibly housing, there were 
broader political ramifications at play. 
Various ANC role-players, including the 
prominent provincial politician already 
referred to, wanted to demonstrate that 
the New National Party (NNP – the 
then opposition party which controlled 
the relevant province and municipality) 
was not serving the community 
adequately. This was particularly 
pertinent because the 1999 national 
and provincial elections were at that 
point only a couple of weeks away.
This political backdrop to the case is 
important for a number of reasons:
•  It again points to the fact that 
neither Apollos nor the community 
was intent on legal action. The 
community was intent on using 
The Grootboom litigation may have been the first time any 
community in South Africa had asserted its constitutional 
rights to shelter and housing, despite the fact that the right to 
housing had been in the Constitution for over 18 months at 
that time, and despite the fact that many communities had 
been faced with eviction and forced to live in conditions just 
as terrible as those of the Grootboom community.
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popular pressure, and Apollos was 
following his clients’ instructions 
and had therefore not instituted 
legal proceedings. It was the 
intervention of the ANC provincial 
leadership that led to court action.
•  It demonstrates that even at this 
early stage of the case there was 
already a potential divergence of 
interests between, on the one hand, 
the community and their lawyer 
and, on the other, the broader 
political cause of embarrassing the 
NNP.
•  And most importantly, it suggests 
that the demand of rights would not 
have happened in the same way had 
the community and its attorney not 
been strong ANC supporters and 
therefore pitted against the NNP-
run local municipality.
The High Court 
proceedings
Ultimately though, and whatever the 
initial political intentions, the litigation 
was launched against all three levels 
of government involved in providing 
housing – local and provincial 
government controlled by the NNP, 
and national government controlled by 
the ANC. The attack focused only on 
the provision of housing or shelter for 
the 900 applicants – not for any broader 
group.
A few days after the urgent application 
had been lodged, a Cape High Court 
judge conducted an in loco inspection 
of the conditions under which the 
Grootboom community was living. 
He was sufficiently moved to order 
that – pending the final determination 
of the application – temporary 
accommodation be provided for the 
children in the community hall, as well 
as for one parent of each child who 
required supervision.
The High Court ultimately concluded 
that given the pressing demands on 
the state’s scarce resources, it had not 
breached its obligations under the 
right to housing in terms of Section 
26 of the Constitution, especially 
because this Section explicitly referred 
to the ‘available resources’ of the state. 
However, the Court did conclude that 
the state was in breach of its obligations 
to provide children with shelter in terms 
of Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution 
because it had not provided shelter 
to children in a situation where their 
parents were unable to do so.
This was an enormous victory because, 
for the first time, the socio-economic 
rights in the Constitution seemed to 
have come to fruition. The community’s 
lawyers did an excellent job of 
portraying the dire situation in which 
the community found themselves – a 
portrait that was undoubtedly greatly 
assisted by having literally hundreds 
of community members in court, 
including children and babies. Faced 
with scenes of desperate people and 
knowing the dreadful winter conditions 
in the Cape, there was clearly immense 
pressure on the Court to give the 
community some relief.
However, despite the victory, it was 
already becoming clear that the hurried 
manner in which the case had been 
litigated, and the fact that the legal team 
lacked experience in the new, untested 
realm of socio-economic rights meant 
there had been some significant errors. 
As the Cape High Court judgment 
made clear, the application of the 
Grootboom community had given 
insufficient attention to the remedy that 
would be appropriate. The community 
had not indicated the nature of the 
shelter to be provided, its location, or 
which of the respondents should be 
responsible therefore. Indeed, it was 
Khayelitsha on the Cape Flats, 
Cape Town 2007. Khayelitsha 
is reputed to be the largest 
and fastest growing informal 
settlement in South Africa.
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only in the replying affidavits that the 
applicants, through their attorney, made 
some practical suggestions as to the 
nature of the relief. The Court therefore 
could not grant any specific relief and 
was forced to postpone the case for 
three months, pending proposals from 




Before this could be done, however, 
government launched an appeal against 
the judgment before the Constitutional 
Court. The Court granted leave to 
appeal and set the case down for 
hearing. At the same time, the South 
African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) and the Community Law 
Centre (CLC) intervened as amici 
curiae, represented by the LRC.
When the case was heard before the 
Constitutional Court and when the 
Court ultimately delivered its judgment, 
a fundamental shift occurred from the 
original narrow case to a far broader 
cause.
Firstly, the Constitutional Court proved 
extremely reluctant to follow the High 
Court approach and decide the case on 
the basis of the rights of the children 
involved. This was partly because it 
would then mean – in this case as well 
as in future cases – that adults without 
children would not be accommodated 
at all, which seemed at odds with the 
spirit of the Constitution. 
More importantly, because the 
children’s rights contained no limitation 
with regard to resources, upholding 
them here would potentially ‘open 
the floodgates’ to all claims from 
homeless children, which would place 
unmanageable pressure on the state 
and the courts. With this concern 
in mind, the Constitutional Court 
hearing and judgment focused on the 
right to housing (Section 26 of the 
Constitution) instead of the children’s 
right to shelter (Section 28). This was 
despite the fact that the community’s 
lawyers had abandoned this leg of their 
argument when the case reached the 
Constitutional Court, presumably 
because it had been so thoroughly 
dismissed by the Cape High Court.
The space for the Constitutional Court 
to focus on Section 26 was created 
partly by the submissions of the LRC, 
representing the amici curiae, which 
urged the Court to decide the case on 
Section 26 instead of Section 28. The 
LRC argued that government’s housing 
programme, though substantial in 
size, did not comply with the state’s 
obligations under Section 26 and 
contended that it was important for the 
Court to clarify this in its judgment and 
order to ensure that the Constitution 
was upheld.
Secondly, the case shifted away from 
the particular needs of the Grootboom 
community.
At the start of the Constitutional 
Court hearing, government surprised 
everyone by offering the community:
[…] some alternative accommodation, 
not in fulfilment of any accepted 
constitutional obligation, but in 
the interests of humanity and 
pragmatism.73
This was not an offer of settlement 
and the community accepted the offer 
without prejudice.
As an aside, though the offer was not 
one of settlement, this illustrates how 
easily government might have used the 
narrow claim of the particular group 
of plaintiffs to thwart the precedent-
73  Government of the Republic of South Africa & 
Others v Grootboom & Others op.cit., paragraph 
91.
The High Court ruling in the Grootboom case was an 
enormous victory because, for the first time, the socio-
economic rights in the Constitution seemed to have 
come to fruition.
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setting value of the case. A proper offer 
of settlement to the plaintiffs would 
have been almost impossible to resist 
and this would have prevented the 
case going ahead and a Constitutional 
Court-level precedent being 
established.
Nevertheless, the offer had a significant 
effect. Suddenly, it seemed far less 
important for the Constitutional 
Court to give a remedy that assisted 
the community directly. The Court 
therefore began to look even more 
closely at the broader implications 
of the case, rather than the plaintiffs 
involved.
This was exacerbated by a decision 
not to have any community members 
present at the proceedings. While this 
must have seemed sensible at the time, 
one can never overestimate the value 
of having real plaintiffs being visible at 
court proceedings – especially where 
the plaintiffs’ circumstances were as 
sympathetic as those of the Grootboom 
community.
Thirdly, again at the instance of the 
LRC, the focus of the legal arguments 
became whether the precise parameters 
and contours of government’s housing 
policy met its constitutional obligations. 
This was a shift from the far starker 
arguments that the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
were making, which asked simply 
whether these people had housing, and 
if not whether government could afford 
to supply it to them.
These shifts had a profound effect 
on the outcome of the case. In its 
judgment, the Constitutional Court:
•  reversed the Cape High Court’s 
ruling on both issues before it by 
finding a violation of Section 26 
(the right to housing) but not a 
violation of Section 28 (children’s 
right to shelter);
•  emphatically rejected the notion 
that the constitutional rights could 
be used by individual plaintiffs to 
claim ‘housing on demand’, finding 
instead that such cases only involved 
an evaluation of the ‘reasonableness’ 
of the government programme at 
issue; and
•  did not give a tangible remedial 
order to the community, despite 
finding a violation of Section 
26. Instead, the Court issued a 
declaratory order explaining that 
government’s policy generally was 
a breach of the right to housing in 
Section 26. It declared as follows:
(a) Section 26(2) of the Constitution 
requires the state to devise and 
implement within its available 
resources a comprehensive and co-
ordinated programme progressively to 
realise the right of access to adequate 
housing.
(b) The programme must include 
reasonable measures such as, but 
not necessarily limited to, those 
contemplated in the Accelerated 
Managed Land Settlement 
Programme, to provide relief for 
people who have no access to land, 
no roof over their heads, and who are 
living in intolerable conditions or crisis 
situations.
(c) As at the date of the launch of 
this application, the state housing 
programme in the area of the Cape 
Metropolitan Council fell short of 
compliance with the requirements 
in paragraph (b), in that it failed to 
make reasonable provision within its 
available resources for people in the 
Cape Metropolitan area with no access 
to land, no roof over their heads, 
and who were living in intolerable 
conditions or crisis situations.74
74  Government of the Republic of South Africa & 
Others v Grootboom & Others op.cit., paragraph 
99.
The ‘Red Ants’ (guards hired 
by the municipal authorities) 
breaking down shelters and 
evicting residents from an 
‘illegal’ informal settlement in 
Eldorado Park, south-western 
Johannesburg, in 2003.
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The effect of the 
Legal Resources 
Centre intervention
The intervention of the LRC had 
complex repercussions. On the one 
hand, the intervention may be seen as 
damaging to the case because it took the 
focus away from the individual plaintiffs 
and their situation and focused on 
government’s housing programme to 
the potential exclusion of individual 
relief. However, in our view, had it not 
been for the intervention of the LRC, it 
appears quite possible, and even likely, 
that the case might have been lost and 
would not have produced any binding 
precedent in favour of the right to 
housing for the plaintiffs, particularly 
once they had accepted government’s 
humanitarian offer. The critical role of 
the LRC’s intervention was emphasised 
by then Justice Albie Sachs. As he 
explained:
The amicus intervention swung the 
debate dramatically. Most of the 
preceding arguments had failed to 
really look socio-economic rights in 
the eye. There had been technical 
arguments and attempts to frame 
the case in terms of children’s rights, 
but [the LRC intervention] forced us 
to consider what the nature of the 
obligations imposed by these rights 
was. Although we didn’t accept the 
entire argument of the amici, this 
wasn’t vital. What was important was 
the nature of the discourse. It was 
placing socio-economic rights at the 
centre of our thinking and doctrine.75
One has to accept that this was an 
exceptionally difficult case. It was 
not a case about government doing 
nothing or ignoring the Constitution. 
Government had put in place a massive 
housing programme to deliver housing 
to poor people, and the Constitutional 
Court was acutely aware of the 
challenges facing government. The 
Court cited figures stating that, between 
March 1994 and September 1997, 
362 160 houses had been built or were 
under construction, while an overall 
total of some 637 190 subsidies had 
been allocated by October 1997 for 
projects in various stages of planning or 
development.
Thus, for all the blunt arguments 
made by the Grootboom community’s 
lawyers about how their clients did 
not have housing, it was far from clear 
75  Albie Sachs, Concluding Comments on the Panel 
Discussion, in ESR Review, Vol. 8, No. 1: May 
2007, pages 18-19.
that this amounted to a breach of the 
right to housing when government was 
distributing houses to thousands of 
poor people, but had not reached these 
plaintiffs yet.
What the LRC’s intervention managed 
to do was analyse government’s housing 
programme with a sophistication and 
nuance that was lacking in the plaintiffs’ 
case. 
The LRC emphasised the size and scope 
of government’s housing programme, 
but argued that it suffered from a crucial 
flaw – it was an ‘all-or-nothing’ policy. 
While poor people did get proper 
houses under the policy, they were often 
left waiting for years on inordinately 
long waiting lists. 
The LRC argued that in addition to the 
housing programme, the Constitution 
required government to do something 
in the interim for people who were 
waiting and living in appalling 
circumstances. This involved security 
of tenure, effective protection from the 
elements, and basic water and sanitation 
services.
Though a number of the LRC’s 
legal submissions were ultimately 
rejected, its approach to and analysis 
of government’s housing programme 
When the Grootboom case was heard before the 
Constitutional Court and when the Court ultimately 
delivered its judgment, a fundamental shift occurred 
from the original narrow case to a far broader cause.
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proved to be the core around which 
the Constitutional Court judgment 
was based. In particular, it looked at 
government’s policies and showed 
that government itself had identified 
the need for an ‘accelerated land 
management settlement scheme’ that 
would cater to people in desperate need, 
but had failed to put such a programme 
in place.
Without the LRC’s intervention and 
approach, it is quite possible that 
the Grootboom case would have 
had to go the way of Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal. 
As noted in Chapter 1, there in its first 
decision on socio-economic rights, 
the Constitutional Court held that it 
could not come to the assistance of a 
dying man needing dialysis treatment as 
government’s policy did not violate the 
right to health care.
A loss in the Grootboom case, following 
the loss in the Soobramoney case, 
would have been potentially devastating 
to future socio-economic rights 
litigation in South Africa.
Outcomes of 
the case for the 
Grootboom 
community
As has been discussed above, at 
the hearing of the case before the 
Constitutional Court, government 
made an offer of some temporary 
accommodation for the community 
consisting of a marked-off site, 
provision for temporary structures 
intended to be waterproof, and basic 
sanitation, water and refuse services. 
As noted, the Grootboom community 
accepted the offer. The Court’s 
judgment referred to this offer and its 
acceptance, but gave the community no 
additional relief.
However, the offer (which should have 
been relatively simple to implement) 
took months to materialise. It was made 
on 11 May 2000, but four months later 
– and with the Constitutional Court 
judgment still pending – nothing had 
been done to fulfil it. The Grootboom 
community was therefore forced to 
go back to the Constitutional Court 
with an urgent application to compel 
fulfilment of the offer. At the hearing 
of the urgent application, the parties 
agreed on details regarding the 
implementation of the offer and these 
details were then, by consent, made an 
order of court.
Over the following few months, the 
offer was gradually implemented. 
The community continued to live on 
the Wallacedene sports field in their 
shacks, while government put in place 
the temporary and then permanent 
sanitation and water services required 
by the urgent order. Also, as per the 
urgent order, government paid over an 
amount of R200 000 for the purposes 
of obtaining materials to make the 
community’s shacks waterproof. At 
the insistence of the community, 
these materials were bought and 
distributed by Julian Apollos rather 
than by government to ensure that the 
community got substantial value for 
money.
Though government had taken months 
to comply with its own offer and 
the terms of the urgent order, and 
notwithstanding some disagreement 
about whether every aspect of the order 
had in fact been complied with, it is 
clear that generally the terms of the 
offer and order were fulfilled.
However, it is equally clear that, 
Living conditions for the 
Grootboom community in 2007.
Photograph: Legal Resources 
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despite this, the majority of the 
Grootboom community continued to 
live in appalling conditions for many 
years. Nearly 300 government houses 
were eventually distributed to the 
community in July 200876 – more than 
eight years after the Constitutional 
Court judgment – but it remains 
unclear precisely how many of those 
involved in the case benefited.
This is demonstrated most emphatically 
by the position of Irene Grootboom 
herself. Mrs Grootboom died in August 
2008, a month after the nearly 300 
houses had been distributed to her 
community. She was penniless and still 
homeless,77 living in the shack that she 
had built on the Wallacedene sports 
field. She was not allotted one of the 
300 houses, though the spokesperson 
for the Western Cape MEC for Housing 
– at the time of the handover of the 
houses to the community – had stated 
that she was bound to benefit “in the 
next round”.78 After negative publicity 
sparked by her death, Mrs Grootboom’s 
family eventually received a house in 
76  Hundreds say farewell to housing heroine, IOL 
news: 10 August 2008.
77  Grootboom dies homeless and penniless, Mail & 
Guardian: 8 August 2008.
78  Hundreds say farewell to housing heroine op.cit.
September 2008.79
This appalling state of affairs led 
to obvious disillusionment within 
the community regarding the legal 
processes and their effect. The 
disillusionment stemmed mainly from 
the perception that the court victory 
meant that the community would 
be entitled to get actual housing, 
rather than some temporary form of 
shelter. Though the community was 
very pleased with the temporary offer 
made by government and celebrated 
when it was fulfilled, it continued to 
feel frustrated about the years where 
it had not been accommodated 
in government’s formal housing 
programme. This frustration was 
unsurprising and understandable. In 
the view of the community, and even 
in the view of the arguments that the 
community’s lawyers made before the 
court, this was a case where people’s 
rights had been violated because they 
were homeless. The natural remedy, 
of course, would then have been to 
provide the necessary housing.
From a technical point of view, the 
reality was slightly different. Nothing 
in the Constitutional Court judgment 
79  W Cape government apologises, IOL news: 10 
September 2008.
suggested that formal housing for the 
community was on the immediate 
horizon. Rather, the Court’s judgment 
focused on the far narrower violation 
that took place because government 
did not have a programme in place to 
provide temporary relief to people in 
desperate situations. In fact, the Court 
went as far as to stress that government’s 
formal housing programme was:
[a] major achievement. Large sums 
of money have been spent and a 
significant number of houses [have] 
been built.80
It did find, though, that the housing 
programme was having, at best, a small 
effect on the massive housing backlog 
facing South Africa.
In truth, however, this technical 
issue is beside the point. It is difficult 
to conceive why, in the unusual 
circumstances of this case, relevant 
government officials did not make some 
arrangements for the community until 
eight years after the judgment.
A significant part of the explanation 
appears to have been that the 
Grootboom community no longer had 
80  Government of the Republic of South Africa & 
Others v Grootboom & Others op.cit., paragraph 
53.
Nearly 300 government houses were eventually 
distributed to the Grootboom community in July 2008 
– more than eight years after the Constitutional Court 
judgment – but it remains unclear precisely how many 
of those involved in the case benefited.
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effective legal representation. A few 
months after the case concluded, Julian 
Apollos merged his small law firm with 
the larger firm that had represented 
the Oostenberg Municipality in the 
case. There is no other law firm in close 
vicinity. This meant that recently, when 
the Grootboom community wanted 
to consider bringing another action 
against government, it had no lawyer to 
represent it. 
At the same time, the organisational 
structure of the community had also 
been significantly weakened. In 2007, 
when the LRC attempted to assist 
the community to negotiate with 
government, there seemed to be a lack 
of effective community leadership, 
which made the process extremely 
difficult.
As one of Mrs Grootboom’s lawyers 
said after her death:
[T]he fact that she died homeless 
shows how the legal system and civil 
society failed her. […] I am sorry that 
we didn’t do enough following-up after 
judgement was given in her favour. 
We should’ve done more. I feel a deep 
regret today.81
81 Grootboom dies homeless and penniless op.cit.
Broader outcomes
Despite the extraordinary 
disappointment one feels regarding the 
situation of Mrs Grootboom herself, it 
must be stressed that the Grootboom 
case has had a significant and tangible 
effect in a number of broader respects.
Firstly, the decision significantly 
affected government’s housing policy, 
although it did not appear so initially. 
The Grootboom case held that what the 
Constitution required was a short-term 
emergency relief policy for anyone 
who finds themselves in desperate 
circumstances.
At first, there was no sign of 
government putting such a policy in 
place. However, in August 2003, three 
years after the decision was given, 
national and provincial governments 
finally approved a short-term 
emergency relief policy for people in 
desperate circumstances. It is worth 
quoting a summary of the policy:
[This policy] deals with the rules for 
exceptional urgent housing situations. 
[It relates] to assistance to people who, 
for reasons beyond their control, find 
themselves in a situation of exceptional 
and urgent housing need such as the 
fact that their existing shelter has been 
destroyed or damaged, their prevailing 
situation poses an immediate threat 
to their life, health and safety, or they 
have been evicted, or face the threat 
of imminent eviction. The assistance 
provided consists of funds in the form 
of grants to municipalities to give 
effect to accelerated land development, 
the provision of basic municipal 
engineering services and shelter. The 
assistance provided falls short of 
formal housing as provided for in other 
Programmes of the Housing Subsidy 
Scheme contained in the Housing 
Code, and is thus rendered only in 
situations of exceptional and urgent 
housing need.82
The emergency relief policy explicitly 
acknowledges that it was devised 
and accepted as a direct result of the 
Grootboom decision and aims to meet 
what the Grootboom case laid down as 
the constitutional requirements of the 
right to housing.
This was followed, in 2004, by the 
adoption of Chapter 12 of the National 
Housing Code. The Code sets out the 
principles, guidelines and standards 
that apply to state housing programmes. 
82  National housing programme: Housing assistance 
in emergency circumstances, Department of 
Housing: 2004.
Many South African 
communities are still in dire 
need of decent housing.
Photograph: The Kuyasa Fund ©
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Chapter 12 of the Code provides 
for assistance to people who find 
themselves in a housing emergency for 
reasons beyond their control. It is again 
expressly stated to be enacted pursuant 
to the Grootboom decision.
Secondly, the decision played a major 
role in altering South African law on 
housing and evictions. The Constitution 
requires that no eviction be granted 
until all the relevant circumstances 
have been taken into account by a 
court. As a result, there are many court 
decisions which make it clear that, 
effectively, eviction orders in respect 
of poor people will only be given 
when they are coupled with orders 
directing the relevant municipality to 
provide emergency housing to those 
being evicted. This is so irrespective of 
whether the evictions are taking place at 
the behest of the municipality or private 
landowners.83
There can be no question that South 
African courts have massively departed 
from previous case law on evictions, 
and the Grootboom case has been an 
obvious driving force. As Stuart Wilson 
83  See for example: City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd & Another [2011] ZACC 
33; 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC).
has commented:
[T]he true potential of [Grootboom] 
has only really come to light through 
multiple later decisions in which its 
potential to stave off evictions which 
are likely to lead to homelessness has 
been recognised.84
In this regard, the impact of Grootboom 
has certainly been felt very strongly 
by people on the ground because, in 
effect, it gives them security of tenure 
that they would not otherwise have. 
This is important not only because of 
the inherent value of security of tenure, 
but also because security of tenure plays 
an important role in allowing ordinary 
people and communities to organise 
and mobilise to protect and demand 
their rights.85
Thirdly, the Grootboom decision 
impacted significantly on government’s 
attitude to socio-economic rights 
and socio-economic rights cases. 
It loomed large as an indication 
84  Stuart Wilson, Litigating Housing Rights in 
Johannesburg’s Inner City: 2004-2008, in South 
African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 27, Part 1: 
2011, page 130. For an analysis of the housing 
cases decided by the Constitutional Court after 
2008, see: Jackie Dugard, HSRC Review of 
the Courts – Paper on Socio-Economic Rights, 
unpublished: 14 July 2014. 
85  Presentation by Jackie Dugard at the 4th Public 
Interest Law Gathering, held at the Wits School of 
Law, 23 July 2014.
that where government fails to act 
reasonably, it will be taken to court and 
defeated. According to a number of our 
respondents, it was for this reason that 
parts of government began factoring 
these issues into budget processes 
and became far more responsive to 
lawyers’ letters pointing out programme 
flaws and requesting information. 
This is despite the fact that many 
government departments and officials 
had misgivings about the decision. 
However, because they recognised 
that it was good law, which would be 
enforced against them in court, they 
took it into account.
Lastly, there can be no doubt that the 
Grootboom decision had an enormous 
impact on subsequent socio-economic 
rights litigation and will continue to be 
the foundational socio-economic rights 
decision for many years to come.
In 2002, for example, the Constitutional 
Court repeatedly relied on the 
Grootboom decision in deciding the 
TAC case. This case, which we deal with 
next, was an enormously important 
and controversial case dealing with the 
provision of drugs for the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
Given government’s vociferous defence 
of its AIDS policy and the public 
The Grootboom decision played a major role in altering 
South African law on housing and evictions, and 
impacted significantly on government’s attitude to 
socio-economic rights and socio-economic rights cases.
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attention and controversy that the TAC 
case generated, it might have been 
expected that this would be a difficult 
and close decision. The reality though, 
as various respondents made clear to 
us, was that it was the Grootboom 
principles regarding reasonableness that 
made the TAC decision relatively easy, 
at least as to whether there had been a 
violation of the Constitution. Without 
the Grootboom case, the TAC case 
would have been far more difficult to 
launch and decide, and – in the words 
of one of our respondents: 
[...] may not have happened at all 
when it did.
The approach in the Grootboom case 
and the principles it laid down have also 
had a substantial effect in a number of 
socio-economic rights cases that have 
been brought subsequently on issues 
such as social grants,86 education87 
and others, many of which produced 
very favourable settlements before 
the matters could even get to court. 
By holding that socio-economic 
86  See for example: Khosa & Others v Minister of 
Social Development & Others [2004] ZACC 11; 
2004 (6) SA 505 (CC).
87  See for example: Western Cape Forum for 
Intellectual Disability v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa & Another [2010] 
ZAWCHC 544; 2011 (5) SA 87 (WCC).
rights are enforceable and by insisting 
on subjecting all government 
socio-economic rights policies to a 
rigorous reasonableness standard, the 
Grootboom case has made possible 
many future cases to ensure that 
government is acting appropriately to 
achieve the progressive realisation of 
the socio-economic rights enshrined in 
the Constitution.
Thus, ironically, whatever the limits of 
the Grootboom case in terms of social 
change in the Grootboom community 
itself, it presented a remarkable and 
valuable victory that has played and will 
continue to play a key role in achieving 
tangible social change for other 
plaintiffs in a variety of areas.
A question that requires separate 
consideration though is whether and 
to what extent the identified third 
and fourth broader effects of the 
Grootboom case – that is, a more 
responsive attitude to socio-economic 
rights on the part of government 
and the effect on subsequent socio-
economic rights litigation – were 
diminished by the later Mazibuko 
litigation. We address this further below 
as part of the Mazibuko case study.
Lessons
The lessons to be learnt from the 
Grootboom case really permeate this 
entire publication. Suffice it to say at 
this point that the Grootboom case 
demonstrated that:
•  Awareness of rights is an absolute 
precondition if communities are to 
enforce their rights in a manner that 
leads to social change.
•  Advice and assistance are essential 
if people are to enforce their 
rights. This must include legal 
representation where necessary and, 
on a case of this scale and complexity, 
the legal representatives should 
ideally be familiar with national, 
foreign and international law at play.
•  Although critical, the above facets 
are by themselves likely to be 
insufficient. What is necessary is for 
the communities to become socially 
mobilised, structurally organised and 
actively involved. This includes using 
political pressure wherever possible.
Finally, of all the factors necessary to 
ensure that litigation leads to social 
change, perhaps the most significant is 
follow-up. This applies irrespective of the 
kind of remedy granted by the court.
People being evicted from a 
building in the Johannesburg 
inner city in December 2013.
Photograph: 
Matthew Wilhelm-Solomon ©
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One of the most well-known of all 
the decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, at least in the public eye, is the 
TAC case. Unlike the two case studies 
dealt with above, in the TAC case we 
have the advantage of a full written 
account of the background, strategies 
and outcomes of the case authored by 
someone directly involved in the case.
The article Preventing mother-to-child 
HIV transmission in South Africa: 
Background, strategies and outcomes of 
the Treatment Action Campaign’s case 
against the Minister of Health88 was 
written by Mark Heywood, co-founder 
of the TAC and its then National 
Secretary, and head of the AIDS Law 
Project (ALP – now Section27).
In what follows, rather than attempting 
to restate the facts relating to the TAC 
case in our own words, we have instead 
made extensive use of the article by 
Heywood.
88  Published in South African Journal on Human 
Rights, Vol. 19, Part 2: 2003, pages 278-315.
Background
For HIV-positive pregnant women, 
there is a 30% risk that the child will 
be infected with HIV, mostly during 
birth and the breastfeeding period. The 
issue of mother-to-child transmission 
(MTCT) of HIV was extremely 
important in South Africa given that, 
by 1998, it was estimated that up to 
70 000 children were born with HIV 
every year, and there were already signs 
that HIV was causing a rise in infant 
mortality. Most of these children live 
short, painful lives, with HIV infection 
carrying a terrible toll for both parents 
and children.
One of the earliest and most enduring 
breakthroughs in the fight against the 
AIDS pandemic was the discovery in 
1994 that the use of the antiretroviral 
(ARV) drug AZT could dramatically 
reduce the risk of MTCT. However, 
this would be of limited efficacy outside 
of industrialised countries because of 
the need to begin administering the 
drug relatively early in pregnancy and 
the infrastructural requirements for 
its delivery. Consequently, research 
began to find shorter and simpler 
ARV regimens that would also benefit 
patients in poorer countries. Ultimately, 
a clinical trial in Thailand demonstrated 
that a short course of AZT given to 
mother and child (starting at 36 weeks 
of pregnancy) still brought about 
significant reductions in MTCT.
It was with the aim of securing the 
benefits of these breakthroughs in 
medical science for mothers who were 
HIV positive that, as early as in 1997, 
various HIV and AIDS organisations 
began a period of sustained lobbying 
of the Minister and the Department 
of Health to develop a policy and 
programme to prevent MTCT. The 
objective was to put pressure on 
government to implement the steps 
listed in the Department of Health’s 
1994 National AIDS Plan for South 
Africa. These included offering 
HIV testing at antenatal clinics on a 
voluntary basis and conducting research 
into methods of preventing perinatal 
transmission such as short-course 
AZT and non-nucleoside reverse 
transcriptase inhibitors.
The campaign received renewed 
impetus in December 1998 when 
the TAC was founded and set as one 
of its primary objectives a demand 
that government implement a 
programme to prevent MTCT. The 
TAC conducted extensive activities in 
this regard between 1999 and 2001, 
including meetings with the first 
and second post-1994 Ministers of 
Health, demonstrations, the drafting of 
memoranda, a 50 000-signature petition 
to the President and a campaign that 
targeted pharmaceutical companies 
to reduce the prices of essential ARV 
medicines, particularly AZT.
Initially, demands for a policy and plan 
on the prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission (PMTCT) received 
a relatively sympathetic ear from 
government. In 1998, for example, the 
Gauteng health department responded 
timeously to the results of the 
Bangkok-Thai study by announcing the 
establishment of five pilot sites where 
programmes to reduce MTCT would 
be introduced. On 30 April 1999, a 
meeting between the TAC and the then 
Minister of Health, Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma, led to a joint statement that the 
price of AZT was the major barrier to a 
PMTCT programme, and to a promise 
that:
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[g]overnment would name 
an affordable price for the 
implementation of AZT to pregnant 
mothers and report within six 
weeks on the price and other issues 
pertaining to the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission.89
At this point, it appeared that the 
TAC’s campaign would primarily target 
manufacturers of ARV medicines 
to force them to reduce their prices. 
However, an unanticipated and 
unfortunate diversion revealed itself in 
late 1999 – AIDS denialism.
Since the mid-1990s, a small group of 
scientists had developed a thesis that 
HIV had not been properly isolated 
as a virus, and that the real causes of 
AIDS were initially the recreational 
drugs taken by many gay men in the US 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and 
thereafter ARV medicines. This group 
(often referred to as ‘AIDS dissidents’) 
argued that, rather than helping to 
restore the immune system, ARV drugs 
destroy it by destroying cell replication 
and causing a range of life-threatening 
side effects. Although their arguments 
vary, the basic contention is that AIDS 
89  Quoted from Treatment Action Campaign News, 
26 July 2000.
in Africa is caused by poverty and that a 
range of poverty-related illnesses (such 
as tuberculosis) are misrepresented as 
HIV-related in order to create markets 
for first-world drugs, particularly ARVs.
When the TAC launched legal action 
to demand broader access to the 
drug Nevirapine in 2001, none of the 
affidavits filed by government officials 
made reference to these dissident 
views on ARV medicines or whether 
HIV is a cause of AIDS as reasons 
to justify the failure to develop or 
implement a programme. However, a 
sometimes hidden, sometimes open 
relationship was apparent between 
the then President Thabo Mbeki and 
AIDS denialists, and this seemed to 
be the primary reason for the delays in 
establishing a PMTCT programme.
The fact that such a relationship 
existed was first signalled in October 
1999 in a speech by President Mbeki 
to the National Council of Provinces 
(NCOP). At the end of this speech, he 
unexpectedly questioned the safety of 
AZT and warned that the:
[…] toxicity of this drug is such that it 
is, in fact, a danger to health.90 
90  Department of Health, Address to the National 
Council of Provinces, Cape Town, 28 October 
1999.
The President informed the NCOP that 
he had instructed his new Minister of 
Health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang 
(who succeeded Dlamini-Zuma in June 
1999), to launch a probe into the safety 
of AZT and that, until it was complete, 
the drug would not be used in South 
Africa.
From this point onwards, progress in 
implementing a national programme 
to prevent MTCT was derailed. A few 
weeks later, on 16 November 1999, 
the Minister of Health announced to 
the National Assembly that although 
she was aware of the positive results of 
AZT:
[…] there are other scientists who say 
not enough is yet known about the 
effects of the toxic profile of the drug, 
that the risks might well outweigh the 
benefits, and that the drug should not 
be used.91
As a result, she instructed the 
Medicines Control Council (MCC) to 
review the use of AZT.
On 5 April 2000, the Minister of Health 
made a speech to Parliament that had all 
the hallmarks of ‘dissidentese’. Raising 
91  Department of Health, Statement to the National 
Assembly by Dr M E Tshabalala-Msimang MP, 
Minister of Health, on HIV/AIDS and related 
issues, Tuesday, 16 November 1999.
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reasonable concerns about a number 
of deaths of adults on therapeutic drug 
trials that appeared to be associated 
with daily Nevirapine use as part of 
a combination of ARV drugs, she 
confused these deaths with the use 
of the same medicine for preventing 
intrapartum HIV transmission – despite 
the knowledge that it requires only 
one dose to mother and child and 
the fact that there were no reported 
adverse safety events concerning its 
use in PMTCT. Tshabalala-Msimang 
remained steadfast in opposition to 
AZT, stating that government would 
never use AZT in PMTCT.
Government’s 
choice of Nevirapine
An important development occurred in 
July 1999 when the first results of a drug 
trial in Uganda, known as HIVNET 
012 (testing the efficacy of a single dose 
of Nevirapine in reducing MTCT), 
were released. The results showed that 
Nevirapine had similar efficacy to AZT 
but with a much less complex regimen.
In the face of presidential opposition 
to AZT, the Minister of Health and 
others latched on to Nevirapine as an 
alternative and quickly arranged a study 
tour to Uganda, which included the 
objective of hearing more about the 
trial of this drug.
In answer to the growing pressure from 
the TAC, Nevirapine was now offered 
as government’s probable medicine of 
choice and the TAC was persuaded to 
stall its demands pending the outcome 
of a local trial known as the South 
African Intrapartum Nevirapine Trial 
(SAINT). The TAC accepted the bona 
fides of the Minister, and for a period of 
nine months pressure on government 
was reduced. The TAC engaged in a 
number of other successful campaigns 
that aimed to bring down the price 
of essential anti-HIV medicines, and 
targeted patent abuse and drug pricing. 
This was generally not well received by 
clinicians working on PMTCT, who felt 
that the TAC had ‘let government off 
the hook’.
As the preliminary results of the 
SAINT study (supporting the use of 
Nevirapine) had started to leak out in 
mid-2000, a new catalogue of excuses 
emerged from the Minister of Health. 
It seemed as if the clinicians’ concerns 
were correct.
Fear of further delays and political 
interference in public health policy 
appeared to be confirmed at the 
International AIDS Conference held in 
Durban in July 2000. The conference 
opened in controversy as President 
Mbeki spoke eloquently about 
poverty, but refused to name HIV 
as a specific challenge for Africa. At 
the same time, government declined 
an offer from Boehringer Ingelheim, 
the manufacturer of Nevirapine, of a 
‘free’ supply of the drug for five years 
and reacted coolly to a preliminary 
announcement of the SAINT study 
results. It took the intervention of 
former President Nelson Mandela to 
quell the storm. In his closing speech 
at the conference, Mandela called for 
widespread interventions to prevent 
MTCT.
In response to these developments, 
the TAC publicly reinstated its threat 
of litigation. This threat of legal action 
in July 2000 raises important issues 
about the timing and objectives 
of the litigation. By this time, the 
TAC’s campaign had already made 
government policy on PMTCT a matter 
of national concern and had achieved 
wide support. At the International 
AIDS Conference in Durban, the 
TAC seriously considered bringing 
an urgent High Court application 
As early as in 1997, various HIV and AIDS organisations 
began a period of sustained lobbying of the Minister 
and the Department of Health to develop a policy and 
programme to prevent mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV. The campaign received renewed impetus in 
December 1998 when the TAC was founded.
51Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Changing trends in the South African public interest litigation environment Chapter 2
for access to Nevirapine on behalf of 
several women in the late stages of 
pregnancy. However, despite scientific 
consensus on its safety and efficacy, 
the medicine was not yet registered in 
South Africa for PMTCT. AZT was 
registered, but it was felt that the greater 
cost of this medicine, together with a 
more complicated drug regimen, made 
successful litigation more difficult.
The TAC’s legal counsel cautioned 
against commencing litigation before 
Nevirapine was registered, because 
although the TAC could point to 
precedents for ‘off-label’ use of 
medicines, and even instances where 
government policy endorsed this, a 
court would likely have stuck to the 
strict letter of the law. For a court 
formally to condone off-label use of 
medicines was inviting compromise 
in the system of medicine registration. 
There was no other option for the 
TAC but to continue the campaign 
while delaying the litigation. Pressure 
was now turned to the MCC to speed 
up registration of the drug, and to 
government to clarify its programme.
On 12 and 13 August 2000, the 
Department of Health convened a 
meeting with South African scientists 
to assess the new knowledge gleaned 
from the Durban conference. After 
this meeting, the Health MinMEC – a 
committee consisting of the national 
Minister of Health and the heads 
(MECs – Members of the Executive 
Council) of the nine provincial health 
departments – decided that the 
current policy of not using AZT would 
continue and that the use of Nevirapine, 
once registered, would first be tested 
for two years at two pilot sites in every 
province. The reason for this was:
[…] to determine whether or not the 
exercise would be feasible, taking 
into account all the operational 
issues. Should the pilot sites be 
successful, the next step would be 
phased implementation; should this 
not be possible the exercise would be 
terminated.92
This approach ignored the ethical and 
constitutional obligation to provide 
Nevirapine to women who already 
knew they were HIV positive. It meant 
that even where a woman knew she 
was HIV positive and knew about the 
potential effects of Nevirapine but 
92  Health MinMEC Minutes, 18 August 2000, 
quoted from Mark Heywood, Preventing 
mother-to-child HIV transmission in South Africa: 
Background, strategies and outcomes of the 
Treatment Action Campaign’s case against the 
Minister of Health, in South African Journal on 
Human Rights, Vol.19, Part 2: 2003, page 286.
wanted to take the drug, if she gave 
birth at a place other than a pilot site, 
she was not allowed to take the drug.
In April 2002, after substantial delays 
apparently due to significant political 
interference, the MCC finally formally 
registered Nevirapine for the prevention 
of intrapartum HIV transmission.
This removed the last obstacle to 
legal action. The TAC decided that 
both morally and politically it had no 
other option than to launch a case 
against government. As Heywood 
explains, the TAC was able to elicit 
the support of some of the most 
experienced constitutional lawyers in 
the country, whose commitment and 
professionalism were central to the 
success of the case.
Politics and 
mobilisation
In essence, the TAC’s challenge related 
to public health policy. It should 
have been managed by government 
as a legitimate challenge, envisaged 
and encouraged by the Constitution 
– similar, for example, to the 
Soobramoney case. But it was not.
Throughout this period, the denialist 
A sister at the Msunduzi 
Hospice comforts a dying 
man with AIDS at his home 
outside Pietermaritzburg, 
KwaZulu-Natal.
Photograph: Henner Frankenfeld 
& PictureNET Africa ©
52 Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Chapter 2 Changing trends in the South African public interest litigation environment
AIDS policy was under fierce attack 
and the policy on Nevirapine – being 
essentially a manifestation of President 
Mbeki’s AIDS policy – was ferociously 
defended. There also appeared to 
be political interference in the case, 
particularly apparent in pressure 
brought to bear on the SAHRC to 
withdraw its application to enter as 
amicus curiae in the case in support of 
the TAC.93
The TAC, however, was prepared for 
the politics that surrounded the case. 
It believed that the PMTCT policy 
was based on a political decision taken 
at the highest level of government. 
The TAC’s constitution empowers it 
to engage in litigation as a means of 
challenging any type of discrimination 
relating to the treatment of HIV and 
AIDS in the private and public sector. 
This allows it to take legal action to 
enforce any right that is explicitly 
recognised in the South African 
Constitution. The reference to litigation 
in the TAC’s constitution occurs in the 
same paragraph as a reference to:
[...] lobbying, advocacy and all forms of 
legitimate social mobilisation.94
93 Heywood, op.cit., pages 299-300.
94  About the Treatment Action Campaign, www.
tac.org.za.
For the TAC, litigation both emerges 
from and feeds back into a social context. 
Resort to litigation is not exclusive of 
other strategies. Litigation can also help 
catalyse mobilisation and assist public 
education on contested issues, as well as 
bring about direct relief to individuals 
or classes of applicants. Thus, between 
August and December 2001, the TAC 
engaged in intensive public mobilisation, 
attracting enormous support and media 
interest.
However, support within the TAC for a 
litigation strategy could not be taken for 
granted. 
Internally, numerous workshops 
were conducted with TAC volunteers 
to explain the case. Externally, and 
among some of the TAC’s main allies 
– particularly the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
– there was hesitation publically to 
endorse taking ‘our’ government to 
court. Going the route of litigation 
had to be defended against allies who 
considered it ‘disloyal’ or ‘unpatriotic’. 
While COSATU welcomed each 
judgment in the TAC’s favour, it never 
openly backed the litigation.
Mobilisation culminated on 25 and 
26 November 2001, when rallies and 
marches took place around South Africa, 
including an all-night vigil of 600 TAC 
volunteers outside the Pretoria High 
Court before the hearing commenced. 
For the two days of the hearing, the 
Court was packed with people wearing 
the TAC’s trademark ‘HIV-Positive’ 
T-shirt, and with health professionals 
and journalists, all listening intently to 
the evolution of the argument.
The urgency of the case seemed to be 
understood by Judge Chris Botha, who 
handed down his judgment to a tense 
and expectant court on 14 December 
2001. On all the key issues, the High 
Court found in favour of the TAC, 
commenting that in government’s 
arguments:
[t]here was no unqualified 
commitment to reach the rest of the 
population in any given time or at any 
given rate […] a programme that is 
open-ended and that leaves everything 
to the future cannot be said to be 
coherent, progressive and purposeful.95
Judge Botha further declared that:
[a]bout one thing there must be no 
misunderstanding: a countrywide 
95  Treatment Action Campaign & Others v Minister 
of Health & Others, High Court of South 
Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division), Case No. 
21182/2001, page 24.
In essence, the TAC’s challenge related to public health 
policy. It should have been managed by government as 
a legitimate challenge, envisaged and encouraged by the 
Constitution. But it was not.
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MTCT prevention programme is an 
ineluctable obligation of the State.96
The High Court’s order was bold and 
original. It instructed government 
to allow Nevirapine to be prescribed 
where it was ‘medically indicated’ and 
where, in the opinion of the doctors 
acting in consultation with the medical 
superintendent, there was capacity to 
do so. The High Court also ordered 
government to develop:
[...] an effective comprehensive national 
programme to prevent or reduce 
MTCT97 
and to return to the Court with this 
programme for further scrutiny before 
31 March 2002. 
The High Court judgment was 
welcomed in South Africa and 
worldwide. The acclaim, however, was 
not universal. In South Africa, it attracted 
the ire not only of government but also 
of a number of legal academics, one 
of whom declared it a case of “when 
judges go too far”.98 The accusation 
arose that the High Court had breached 
96  Treatment Action Campaign & Others v Minister 
of Health & Others op.cit., page 25.
97  Treatment Action Campaign & Others v Minister 
of Health & Others op.cit., page 26.
98  Kevin Hopkins, Shattering the divide – when 
judges go too far, in De Rebus, No. 409: March 
2002.
the principle of separation of powers 
between the judiciary and the executive 
by interfering in health policy and 
ordering government to supply a specific 
medicine. Thus, on 18 December 2001, 
when the Minister of Health announced 
that she would seek leave to appeal 
directly to the Constitutional Court, it 
was claimed that the appeal was:
[…] aimed at clarifying a constitutional 
and jurisdictional matter which, if 
left vague, could throw executive 
policymaking into disarray and create 
confusion about the principle of the 
separation of powers, which is a 
cornerstone of our democracy.99
The political and 
legal unravelling of 
government’s case 
When President Mbeki opened 
Parliament in February 2002, he 
appeared to shift government policy by 
promising that: 
[…] continuing work will be done to 
monitor the efficacy of antiretroviral 
interventions against mother-to-
child transmission in the sites already 
99  Department of Health, Press Release: 19 
December 2001.
operational and any new ones that may 
be decided upon.100
A few days later this shift seemed to be 
confirmed in a live television interview 
when President Mbeki explicitly stated 
that provinces should be able to provide 
a PMTCT programme according to 
their respective capacities and that 
provinces with the resources to extend 
the programme should not be delayed 
by provinces that did not have the 
resources.
This new approach appears to have 
been read by a number of senior ANC 
politicians as condoning the roll-out 
of the programme to health facilities 
where capacity existed or could 
easily be created. In particular, on 18 
February 2002, the then ANC Premier 
of Gauteng, Mbhazima Shilowa, 
announced a bold roll-out of the 
programme. He promised that:
[…] during the next financial year, we 
will ensure that all public hospitals and 
our large community health centres 
will provide Nevirapine.101
100  State of the Nation address by the President of 
South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, to the joint sitting of 
the Houses of Parliament, Cape Town, 8 February 
2002, www.gcis.gov.za.
101  Quoted from HIV drug to save 5 000 Gauteng 
babies a year, Independent Online: 18 February 
2002.
Former President Thabo Mbeki 
delivering his State of the Nation 
address at the opening of 
Parliament in February 2002.
Photograph: Trevor Samson ©
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He also named nine further hospitals 
that would commence the programme 
within the next 100 days.
However, once again falling foul of 
public opinion and her own department 
– which had initially claimed that 
the Gauteng roll-out was within the 
parameters set by the Health MinMEC 
– the Minister of Health publicly 
rebuked Shilowa. Although Shilowa 
gave the impression of backing down 
after a behind-the-scenes meeting, the 
Gauteng programme continued. By 
October 2002, Shilowa was in a position 
to announce that Nevirapine was 
available at 70% of all health facilities in 
Gauteng.
During this period, politics and law 
developed an interesting dialectic. The 
pressure of the ongoing legal action 
forced government back into court, 
and the different stages of the appeal 
and application for execution order 
further spurred advocacy and social 
mobilisation – which in turn placed new 
pressures on government. 
At its national executive committee 
meeting in January 2002, and in 
discussion with its legal team, the 
TAC had decided to embark on an 
offensive in response to the appeal, and 
to return to the Pretoria High Court to 
seek an order of execution on the part 
of the judgment that instructed that 
Nevirapine be made available where 
capacity existed. The justification for 
this action was that it could save up 
to 10 lives a day during the period in 
which legal processes around the appeal 
took place – approximately six months. 
Outside and inside of court, the TAC 
argued that this approach was validated 
by developments in the political arena 
such as President Mbeki’s 2002 State of 
the Nation address and the extension 
of the programme in Gauteng and 
KwaZulu-Natal.
On 1 March 2002, demonstrations took 
place at the Pretoria High Court during 
the hearing of government’s application 
for leave to appeal to the Constitutional 
Court and the TAC’s application for 
an execution order, which were heard 
together. Ten days later, on 11 March 
2002, another judgment was handed 
down in favour of the TAC. In this 
judgment, the High Court granted the 
execution order and drew attention to 
the TAC’s argument that up to 10 lives 
a day could be saved by execution of 
orders 1 and 2, and that this was not 
denied by government.
Inexplicably, government decided 
to seek leave to appeal against this 
judgment directly to the Constitutional 
Court. In response, the TAC’s legal 
team quickly filed a counter-application 
arguing that government’s main purpose 
for further legal action was solely to 
stultify the execution order. New legal 
issues arose as to whether interlocutory 
orders could be appealed. The matter 
was heard on 22 March 2002 and 
judgment was handed down three days 
later.
In the days immediately before 
the hearing, government had 
taken advantage of the decision by 
Boehringer Ingelheim to withdraw its 
application to the U.S. Food & Drug 
Administration for the registration of 
Nevirapine as preventing intrapartum 
HIV transmission. Inside (and 
outside) of court, government cast this 
development as a safety issue, justifying 
its caution in making the medicine 
more widely available. However, 
the High Court saw this argument 
as a red herring, pointing out that if 
the registration of Nevirapine was 
withdrawn, it would apply to all uses of 
the drug, including at government pilot 
sites.
During this time, it seemed as if sensible 
legal advice to government was the last 
On all key issues, the High Court found in favour of the TAC 
and issued a bold and original order. The judgment was 
welcomed in South Africa and worldwide, but attracted the 
ire of government and a number of legal academics. 
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thing driving its case. It was as if a nerve 
had been touched and had triggered an 
irrational response that took everything 
to the extreme, regardless of public 
perceptions, lives lost or the cost of 
ongoing legal action. Thus, on 26 March 
2002 (one day after the Pretoria High 
Court had dismissed the attempt to 
appeal the execution order) government 
launched a further and final application 
for leave to appeal – this time directly 
to the Constitutional Court. The 
application was heard on 3 April 2002.
In the court of public opinion, 
government’s various appeals were 
lambasted by newspaper editorials and 
political cartoonists. The appeals were 
also a failure of legal strategy. Although 
the legal issues that the Constitutional 
Court had to decide in the latest 
appeal were narrow and different from 
those it would consider in the main 
appeal, they could not be decided 
without considering the broader issues, 
including the rationality of the PMTCT 
policy. The result was that government 
itself created a situation where the 
issues of the case were aired in the 
Constitutional Court a month before 
the date set for the full appeal.
During the hearing, the Constitutional 
Court judges appeared to be at a loss 
as to why government was so fiercely 
opposed to the execution order. 
Not surprisingly, on 4 April 2002, 
the Constitutional Court refused 
government leave to appeal against the 
order of execution.
Constitutional 
advocacy on the 
streets and in court
On 17 April 2002 – two weeks 
before the main appeal hearing in the 
Constitutional Court – Cabinet took 
South Africa and the world by surprise 
by releasing a statement on HIV 
and AIDS that, among other things, 
promised:
[…] a Universal Roll-out Plan to be 
completed as soon as possible, in 
preparation for the post-December 
2002 period.102 
For the first time, Cabinet publicly 
acknowledged that ARV drug 
treatments:
[…] could help improve the conditions 
of [people living with HIV and AIDS] 
if administered at certain stages in 
the progression of the condition, 
102  Statement by Cabinet on HIV/AIDS, 17 April 
2002.
in accordance with international 
standards.103
Against this backdrop, the TAC 
mobilised for the last leg of the case – to 
be heard in the Constitutional Court. 
A decision was taken to rally ‘Stand Up 
for Your Rights’ marches on the first 
day of the Constitutional Court hearing 
and demonstrations were prepared in 
Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. 
In Johannesburg, over 5 000 people 
marched to the Constitutional Court in 
support of the TAC.
On 2 May 2002, the Constitutional 
Court was filled with activists, doctors, 
nurses and the media. Two months 
later, on 5 July 2002, the judgments in 
the TAC case and related matters were 
handed down.
Unanimously, the Constitutional Court 
decided that government’s policy 
had not met the state’s constitutional 
obligations to provide people with 
access to health care services in a 
manner that was reasonable and took 
account of pressing social needs. 
Drawing on its own prior judgments 
and foreign jurisprudence, the Court 
confirmed the judiciary’s right to issue 
instructions to government to amend 
103 Ibid.
Co-founder of the Treatment 
Action Campaign Zackie Achmat 
(left) with former President 
Nelson Mandela, 
27 July 2002.
Photograph: Andrew October & 
Treatment Action Campaign ©
 
56 Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Chapter 2 Changing trends in the South African public interest litigation environment
policies where these were found to be 
unconstitutional. The judgment also 
insisted on the court’s right to:
[…] ensure that effective relief is 
granted [and to exercise] supervisory 
jurisdiction.104 
Without contradicting the High Court, 
the Constitutional Court stopped short 
of setting time frames for government 
on the basis that it accepted the 
bona fides of commitments made by 
government whose policy was no longer 
as rigid as it was when proceedings 
commenced. Instead, it ordered 
government without delay to:
(a) Remove the restrictions that 
prevent Nevirapine from being 
made available for the purpose of 
reducing the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV at public hospitals 
and clinics that are not research and 
training sites.
(b) Permit and facilitate the use 
of Nevirapine for the purpose of 
reducing the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV and to make it 
available for this purpose at hospitals 
and clinics when in the judgement 
of the attending medical practitioner 
104  Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action 
Campaign & Others (No. 2) [2002] ZACC 15; 
2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), paragraph 106.
acting in consultation with the 
medical superintendent of the facility 
concerned this is medically indicated, 
which shall if necessary include that 
the mother concerned has been 
appropriately tested and counselled.
(c) Make provision, if necessary, for 
counsellors based at public hospitals 
and clinics other than the research 
and training sites, to be trained for 
the counselling necessary for the use 
of Nevirapine to reduce the risk of 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV.
(d) Take reasonable measures to 
extend the testing and counselling 
facilities at hospitals and clinics 
throughout the public health sector 
to facilitate and expedite the use 
of Nevirapine for the purpose of 
reducing the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV.105
Ironically, in light of the April Cabinet 
resolution, this was arguably a more 
intrusive order than that of the High 
Court. Time frames and an instruction 
to return to court were replaced with 
instructions requiring immediate 
action. Despite this, some observers 
have argued that, given the life and 
death nature of the human rights 
105  Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action 
Campaign & Others op.cit, paragraph 135.3.
issue and the history of government’s 
conduct in the case, a supervisory order 
was both justified and necessary as it 
would make it easier to monitor and 
oversee compliance.
Follow-up
The judgment of the Constitutional 
Court did not end the disputes over the 
provision of PMTCT services. After it 
was handed down, pressure continued 
to be necessary to ensure provinces 
complied with the court order. The 
TAC held meetings with the Director 
General of the Department of Health, 
the Deputy President of South Africa, 
and with MECs in the three least 
compliant provinces.
In September 2002, the TAC took a 
decision to launch rolling contempt of 
court proceedings against individual 
provinces, and this decision was 
communicated to the Director General. 
This triggered government’s first serious 
attempt to provide the TAC with the 
information that the Constitutional 
Court held it was under a duty to 
make available. The information was 
inadequate but reflected a creeping 
compliance that benefited parents and 
children. For example, on 16 October 
On 5 July 2002, the Constitutional Court handed down 
judgments in the TAC case and related matters. Unanimously, 
the Court decided that government’s policy had not met 
the state’s constitutional obligations to provide people 
with access to health care services in a manner that was 
reasonable and took account of pressing social needs.
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2002, an email was received from a 
doctor in the Limpopo province saying 
that the provincial health department 
there had:
[…] at long last [given] permission for 
the implementation of the PMTCT 
programme. I think this was due to 
pressure from the TAC/courts. [The] 
initiative came from their side this time 
and they seem to be in quite a hurry to 
get the programme up and running.
Lessons
As we highlight in the remainder of this 
publication, the TAC case is an almost 
perfect model of how to combine 
social mobilisation with litigation. It is 
without a doubt a shining example as to 
how litigation – when run properly and 
as part of a series of broader strategies – 
can achieve social change.
However, the one aspect of the TAC 
case that was, in retrospect, inadequate 
was its follow-up after the court victory. 
This is notwithstanding the efforts 
referred to above. The deficiencies 
in follow-up and their effect are well 
explained by Jonathan Berger:
Perhaps because of its high profile 
work regarding the implementation 
of the public sector ARV treatment 
programme – which owes its existence 
in large part to the Court victory 
– many people believe that the 
TAC has continually monitored the 
implementation of [the judgment], 
putting pressure on government to 
comply with the order. Given the 
detail of the order granted by the 
Constitutional Court, in some ways 
perhaps dispensing with the need for 
a structural interdict, it should have 
been possible for an organisation 
of the TAC’s size and strength to do 
what is clearly required to ensure 
effective implementation. But this did 
not happen. Despite recognising the 
importance of the issue in the case, the 
organisation’s focus was largely on the 
bigger picture, seeing [the judgment] 
as an entry point to develop the right 
to health in general and access to 
ARV treatment in particular. The TAC 
admits that it was a mistake to take its 
eye off the ball. Its current programme 
of action thus focuses attention 
on improving on the state’s MTCT 
prevention programme.106
106  Jonathan Berger, Litigating for Social Justice 
in Post-Apartheid South Africa: A Focus on 
Health and Education, in Varun Gauri & Daniel 
M Brinks (eds), Courting Social Justice: Judicial 
Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in 
the Developing World, 1st Edition, Cambridge 
University Press: 2008, page 80.
Berger adds that:
[h]ad this work happened earlier, the 
drug regimen used in the PMTCT 
programme may have been improved 
– in line with current World Health 
Organization guidelines. Certainly, 
coverage of the programme, uptake 
and its linkages with the ARV 
treatment programme, would in all 




Despite the concerns about follow-
up, it is important to appreciate the 
extraordinary practical effects of the 
case. These effects were not only about 
the provision of treatment to prevent 
MTCT of HIV. Rather it was about the 
manner in which South Africa would 
deal with and treat HIV and AIDS in 
general.
In 2000, the scale of the HIV and 
AIDS pandemic in South Africa was 
staggering. Whereas the prevalence of 
HIV among women attending public 
antenatal clinics had been less than 
1% in 1990, by 1995 it was more than 
107 Ibid.
A Treatment Action Campaign 
demonstration in Durban, March 
2002.
Photograph: Richard Shorey ©
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10%, and by 2000 it had passed 24%. 
Thus, almost a quarter of all pregnant 
women attending public health facilities 
in South Africa had HIV, and there was 
no sign of the rise in infections levelling 
off.108
When the TAC case was first 
conceptualised, it was hoped that it 
would be the first step towards achieving 
universal treatment for all people living 
with HIV. In this regard, the TAC 
saw the PMTCT litigation as an ideal 
starting point in dealing with the issue 
as opposed to, for example, litigation 
seeking ARVs for all HIV-positive people 
(which was regarded as too expensive to 
have good prospects), or ARVs for rape 
survivors (where the absence of clinical 
trials would be an obstacle to success).
Ultimately, the TAC did indeed achieve 
universal treatment for everyone living 
with HIV. This was because of the 
skilful way in which the TAC not merely 
succeeded in the litigation but regarded 
this as just one component of its overall 
struggle for access to medicines.
The effects are described compellingly 
by Justice Edwin Cameron (who was 
not a Constitutional Court judge at the 
time of the TAC decision):
As a matter of political history, the 
court’s decision was the pivot that 
eventually forced government to 
take decisive action in the epidemic. 
Although it responded grudgingly 
at first, government eventually gave 
effect to the ruling. Large-scale 
provision of ARVs began 30 months 
later, in December 2004. 
Today, well over two million people in 
South Africa are living because of ARV 
treatment. […] no one, rich or poor, 
108  Cameron, Justice – A Personal Account op.cit., 
pages 140-141.
employed or unemployed, is denied 
treatment for AIDS because they 
cannot afford it. 
The South African government 
programme to provide antiretroviral 
medications is the largest publicly 
provided AIDS treatment programme 
in the world. This is the most 
significant practical outcome of the 
court’s decision. Although too many 
people are still dying of AIDS, the 
decision saved many lives. More even 
than Grootboom, the Nevirapine 
case materially changed the lives of 
hundreds of thousands and ultimately 
millions of people: it enabled them to 
not die. In this way, the court’s decision 
had dramatic practical force.109
As Cameron explains, this was in part 
because the Court’s decision:
[…] had a profound effect on public 
ideas and public discussion. […] It was 
a rebuke not only for government 
inaction on AIDS drugs, but for the 
anguished and utterly unnecessary 
debate that led to that inaction. That 
poor women had a legal right to use 
anti-retroviral drugs to protect their 
babies from HIV transmission, and 
that government was constitutionally 
obliged to offer them the choice to do 
so, dealt a blow that would eventually 
prove fatal to the presidential discourse 
of denialism.110
109  Cameron, Justice – A Personal Account op.cit., 
page 197.
110  Cameron, Justice – A Personal Account op.cit., 
pages 197 and 198-199.
■ 
The Mazibuko 
case on access 
to water
One of the most controversial decisions 
of the Constitutional Court in the 
last few years is the decision in the 
Mazibuko case.111 This case was the first 
and thus far only case on the right of 
access to sufficient water to reach the 
Constitutional Court.
Background
The applicants in the Mazibuko case 
were five residents of Phiri, Soweto. 
Phiri is one of the poorest areas in 
Johannesburg. Many of its residents 
cannot afford to pay for basic services 
and water. Properties in Phiri are often 
occupied by multiple residents, all using 
the same water supply.
Until 2003, the residents of Phiri 
were provided with unlimited water 
in their homes, charged on a ‘deemed 
consumption’ basis at the rate of R68 
per month. This rate assumed a monthly 
consumption of 20 kilolitres per 
household per month. It was part of the 
apartheid legacy of charging a fixed rate 
for water usage, irrespective of actual 
consumption, in the absence of water 
meters.
However, due to numerous factors, 
including Soweto’s aging and leaking 
water infrastructure and a culture 
of non-payment (in protest against 
discriminatory service delivery), 
enormous amounts of water were lost in 
111  Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others [2009] ZACC 28; 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC).
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Soweto. Very little revenue in respect of 
water consumption was generated there.
As a result, the company responsible 
for providing water and sanitation 
in Johannesburg – Johannesburg 
Water – and the City of Johannesburg 
decided that it was necessary to alter the 
pattern of water usage in Soweto. They 
developed a plan that aimed to reduce 
unaccounted-for water, rehabilitate the 
water network, reduce demand for water 
and improve the rate of payment.
Phiri was selected as the area where the 
plan would first be implemented. In 
2003 and 2004, residents were required 
to choose between a prepayment meter 
(PPM) and a yard tap. The yard tap had 
a restricted water flow providing only 
six kilolitres of water per month. The 
PPMs dispensed six kilolitres of free 
water per household per month, and 
once this free water allocation had been 
consumed, the PPMs automatically cut 
off the water supply unless more credit 
was purchased.
Residents with PPMs, unlike those in 
other suburbs of Johannesburg, were 
not given the option to buy water on 
credit. However, prepayment users paid 
significantly less for water than those on 
credit meters.
The response of members of the Phiri 
community was to resist the roll-out of 
the PPMs. There were two organisations 
integrally involved in this process – the 
Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and the 
Coalition Against Water Privatisation. 
Among the APF’s core objectives were: 
[…] a halt to all privatisation of public 
sector entities and return of public 
control and ownership; [and] the 
co-ordination and intensification 
of antiprivatisation struggles in 
communities.112
The move towards litigation was part of 
the effort to resist the roll-out of PPMs. 
As Dugard and Langford explain:
Determined not to accept PPMs, 
the Phiri community embarked on 
a course of direct resistance against 
the roll-out. However, the resistance 
was critically undermined after 
the City secured a wide-ranging 
interdict. Activists were prohibited 
from coming within 50 meters of any 
PPM operations and private security 
companies were authorised to assist 
112  Jackie Dugard, Civic Action and Legal 
Mobilisation: The Phiri water meters case, in Jeff 
Handmaker & Remko Berkhout (eds), Mobilising 
Social Justice in South Africa: Perspectives from 
Researchers and Practitioners, Hivos/ISS Civil 
Society Building Knowledge Programme/Pretoria 
University Law Press, The Hague: 2010, page 87.
in managing any infringements of 
these terms. This effectively put an 
end to the direct activism. With this 
avenue of protest effectively closed 
off, the community turned to the 
option of rights-based litigation as a 
tactic to challenge PPMs (together 
with the ‘standpipe’ yard taps that 
the City offered some residents as an 
alternative to PPMs).113
Litigation
The case was launched in the 
Johannesburg High Court in 2006. It 
was factually complex and involved 
enormous amounts of research and 
marshalling of evidence regarding 
budgets and policy considerations.
The litigation was brought with 
the assistance of experienced and 
knowledgeable public interest litigators. 
CALS served as the attorney for the 
applicants. Though the APF and the 
Coalition Against Water Privatisation 
were actively involved in the process, 
they did not participate as named 
applicants in the litigation.
As the quote from Dugard and 
Langford above makes clear, the 
litigation was “a tactic to challenge 
113 Dugard & Langford op.cit., page 43.
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PPMs”. During the writing of this 
publication, Dugard confirmed to us 
that this litigation was always primarily 
about the PPMs.
However, in some respects, this was 
not the way the case was presented to 
the court. The relief sought and the 
manner in which the case was presented, 
especially before the High Court, was 
broader and covered two main issues:
•  Firstly, the applicants sought to have 
the use of PPMs declared unlawful. 
•  Secondly, the applicants challenged 
the City’s free basic water policy. In 
terms of this policy, every household 
in Johannesburg was provided 
with six kilolitres of free water per 
month. The applicants contended 
that this was unreasonable and 
constitutionally insufficient and that 
they were entitled to 50 litres per 
person per day free of charge.
Before the matter was heard in the 
High Court, the City made an offer 
of settlement. It offered to make 
its supplementary water provision 
measures, which would in effect have 
provided those in need with unlimited 
water, an order of court. The settlement 
offer would have ensured that those 
who required additional water but were 
unable to pay for it would certainly 
be able to access at least 50 litres per 
person per day. The City was prepared 
to have the settlement made an order 
of court, with the consequence that 
non-compliance could be enforced by 
contempt proceedings. The applicants, 
however, refused the offer because it 
would have required them to relinquish 
the challenge to the PPMs.
The matter was then argued in the High 
Court and the applicants succeeded. 
They secured an order that the right to 
water entailed a free basic water supply 
of 50 litres per person per day and that 
PPMs were unlawful.114
The City then appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. The Court reduced 
the amount of water required to be 
supplied to 42 litres per person per day 
and required the City to reformulate its 
policy in light of this finding. The Court 
also found that the use of PPMs was 
unlawful but suspended the effect of its 
declaration of invalidity for two years 
to allow the City to amend its bylaws to 
allow for PPMs. This meant that PPMs 
could continue to be used during this 
period and raised a real possibility that 
the City would regularise the use of 
114  Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others [2008] ZAGPHC 106.
PPMs within two years.
Despite the alterations made by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal to the High 
Court order, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal judgment still represented a 
significant victory for the applicants.
The applicants, however, elected to 
appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal 
judgment to the Constitutional Court. 
This was primarily because of the 
applicants’ concerns regarding the order 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal on the 
PPM issue.115
The applicants’ decision to appeal 
was an important and, with hindsight, 
ultimately damaging one. The appeal 
by the applicants in turn resulted in a 
cross-appeal by the City, meaning that 
the entire case was placed before the 
Constitutional Court. It is clear that the 
City would not have sought to appeal to 
the Constitutional Court in the absence 
of the appeal by the applicants.
In the Constitutional Court, the City 
did not seek to defend the policy that 
the applicants had originally challenged. 
Instead, it updated and revised the 
policy, partly in light of the challenge, 
and sought to put additional evidence 
115 Dugard & Langford op.cit., pages 44-45.
One of the most controversial decisions of the 
Constitutional Court in the last few years is the decision 
in the Mazibuko case. This case was the first and thus 
far only case on the right of access to sufficient water to 
reach the Constitutional Court. 
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before the Constitutional Court of 
the changes it had made. Crucially, 
the City placed evidence before the 
Constitutional Court that it had 
expanded its indigent persons policy 
to include among others the following 
benefits:
•  People who were registered as 
indigent would receive 10 kilolitres 
of free water per month, rather than 
the standard six kilolitres provided 
to everyone with a PPM.
•  An allowance was made for an 
additional four-kilolitre allocation 
for emergencies.
•  A mechanism was created for 
individuals to make representations 
for an additional allocation 
depending on their personal 
circumstances (including, for 
example, people living with HIV and 
AIDS).
These measures were provided under 
the City’s interim policy for indigent 
persons. In terms of the final policy that 
it intended to implement, every indigent 
person would be entitled to at least 50 
litres of free basic water per day, which 
was essentially what the applicants were 
asking the Constitutional Court to 
order.
The applicants disputed the admissibility 
of this new evidence, arguing that the 
policy should be evaluated as it was at 
the time the challenge was launched. 
The Constitutional Court rejected these 
contentions, holding that the duty of 
progressive realisation requires the 
state continually to review and revise 
its policies. The Court held that the 
evidence was admissible:
[…] for the purpose of showing that the 
City accepts an obligation to continue 
to revise its policy consistently with 
the obligation to ensure progressive 
realisation of rights, and that it has 
done so.116 
The judgment of the 
Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court overturned 
the judgments of both lower courts, 
finding that the City’s free basic water 
policy was reasonable. The Court 
refused to give quantified content to the 
right to water, holding that this would 
not be appropriate. It reaffirmed the 
approach to socio-economic rights that 
it had taken in the Grootboom and TAC 
cases. It found that the right to water:
116  Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others [2009] ZACC 28 op.cit., paragraph 40.
[…] does not require the state upon 
demand to provide every person with 
sufficient water […]; rather it requires 
the state to take reasonable legislative 
and other measures progressively to 
realise the achievement of the right 
of access to sufficient water, within 
available resources.117 
Furthermore, the Court found that:
[…] ordinarily it is institutionally 
inappropriate for a court to determine 
precisely what the achievement of any 
particular social and economic right 
entails and what steps government 
should take to ensure the progressive 
realisation of the right. This is a matter, 
in the first place, for the legislature 
and executive, the institutions of 
government best placed to investigate 
social conditions in the light of 
available budgets and to determine 
what targets are achievable in relation 
to social and economic rights. Indeed, 
it is desirable as a matter of democratic 
accountability that they should do so 
for it is their programmes and promises 
that are subjected to democratic 
popular choice.118
117  Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others [2009] ZACC 28 op.cit., paragraph 50.
118  Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others [2009] ZACC 28 op.cit., paragraph 61. 
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The Court pointed out that its orders 
in the Grootboom and TAC cases 
illustrated: 
[…] institutional respect for the policy-
making function of the two other arms 
of government. The Court did not 
seek to draft policy or to determine its 
content. Instead, having found that 
the policy adopted by government did 
not meet the required constitutional 
standard of reasonableness, the Court, 
in Grootboom, required government 
to revise its policy to provide for those 
most in need and, in Treatment Action 
Campaign No 2, to remove anomalous 
restrictions.119
The Constitutional Court summarised 
its approach to socio-economic rights 
cases as follows: 
[T]he positive obligations imposed 
upon government by the social and 
economic rights in our Constitution will 
be enforced by courts in at least the 
following ways. If government takes no 
steps to realise the rights, the courts 
will require government to take steps. 
If government’s adopted measures are 
unreasonable, the courts will similarly 
require that they be reviewed so as 
to meet the constitutional standard 
119  Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others [2009] ZACC 28 op.cit., paragraph 65. 
of reasonableness. From Grootboom, 
it is clear that a measure will be 
unreasonable if it makes no provision 
for those most desperately in need. 
If government adopts a policy with 
unreasonable limitations or exclusions, 
as in Treatment Action Campaign 
No 2, the Court may order that those 
are removed. Finally, the obligation 
of progressive realisation imposes a 
duty upon government continually 
to review its policies to ensure that 
the achievement of the right is 
progressively realised.120
The Constitutional Court held that 
the High Court and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal had overlooked these 
considerations and erred by quantifying 
the content of the right. 
Despite the applicants’ disavowal 
of reliance on the concept of the 
‘minimum core’,121 the Constitutional 
120  Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others [2009] ZACC 28 op.cit., paragraph 67.
121  A ‘minimum core’ approach to socio-economic 
rights involves a determination of some basic 
level of the relevant socio-economic right 
that every person is, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, able to claim. In both the 
Grootboom case (Government of the Republic 
of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others 
op.cit., paragraphs 29-33) and the TAC case 
(Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action 
Campaign & Others op.cit., paragraphs 26-39), 
the Constitutional Court effectively rejected 
this approach in favour of a reasonableness 
approach.
Court interpreted their free basic water 
claim as being “similar to”122 a minimum 
core argument. The Court rejected the 
claim for the same reasons as in the 
Grootboom case.
Finally, the Constitutional Court spelt 
out its vision of the role and purpose of 
socio-economic rights litigation. The 
passage of the Mazibuko judgment is 
worth quoting at length in view of its 
potential effect on future public interest 
litigation:
The outcome of the case is that the 
applicants have not persuaded this 
Court to specify what quantity of water 
is “sufficient water” within the meaning 
of Section 27 of the Constitution. Nor 
have they persuaded the Court that 
the City’s policy is unreasonable. The 
applicants submitted during argument 
that if this were to be the result, 
litigation in respect of the positive 
obligations imposed by social and 
economic rights would be futile. It is 
necessary to consider this submission.
The purpose of litigation concerning the 
positive obligations imposed by social 
and economic rights should be to hold 
the democratic arms of government to 
account through litigation. In so doing, 
122  Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others [2009] ZACC 28 op.cit., paragraph 52.
The Mazibuko litigation was a tactic to challenge 
prepayment water meters, but in some respects, this was 
not the way the case was presented to the court.
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litigation of this sort fosters a form of 
participative democracy that holds 
government accountable and requires 
it to account between elections over 
specific aspects of government policy.
When challenged as to its policies 
relating to social and economic 
rights, the government agency must 
explain why the policy is reasonable. 
Government must disclose what it 
has done to formulate the policy: 
its investigation and research, the 
alternatives considered, and the 
reasons why the option underlying the 
policy was selected. The Constitution 
does not require government to be held 
to an impossible standard of perfection. 
Nor does it require courts to take over 
the tasks that in a democracy should 
properly be reserved for the democratic 
arms of government. Simply put, 
through the institution of the courts, 
government can be called upon to 
account to citizens for its decisions. 
This understanding of social and 
economic rights litigation accords with 
the founding values of our Constitution 
and, in particular, the principles that 
government should be responsive, 
accountable and open.
Not only must government show that 
the policy it has selected is reasonable, 
it must show that the policy is being 
reconsidered consistent with the 
obligation to “progressively realise” 
social and economic rights in mind. 
A policy that is set in stone and never 
revisited is unlikely to be a policy that 
will result in the progressive realisation 
of rights consistently with the 
obligations imposed by the social and 
economic rights in our Constitution.
This case illustrates how litigation 
concerning social and economic rights 
can exact a detailed accounting from 
government and, in doing so, impact 
beneficially on the policy-making 
process. The applicants, in argument, 
rued the fact that the City had 
continually amended its policies during 
the course of the litigation. In fact, 
that consequence of the litigation (if 
such it was) was beneficial. Having to 
explain why the Free Basic Water policy 
was reasonable shone a bright, cold 
light on the policy that undoubtedly 
revealed flaws. The continual revision 
of the policy in the ensuing years 
has improved the policy in a manner 
entirely consistent with an obligation of 
progressive realisation.123
123  Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others [2009] ZACC 28 op.cit., paragraphs 159-
163.
Lessons
The Constitutional Court judgment 
provoked outrage and dismay on the 
part of some public interest litigators 
and commentators, who interpreted 
it as the death knell for South African 
socio-economic rights litigation. It 
has been said, for example, that the 
Mazibuko judgment:
•  […] represents a retreat for the Court 
from its hey-day when (in the TAC 
case) it ordered the state to take 
steps to make Nevirapine available;124 
•  […] endorses the neo-liberal 
paradigm of water provision adopted 
by the city, a policy which would 
often deny poor people access to 
adequate water because they would 
be unable to pay for the water 
needed to live;125 
and that it is
•  […] a classic example of a lazy 
legalism as well as wholly biased and 
contradictory reasoning.126
124  Pierre De Vos, Water is life (but life is cheap), 
www.constitutionallyspeaking.co.za: 13 October 
2009.
125 Ibid.
126  Constitutional Court rules against Phiri, Coalition 
Against Water Privatisation, www.apf.org.za: 8 
October 2009. 
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There is no doubt that the Mazibuko 
judgment is unhelpful for future 
litigation on socio-economic rights 
in South Africa. However, we do not 
consider that it has had or will have the 
apocalyptic effect initially claimed by 
its critics. 
In what follows, we distil five main 
public interest litigation lessons from 
the Mazibuko case.
Taking a cautious 
approach when litigating 
rights without precedent
The first lesson is that when litigating 
rights in respect of which no precedent 
exists, taking a cautious, incremental 
approach to the relief sought is the 
prudent option.
The Mazibuko case was the first serious 
attempt to litigate the right to water. 
It was suggested by a number of our 
respondents and by commentators that 
the first right to water case should have 
been on behalf of those who are worst 
off with respect to water – the many 
people who have no access to water at 
all – rather than people who were in the 
relatively advantaged position of having 
access to running water in their homes 
but could not afford to pay for it. This is 
a variation on the criticism that the first 
case on a particular right should take as 
its focus the worst off, or the poorest of 
the poor.
It would have been difficult for the City 
of Johannesburg to resist, for example, 
a structural interdict compelling it 
to demonstrate what it was doing 
to extend access to water to the 
approximately 750 000 residents in the 
City who have none at all.
We consider that this point has much 
force and that it demonstrates how 
future cases on the right to water (and 
other socio-economic rights) might be 
run. Indeed, LHR is currently in the 
process of building and launching just 
such a case, on the right to water and on 
behalf of farming communities living 
without access to safe and clean water in 
the Northern Cape province.
We do not suggest that litigation must 
necessarily begin with the worst off. 
However, where it is possible to persuade 
a court that the relief sought would 
amount to giving content to a right in 
an incremental, restrained manner, it 
is more likely to succeed. The sexual 
orientation litigation discussed earlier is 
an example of this.
In fairness to the applicants in the 
Mazibuko case though, this point must 
not be taken too far. As we have made 
clear above, irrespective of how the case 
was characterised in the media, and even 
in the litigation itself, it seems clear that 
the main concern of the applicants was 
to resist the installation of PPMs. At 
its core, therefore, the case was not as 
much about the City’s water policy as 
it was about an attempt to prevent the 
implementation of the privatisation of 
water (and ultimately other) municipal 
services.
When understood in this way, the 
reasons why the case was not run on 
behalf of residents with no access to 
water at all become clear. Indeed, once 
one accepts the proposition that the 
case was fundamentally a case about 
resisting PPMs and privatisation, it is 
hard to conceive of better applicants.
However, with this understanding, 
additional difficulties which are of 
importance in their own right are 
revealed. 
The first difficulty is that litigation 
is not generally a reliable means to 
obtain direct large-scale and radical 
policy change such as reversing the 
privatisation of the provision of basic 
services.
If the Mazibuko litigation is viewed 
The Constitutional Court judgment in the Mazibuko case 
provoked outrage and dismay on the part of some public 
interest litigators and commentators, who interpreted 
it as the death knell for South African socio-economic 
rights litigation.
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as being primarily about PPMs and 
privatisation – and with the obvious 
benefit of hindsight – the case had 
a high mountain to climb. This case 
is then materially different from the 
Grootboom case (where no real 
policy considerations were at play) 
and the TAC case (which was about 
policy completely precluding access 
to medicines and on very dubious 
grounds).
The second difficulty is that 
achieving two different objectives 
in a single case can be problematic 
and counterproductive. In this case, 
the two aims – challenging PPMs 
and privatisation on the one hand, 
and challenging the free basic water 
policy on the other – did not always sit 
comfortably with each other.
As one of our respondents explained, if 
the aim was primarily to ensure wider 
access to water, it might well have 
made more sense for the organisations 
involved to organise registration and 
education campaigns to maximise the 
number of people who registered for 
the City’s indigent persons benefits, 
thereby ensuring that more people had 
access to the 10 kilolitres of free water 
per month. However, this route would 
arguably have undermined the other leg 
of the case – against PPMs.
The same potential tension is evident 
in the decisions the applicants had to 
take regarding whether to accept the 
settlement proposal and whether to 
appeal to the Constitutional Court. In 
both cases, the prepayment water issue 
suggested taking one route (refusing 
the settlement and proceeding with 
the appeal), whereas the free basic 
water policy issue might have suggested 




practicality of the order 
sought
The second lesson relates to the vital 
importance of reassuring courts that the 
order sought is both jurisprudentially 
sustainable and practically workable.
In the Mazibuko case, the practical 
and cost implications of the broad, 
ambitious relief sought by the 
applicants regarding the City’s free 
basic water policy ultimately counted 
against them. The applicants were 
unable to find any precedent in the 
world in which a court had ordered the 
provision of 50 litres per person per day 
free of charge, let alone in a developing 
and water-stressed country like South 
Africa.
Moreover, an order invalidating the use 
of PPMs (especially with immediate 
effect as the applicants sought) 
would have had enormous financial 
implications for the City. Huge sums 
of money had already been spent and 
over 80 000 meters had already been 
installed. This was inevitably going 
to raise a risk that even if the court 
found for the applicants on the merits 
of the attack, it would be inclined to 
suspend the declaration of invalidity in 
terms of Section 172(1)(b)(ii) of the 
Constitution while the City corrected 
the defect – thus allowing the PPMs 
to remain in place.127 This was the 
approach taken by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal.
At a broader level, we point out that the 
127  Section 172(1) of the Constitution provides:  
When deciding a constitutional matter within its 
power, a court—
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to 
the extent of its inconsistency; and
(b) may make any order that is just and 
equitable, including—
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect 
of the declaration of invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration 
of invalidity for any period and on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority 
to correct the defect.
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courts have, understandably, become 
increasingly receptive to requests by 
government departments for orders of 
suspending declarations of invalidity. 
This means that it is now critical for 
public interest litigants to consider at 
the outset whether:
•  there is a risk of the court granting 
suspension; 
•  the extent to which this would 
prevent the aims of the litigation 
being achieved; and
•  any evidence that could be placed 
before a court to dissuade it from 
granting such a suspension order. 
Causing indirect policy 
changes
A third lesson is that litigation can 
produce indirect policy changes, even 
where it is ultimately unsuccessful.
A City of Johannesburg official whom 
we interviewed commented that 
the mere existence of the Mazibuko 
litigation gave progressive bureaucrats 
in the City a lever with which to effect 
policy changes. The threat of an adverse 
order from the litigation made the City 
more responsive to such efforts than 
it otherwise would have been, and 
made the expansion of the indigent 
persons and social benefits programmes 
politically possible.
International experience suggests 
that litigation can give administrators 
who are willing to make changes 
political cover, or a tool for leverage.128 
This appears to have occurred in 
the Mazibuko case. The litigation 
contributed to a significant expansion of 
the City’s social services provision for 
128  See for example: Gerald N Rosenberg, The 
Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change?, 2nd Edition, University of Chicago Press: 
2008, pages 311-312.
indigent residents.
It is apparent that there are problems 
with the implementation of these types 
of policies – but it is here that extra-
legal strategies such as mass-registration 
campaigns, engagement with the City, 
and protests where necessary, are 
appropriate.
Value in spite of 
unsuccessful outcome
A fourth lesson that can be derived 
from the Mazibuko case is that litigation 
can serve valuable political purposes 
even when it is not successful.
It seems clear that there were significant 
benefits to running the Mazibuko 
litigation despite its unsuccessful 
outcome. Some of those involved 
argued that the benefits of having 
brought the case justified the decision 
of those involved: 
[T]he litigation was strategic – and 
successful – because it raised the 
profile of the issues and energised 
the movement at a time when direct 
protest had been crushed by state 
repression.129
Perceptions matter
The last lesson is that perceptions of 
litigation and its consequences matter. 
When it comes to trying to effect 
broad social change in government 
bureaucracies, perceptions of the results 
of litigation can be just as important 
as its actual direct legal effects. Even 
the tone and language of a judgment 
can be significant and may sometimes 
be more important than the ultimate 
order. For example, a leading gay rights 
activist in the US, Tom Stoddard, said 
129   Losers can be winners, Business Day: 20 October 
2009.
(when explaining the damage done by 
the failed sodomy reform case in the US 
Supreme Court):
The most important judicial body 
in the United States has expressed 
a certain distaste for gay men and 
women and suggested they may 
be treated differently from other 
Americans.130 
In another example, the immediate 
practical effects of the Grootboom 
judgment taken alone were really quite 
limited in scope. However, it was widely 
perceived as a significant victory for the 
poor and a bloody nose for government, 
a perception that contributed to the 
bringing into effect of the Housing 
Code and other changes in the housing 
policy environment.
By contrast, the Mazibuko judgment 
was perceived as a big win for 
government and a significant reversal 
for public interest litigation.
After the judgment was delivered, 
there was considerable anxiety that the 
progress made in terms of government 
responsiveness would be diminished as 
a consequence.
When we raised this issue with a 
senior City of Johannesburg official, he 
disagreed that this had been the effect of 
the Mazibuko case. He emphasised that 
the effect of the Grootboom case and 
other cases had only really permeated 
senior levels of officialdom, with the 
bulk of officials content simply to 
implement whatever instructions came 
from above. In relation to these senior 
officials, he felt that the Mazibuko case 
made them more trusting of balance 
in the litigation process because they 
considered that this case gave more 
130 Quoted from Andersen op.cit., page 98.
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emphasis to practicality as a relevant 
variable in implementing socio-
economic rights than the cases which 
preceded it. Thus, his view appeared to 
be that these senior officials viewed the 
Mazibuko judgment as assisting them 
– but only where they embarked on 
practical methods of addressing socio-
economic rights.
Accordingly, it appears to us that 
concerns about the Grootboom effect 
being dissipated by the Mazibuko case 
did not ultimately come to fruition. City 
officials with a sufficient understanding 
of the nuances of the Mazibuko 
judgment have taken cognisance of the 
fact that it was only the City’s belated 
efforts to amend and alter its policies 




case on access 
to electricity
Background
The applicants in the case of Joseph 
v City of Johannesburg131 were the 
tenants of a building in Johannesburg 
called Ennerdale Mansions. The 
tenants paid their electricity bills 
to the landlord as part of their rent 
accounts. The landlord had a contract 
with City Power132 for the provision of 
electricity to the building. However, the 
landlord had not paid City Power for 
the electricity supplied to the building. 
As a result, and without notice to the 
tenants, City Power disconnected 
the electricity supply to Ennerdale 
Mansions on 8 July 2008.
The tenants had no idea why their 
electricity was disconnected and 
formed a committee to investigate the 
131  Joseph & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others 
[2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC).
132  Private company responsible for the provision of 
electricity in Johannesburg, and wholly owned by 
the City of Johannesburg.
reasons for the disconnection. Members 
of the committee visited the City 
Council offices and were informed that 
the electricity had been disconnected 
because the landlord’s account was in 
arrears by about R400 000.
The disconnection had significant 
effects on the quality of life of the 
residents. Learners had to study by 
candlelight, food could not be stored 
as refrigeration was impossible, and 
heating was provided through the 
burning of paraffin or other fuels, with 
detrimental effect on the health of 
children and adults.
Many of the residents left the building 
as the lack of electricity made life 
there unbearable for them. Those who 
remained did so because it was the 
only accommodation in the area they 
could afford. The average household 
income at Ennerdale Mansions was 
R3 000-4 000 per month. Some of the 
households had no income at all.
Litigation
The residents approached the 
University of the Witwatersrand 
(Wits) Law Clinic and were advised to 
launch proceedings in the High Court. 
The litigation was brought with the 
Photograph: War on Want ©
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assistance of CALS.
On 21 July 2008, the applicants 
brought an application in two parts. 
Their case was a narrow one. They did 
not contend that they were entitled to 
free electricity, or that City Power was 
absolutely precluded from cutting off 
their electricity. What they contended 
was simply that they had a right to prior 
notice of the cut-off and a right to make 
representations to City Power before 
the cut-off occurred. The notice could 
have happened by means of a general 
poster in the foyer of the building, and 
representations could have been made 
in writing.
The first part of the application 
(Part A), which was brought on an 
urgent basis to operate as interim 
relief pending the resolution of the 
second part (Part B), sought an order 
requiring the respondents to reconnect 
the electricity supply to the building 
and requiring City Power to conclude 
temporary electricity use agreements 
with the applicants to govern the 
contractual relationship between the 
parties.
In Part B, the applicants sought a 
declaration stipulating that, before 
disconnecting the electricity supply 
to a building or residence, the 
respondents are required to ensure 
that the disconnection is procedurally 
fair as envisaged in the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(PAJA) – legislation that had been 
enacted to give effect to the right to 
administrative justice enshrined in 
Section 33 of the Constitution. PAJA 
creates wide-ranging procedural and 
substantive constraints on the exercise 
of public power.
Under the heading of procedural 
fairness, the applicants argued for 
a declaration that the electricity 
disconnection in this case was unlawful 
and invalid, as PAJA requires that:
•  affected persons receive adequate 
notice;
•  affected persons are afforded the 
right to make representations; and 
that
•  all relevant circumstances are 
taken into account, including the 
personal circumstances of those to 
be affected.
The High Court dismissed Part A (the 
urgent relief) on the ground that the 
applicants did not have a prima facie 
right to the relief sought in Part B. Later, 
when it was heard, Part B was dismissed 
on the ground that the residents had 
no contractual relationship with City 
Power and therefore had no rights that 
were affected by the disconnection. The 
High Court found that the landlord was 
entitled to notice of the disconnection 
because he had a contract with the City, 
but the residents were not.
The residents sought leave to appeal 
directly to the Constitutional Court. 
They conceded that they had no 
contractual rights against the City or 
City Power. They argued that they were 
nonetheless entitled to procedural 
fairness in terms of PAJA because access 
to electricity was a component of the 
right of access to adequate housing in 
terms of Section 26 of the Constitution.
They also argued that the disconnection 
affected their right to human dignity in 
terms of Section 10 of the Constitution, 
that they were entitled to be given 
notice before the cut-off, and that 
the City ought to have allowed them 
to make representations before the 
disconnection.
The Constitutional Court ruled in 
favour of the applicants, though not on 
the basis of the case they made out. The 
Court did not find that electricity was 
a component of the right of access to 
The Joseph case was a narrow one. The applicants did not 
contend that they were entitled to free electricity, or that 
City Power was absolutely precluded from cutting off their 
electricity. What they contended was simply that they had 
a right to prior notice of the cut-off and a right to make 
representations before the cut-off occurred.
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adequate housing. Instead, it ruled that 
when City Power supplied electricity 
to the building, it did so in fulfilment of 
its constitutional and statutory duty to 
provide basic municipal services to all 
persons living in the City:
When the applicants received 
electricity, they did so by virtue of 
their corresponding public law right to 
receive this basic municipal service. In 
depriving them of a service which they 
were already receiving as a matter of 
right, City Power was obliged to afford 
them procedural fairness before taking 
a decision which would materially and 
adversely affect that right.133
Procedural fairness required that the 
applicants had to be given 14 days’ 
pre-termination notice in the form of a 
physical notice placed in a prominent 
position in the building. Users were 
entitled to approach the City within 
the notice period in order to challenge 
the proposed termination or to tender 
arrangements to pay off arrears.
The Constitutional Court ordered the 
reconnection of the electricity supply 
to Ennerdale Mansions. Unfortunately, 
in the interim, the building’s wiring had 
133  Joseph & Others v City of Johannesburg & Others 
op.cit., paragraph 47.
been stolen. This made it impossible 
to reconnect the electricity without 
considerable expenditure to replace 
the wiring. The residents did not have 
access to the resources to pay for this 
and therefore did not obtain any direct 
relief as a result of the litigation.
Lessons
The advantages of narrow 
relief and defensive 
litigation
The first lesson derived from the Joseph 
case relates to the advantages that can 
result from narrow relief and defensive 
litigation.
The relief sought in Joseph was narrow 
and limited, despite the novelty of 
the legal argument in its favour. The 
effect of the order sought was merely 
to extend certain procedural fairness 
entitlements to people who lacked them 
under the law as it stood. Though the 
City of Johannesburg and City Power 
attempted to do so, it was not easy to 
paint this relief as imposing enormous 
burdens on them if it was granted. This 
made it easier for the court to grant the 
order sought.
The litigation was also defensive, 
rather than offensive, in the sense that 
it involved applicants who went to 
court to prevent the state from taking 
action which reduced their access to 
an important good. Several of our 
respondents felt that it is easier to 
obtain relief in such cases than in cases 
where the applicants turn to courts 
to require organs of state to provide a 
good.
Delivering meaningful 
outcomes for the 
applicants
The second lesson concerns the 
importance of trying to structure 
litigation in a manner that produces a 
meaningful outcome for those affected.
In the Joseph case, the applicants’ legal 
representatives tried to do precisely 
that. They were alive to the fact that a 
victory at the end of the day would not 
resolve their applicants’ urgent needs. 
Consequently, they sought the urgent 
interim reconnection order in Part A, 
pending the final determination in 
Part B.
Regrettably, the High Court refused 
the Part A relief, meaning that by the 
time Part B of the case succeeded in the 
Constitutional Court, the applicants 
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could no longer get any effective relief, 
since the wiring at Ennerdale Mansions 
had been stolen and electricity could 
not be restored.
With the benefit of hindsight, it might 
well have been appropriate to try to 
appeal the High Court’s refusal of the 
Part A application immediately to the 
Constitutional Court. 
Such a course was recently followed 
successfully in the case of South 
African Informal Traders Forum v 
City of Johannesburg,134 involving the 
removal by the City of Johannesburg 
of thousands of informal traders. 
In this case, when the High Court 
refused to grant urgent interim relief, 
the applicants felt that they had no 
other option but to take the bold 
step of appealing immediately to the 
Constitutional Court – which upheld 
the appeal and granted interim relief to 
the applicants.
No immediate relief but 
broader effects 
The third lesson relates to an awareness 
that sometimes litigation will have an 
effect on other people on the ground 
134  South African Informal Traders Forum & Others 
v City of Johannesburg & Others [2014] ZACC 8; 
2014 (6) BCLR 726 (CC).
even where the applicants obtain no 
relief themselves.
This was the case in Grootboom, and 
the Joseph case also demonstrates 
this very well. While the applicants 
got no effective relief (because the 
Constitutional Court’s order could 
not be implemented due to a lack of 
wiring) the tangible effects of the order 
were felt in a later case – Residents of 
Chiawelo Flats v Eskom135 & City of 
Johannesburg.136
This case involved a block of 420 flats 
in Soweto, housing many vulnerable 
people. Eskom had disconnected 
the electricity supply due to non-
payment. When the disconnection was 
challenged on the basis of the Joseph 
decision, the matter was settled by 
agreement and an order was issued in 
terms of which:
•  the electricity supply had to be 
reconnected; and
•  Eskom had to engage with each 
applicant separately to conclude 
individual agreements regarding 
electricity supply, including where 
appropriate:
135 Parastatal electricity utility.
136  Residents of Chiawelo Flats v Eskom & City of 
Johannesburg, South Gauteng High Court, Case 
No. 2010/35177.
[…] an affordable payment plan 
in respect of any arrears agreed 
between the parties.137
Moreover, the Joseph litigation 
also appears to have had effects 
on the manner in which the City 
of Johannesburg conducts itself 
on electricity disconnections due 
to arrears. This was confirmed 
independently by a respondent of ours 
working at a public interest organisation 
and by an official from the City. The 
City official indicated that there was a 
“palpable shift” away from mass cut-offs 
towards data clean-up, customer focus 
and accuracy as the main tools to drive 
the collection of outstanding debt, 
and he considered that the Joseph case 
helped force this “bureaucratic culture 
change”.
Deciding whether to 
pursue an appeal
The last lesson is about deciding 
whether to pursue an appeal to the 
Constitutional Court at all.
Having lost in the High Court, the 
applicants in the Joseph case wanted to 
appeal. Quite apart from ethical duties 
to the tenants, CALS had to decide 
137  Residents of Chiawelo Flats v Eskom & City of 
Johannesburg op.cit., paragraph 4.1.
Two of the lessons that can be derived from the Joseph 
case relate to the advantages that can result from narrow 
relief and defensive litigation, and to the importance of 
trying to structure litigation in a manner that produces a 
meaningful outcome for those affected.
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whether this was the correct move from 
a test case point of view or whether it 
would be better to wait for another case. 
Ultimately, CALS decided that the case 
should be appealed.
The Joseph case provides an instructive 
example of the factors that ought to be 
taken into account in deciding whether 
to pursue an appeal. It seems to us that 
the first question to be asked is always: 
What are the prospects of success? If 
those prospects are slim, then it will 
seldom be in the public interest to run 
the case. But what if, as here, the case 
was eminently plausible, albeit difficult? 
In other words, what if it is a 50-50 
case?
In those circumstances, it seems to us 
that the focus shifts to another enquiry: 
Is this the right case to run on this 
issue? Clearly, where an issue has a 
50-50 chance of success and will have 
a positive effect on people’s lives in the 
event of a court victory, it ought to be 
litigated. But is this the right case in 
which to ventilate the issue?
In determining this, we believe 
the following questions need to be 
answered:
• Are these the right applicants?
• Are these the right respondents?
•  Is this the best context to establish 
the right contended for?
•  Is there any deficiency in the papers 
or in the evidence?
•  Do the applicants have any 
alternative remedies?
•  What will be the consequences of 
an unsuccessful attempt to run this 
case?
We address each of these questions in 
turn in the context of the Joseph appeal. 
Firstly, were the applicants the right 
applicants? The applicants were 
certainly poor. However, they were not 
the poorest of the poor. If they were the 
poorest of the poor, the City’s argument 
would probably have been that they 
ought to have applied for exemptions 
from paying under the City’s indigent 
persons policy – therefore, the appeal 
would have been unlikely to succeed.
The applicants were families. They had 
among them numerous children and 
elderly people. They were thus plainly 
vulnerable.
Moreover, they were lawful occupiers 
who had paid their rent (and electricity) 
timeously. The fact that the applicants’ 
conduct was so exemplary contributed 
to the sense that it was unfair that they 
should be disconnected without any 
procedural safeguards whatsoever.
Secondly, were the respondents the 
right respondents? The primary 
respondent was City Power. This is a 
private entity, which would ordinarily 
raise concerns given that the assertion 
of socio-economic rights against private 
parties is controversial and relatively 
untested.
However, City Power was acting as 
the agent of the City of Johannesburg, 
which is the entity that bears the 
constitutional obligation for delivering 
services, including electricity. It 
accordingly accepted (as it had to) 
that it is akin to a state entity for the 
purposes of this litigation.
Thirdly, was this the best context to 
establish that the right to electricity 
forms part of the right to adequate 
housing? The case did not involve an 
attempt to get government to provide 
free electricity. It was therefore a 
‘negative’ assertion of the right, not a 
‘positive’ one. Indeed, it was a limited 
negative assertion of the right given that 
the tenants accepted that cut-offs could 
occur provided that correct procedure 
is followed.
Moreover, it was thought that while 
it may be that the extent to which 
Protest against electricity price 
hikes, January 2013.
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electricity formed part of the right to 
housing would depend on context, 
these were people living in an urban 
apartment block. If electricity formed 
part of the right anywhere, it would 
seem to be here.
Fourthly, was there any deficiency in 
the evidence or papers? There was none 
as far as CALS was aware. The case was 
designed as a constitutional test case 
and papers were carefully drawn up 
with this in mind.
Moreover, there was no deficiency 
exposed at the High Court level. The 
High Court judgment simply took a 
different principled point of view as a 
matter of law.
Fifthly, did the tenants have alternative 
remedies? This was a hotly contested 
issue in this case. City Power contended 
that there were alternative remedies 
available for the tenants such as 
compelling the landlord to pay City 
Power the outstanding arrears and 
engaging in direct billing with City 
Power.
The tenants disputed this, pointing to 
City Power’s own inability to extract 
payment from the landlord and the fact 
that, by law, all arrears must be paid 
before direct billing agreements are 
reached.
And, lastly, what would be the 
consequences if the judgment was 
appealed and lost in the Constitutional 
Court? Due to the narrow nature of 
the relief sought, CALS decided that 
the negative consequences of losing on 
appeal would be limited. The only result 
would be that the previous position – 
namely that persons in the situation 
of the applicants were not entitled to 
procedural fairness prior to electricity 
disconnections – would be confirmed 
by the Constitutional Court.
Because of this, no one would be 
any worse off than they were before 
the litigation. Since the case was 
conceptualised on such a novel basis 
(that access to electricity may be a 
component of the right of access to 
adequate housing), CALS believed that 
a loss would not preclude viable future 
litigation.
Essentially, CALS decided that there 
was no significant broader risk in 
pursuing the appeal. This is to be 
contrasted with other cases, where 
a losing appeal might inhibit future 
litigation on better facts such as in 
the Mazibuko case or in reasonable 
chastisement cases discussed elsewhere 
in this publication.
In sum, CALS concluded that it was 
difficult to envisage a ‘better’ case on 
this issue arising in the foreseeable 
future. Perhaps the only real strategic 
weakness was the fact that the tenants 
did not have a contract with City Power 
– but the whole point of the case of 
course was to establish that procedural 
fairness obligations existed even 
without such a contract.
Ultimately, the decision to pursue the 
appeal proved beneficial. However, the 
point we make is a different one: These 
are the sort of questions that should 
be carefully considered whenever a 
major public interest case is initiated, or 
whenever a decision is taken regarding 
an appeal.
Of course, sometimes decisions 
will inevitably be made to run less 
than ideal cases, for ethical or other 
reasons. Where this occurs, however, 
the decision must be mindful of the 
weaknesses in the case and alive to the 
dangers involved.
The Joseph case provides an instructive example of the 
factors that ought to be taken into account in deciding 
whether to pursue an appeal.
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The third of the socio-economic rights 
cases decided by the Constitutional 
Court in late 2009 was the Nokotyana 
matter.138
The applicants in this case were 
residents of the Harry Gwala informal 
settlement in Ekurhuleni, Gauteng. The 
settlement lacked access to any basic 
services, including decent sanitation, 
water services and electricity.
In 2006, the Ekurhuleni Municipality 
submitted a proposal to the provincial 
MEC for Housing that the status of 
the settlement be upgraded to that of 
a formal township. This would have 
entitled the residents to basic services. 
The MEC did not respond to the 
proposal for a period of more than three 
years.
138  Nokotyana & Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality & Others [2009] ZACC 33; 2010 (4) 
BCLR 312 (CC).
Litigation
The applicants, represented by the 
pro bono department of a Johannesburg 
firm of attorneys, went to the High 
Court seeking an order that the 
Ekurhuleni Municipality provide them 
with basic services pending the decision 
on whether the settlement would be 
upgraded to a formal township. They 
sought:
•  communal water taps;
• temporary sanitation facilities;
• refuse removal; and
• high mast lighting in key areas.
The Municipality did not resist the 
application for water taps and refuse 
removal, and the Court ordered it to 
provide these services immediately.
However, the High Court found that 
no case had been made out in respect of 
temporary sanitation services and high 
mast lighting, because in the absence 
of a decision to upgrade the settlement, 
the National Housing Code did not apply 
to the settlement.
The applicants then appealed to the 
Constitutional Court seeking an order 
compelling the Municipality to provide 
them with high mast lighting and 
temporary sanitation facilities, pending 
a decision on whether the settlement 
would be upgraded in situ. In particular, 
they sought one ventilated improved pit 
(VIP) latrine per household, rather than 
the one chemical toilet per 10 families 
offered to them by the Municipality. 
They relied on their right of access 
to adequate housing, arguing that 
adequate sanitation was a component of 
this right.
Government respondents argued that it 
was impractical to invest in VIP latrines 
before the decision as to whether the 
settlement should be upgraded had 
been taken, since such a significant 
investment would then be wasted if a 
decision to relocate the settlement was 
taken.
It was on appeal to the Constitutional 
Court that it became clear that there 
were significant problems with the 
manner in which the Nokotyana case 
was conceptualised and formulated.
Firstly, the applicants’ representatives 
failed to realise that the core of the 
case was the failure of the Gauteng 
provincial government to process the 
Ekurhuleni Municipality’s application 
to upgrade the settlement. As a 
result, they did not seek relief in this 
regard and did not include provincial 
Harry Gwala informal 
settlement.
Photograph: Dorothy Tang ©
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government as a respondent in the 
proceedings before the High Court. 
The Constitutional Court was therefore 
forced to take the very unusual step 
of remedying this failure of its own 
accord by joining the provincial MEC 
for Local Government and Housing 
as second respondent, as well as 
national government officials as further 
respondents.
Secondly, the remedy sought and the 
arguments advanced by the applicants 
changed substantially on appeal to the 
Constitutional Court. The applicants 
had not challenged the sanitation policy 
of the Municipality in the High Court. 
Instead, they sought to proceed to the 
Constitutional Court relying directly 
on the constitutional right to housing. 
Because of this, the High Court did not 
consider any evidence regarding the 
reasonableness of the sanitation policy, 
and government respondents were not 
called upon to defend the policy in the 
High Court. This put the Constitutional 
Court in an impossible position, 
requiring it to sit as a court of first and 
final instance on factual matters that 
ought to have been considered in the 
courts below.
Thirdly, the problems were exacerbated 
by the applicants’ unsuccessful attempt 
to introduce controversial new evidence 
before the Constitutional Court. The 
new evidence addressed, among other 
things:
•  the extent of sanitation provision in 
townships across the country;
•  the negative consequences of poor 
sanitation on health, the economy 
and education;
•  the link between water, HIV and 
AIDS; and
• the costs of providing latrines.
Because of the late attempt to introduce 
this new evidence, none of the 
respondents had the opportunity to 
respond to it.
Lastly, at the Constitutional Court 
hearing, counsel for the applicants 
took an extravagant line, urging the 
Court to overturn its socio-economic 
rights jurisprudence on the basis that 
the Grootboom and TAC judgments 
were clearly wrong, and to adopt the 
minimum core approach139 to socio-
economic rights.
Despite all of this, on the morning 
of the hearing, the Chief Justice 
encouraged the parties to discuss a 
possible settlement. The Gauteng 
139  The minimum core approach is explained above 
in the context of the Mazibuko case study.
provincial government duly made a 
settlement offer in terms of which it 
would subsidise the Municipality’s 
sanitation provision, resulting in the 
provision of sanitation at a level of one 
toilet for every four families (compared 
to the one for every 10 that was being 
offered by the Municipality). The terms 
of this agreement would have ensured 
that the residents of the Harry Gwala 
settlement were substantially better 
off, and that the quality of sanitation 
in the settlement would have been 
markedly improved. The applicants’ 
representatives, however, turned down 
the settlement offer.
The matter proceeded and the appeal 
was unequivocally dismissed. Far from 
overturning Grootboom and TAC, 
as the counsel for the applicants had 
urged, the Constitutional Court did not 
consider that the applicants had made 
even an arguable case. The applicants’ 
direct reliance on several constitutional 
provisions was held to be “vague 
and insufficiently specified”.140 The 
Court did not pronounce on the 
reasonableness of the Municipality’s 
newly adopted policy, as it was held to 
be inappropriate to consider a case so 
fundamentally changed on appeal.
140 Ibid.
It was on appeal to the Constitutional Court that it 
became clear that there were significant problems 
with the manner in which the Nokotyana case was 
conceptualised and formulated.
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However, the Court did order 
provincial government to take a 
decision on the Municipality’s 
application for the upgrade of the 
settlement within 14 months of 
its judgment. Again, it is worth 
emphasising that the applicants did 
not seek this relief and that it was only 
made possible by the Court going out 
of its way and joining the province as a 
respondent.
The sequel to the Court’s ruling is that 
slow progress has been made towards 
upgrading the settlement. In 2011, 
provincial government ultimately took 
the decision required by the court 
order. It concluded that the settlement 
should be upgraded in situ and 
developed.
However, at the time of writing, such 
upgrading and development had not 
yet occurred. It appears that this is a 
consequence of disagreement over 
precisely what form the development 
should take. In particular, the plan 
currently proposed by the province 
would accommodate only 400 stands, 
meaning that 800 households would 
not be accommodated. The situation 
is complicated further by disputes 
regarding the practical suitability of 
certain land which could potentially be 
used for the development.
We understand that discussions around 
potential solutions are still ongoing. 
What does seem clear is that the 
development of the settlement for at 
least 400 stands will occur.
Lessons
Three main lessons emerge from the 
Nokotyana matter.
Awareness of existing 
precedents
The first lesson is about the importance 
of designing and arguing a case with full 
awareness of the Constitutional Court’s 
existing precedents and the difficulties 
of overturning recent and repeatedly 
affirmed precedents.
Litigators must live in the real world. 
Academic debates are important and 
valuable, but there is little point in being 
outraged about the Court’s approach to 
minimum core and trying repeatedly to 
overturn it, when there is no possibility 
of that occurring and when it is 
unnecessary.
In general, successful public interest 
litigation involves taking the existing 
jurisprudence as a starting point and 
seeking to change it only when strictly 
necessary. We suggest that trying to 
overturn settled precedent should only 
be attempted as a last resort when there 
are no other options available for the 
litigation to succeed. Litigators should 
be mindful of how enormously difficult 
it will be to persuade a court to change 
its mind.
The insistence on a minimum core 
approach in the Nokotyana case was all 
the more surprising and unnecessary 
because there was an easier route for 
success to be achieved, namely to bring 
an application to court compelling 
the Gauteng province to render a 
decision on the possible in situ upgrade 
of the informal settlement and, if the 
decision went against the applicants, 
to consider reviewing that decision on 
administrative and constitutional law 
grounds.
Though the Constitutional Court 
eventually gave an order compelling a 
decision by provincial government, this 
was due to the Court trying to find a 
way to assist the applicants despite the 
fact that their representatives had not 
sought such an order.
This point is especially important 
in light of the Court’s judgment in 
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the Mazibuko case. There, the Court 
unequivocally laid down a range 
of situations in which the positive 
obligations arising from socio-
economic rights would be enforced by 
the courts. It is worth repeating these 
situations:
If government takes no steps to 
realise the rights, the courts will 
require government to take steps. If 
government’s adopted measures are 
unreasonable, the courts will similarly 
require that they be reviewed so as 
to meet the constitutional standard 
of reasonableness. From Grootboom 
it is clear that a measure will be 
unreasonable if it makes no provision 
for those most desperately in need. 
If government adopts a policy with 
unreasonable limitations or exclusions 
as in Treatment Action Campaign 
No 2, the court may order that those 
are removed. Finally, the obligation 
of progressive realisation imposes a 
duty upon government continually 
to review its policies to ensure that 
the achievement of the right is 
progressively realised.141
Whatever misgivings organisations and 
litigators may hold about the Mazibuko 
141  Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg & 
Others [2009] ZACC 28 op.cit., paragraph 67.
decision, they must now contend where 
possible that their case falls within one 
of these situations. Doing so avoids or 
reduces the risk of government relying 
on Mazibuko as a defence, because 
litigants can argue that these are the 
very situations in which the Court has 
made it clear that it will enforce the 
positive obligations concerned.
It is true that the judgment states that 
this is not a closed list and that the 
obligations will be enforced in “at 
least”142 these ways. But if applicants 
cannot bring themselves within one 
of these categories, they will likely 
need a particularly compelling set of 
facts to succeed, coupled with a cogent 
argument to explain why their case does 
not fall foul of the Mazibuko principles.
Properly forming a case 
and placing the evidence 
before the court
Secondly, the Nokotyana case also 
demonstrates the importance of 
properly conceiving a case and ensuring 
that all the required evidence is placed 
before the appropriate court at the 
appropriate stage.
Ordinarily, new and controversial 
142 Ibid.
evidence cannot be introduced for the 
first time on appeal. For this reason, 
litigators must be extraordinarily careful 
to ensure that their case is properly 
conceived from the start of litigation, 
as it will rarely be possible to provide 
essential evidence for the first time on 
appeal.
Former Justice Richard Goldstone 
points out that the same mistake was 
made in the Grootboom case:
For the first time on appeal before 
the Constitutional Court, counsel 
sought to rely on the approach of 
the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
that socioeconomic rights contain a 
‘minimum core’. […] There was no 
evidence at all on the record that 
would have enabled the Court to begin 
a consideration of an appropriate 
minimum core for the provision of 
housing or access to housing in the 
South African context.143
The risk of rejecting 
reasonable settlement 
offers
As a third and final lesson, the 
Nokotyana case shows the risk of 
143  Richard Goldstone, Foreword, in Gauri & Brinks 
(eds) op.cit., page xii. 
The Nokotyana case demonstrates the importance of 
designing and arguing a case with full awareness of 
the Constitutional Court’s existing precedents and the 
difficulties of overturning recent and repeatedly affirmed 
precedents.
77Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Changing trends in the South African public interest litigation environment Chapter 2
litigants seeking full vindication and, 
in doing so, rejecting settlement offers 
that might be better than what could 
realistically be achieved via a court 
judgment.
The decision to reject the settlement 
offer made at the doors of the 
Constitutional Court was plainly 
incorrect. By that stage, it ought to 
have been clear that the odds of the 
applicants obtaining substantive relief 
from the Court were slim.
The offer would have given the 
applicants immediate relief in respect 
of sanitation. Moreover, it would not 
have precluded the applicants from 
requesting, if needs be compelling, 
the province to make a decision on 
the in situ upgrade within a specific 
time. In other words, there was no real 
downside.
Yet, the offer was rejected. It was only 
by virtue of the Constitutional Court’s 
determination to assist the applicants – 
despite the inherently flawed nature of 
the case – that the applicants ended up 
with any relief at all.
■ 
Litigation on 
the right to 
basic education
The right to basic education was 
included in Section 32(a) of South 
Africa’s interim Constitution, which 
came into force in April 1994. It was 
then also included in Section 29(1)
(a) of South Africa’s final Constitution 
which came into effect in February 
1997. Section 29(1) provides:
Everyone has the right—
(a) to a basic education, including 
adult basic education; and
(b) to further education, which the 
state, through reasonable measures, 
must make progressively available and 
accessible.144
Despite this and despite the severe 
challenges facing many learners and 
schools throughout the country, there 
was no meaningful litigation around 
government’s positive obligations to 
provide basic education until 2010. 
Those education cases that did reach 
144  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
op.cit.
the Constitutional Court dealt with, for 
example, school language policies,145 
religious146 and cultural practices,147 
and with the obligations of a private 
landowner (a trust) in relation to a 
school situated on its land.148
However, since 2010 this situation has 
changed markedly. A number of skilled 
legal and advocacy organisations have 
engaged in a series of pieces of litigation 
dealing with a wide range of aspects of 
government’s positive obligations in 
terms of the right to basic education.
In this section, we consider four main 
examples of such litigation and lessons 
emerging from these. We do so in part 
by drawing on reports done by the 
organisations involved in the litigation.149
145  Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department 
of Education & Another v Hoërskool Ermelo & 
Another [2009] ZACC 32; 2010 (2) SA 415 (CC).
146  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of 
Education [2000] ZACC 11; 2000 (4) SA 757 
(CC).
147  MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal & Others v 
Pillay [2007] ZACC 21; 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC).
148  Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary 
School & Others v Essay N.O. & Others [2011] 
ZACC 13; 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC).
149  Notably: Faranaaz Veriava, The 2012 Limpopo 
Textbook Crisis: A study in rights-based 
advocacy, the raising of rights consciousness 
and governance, Section27: September 2013; 
Legal Resources Centre, Ready to Learn: A legal 
resource for realising the right to education, 1st 
Edition, Legal Resources Centre: 2013; and Equal 
Education campaign materials and statements 
(www.equaleducation.org.za).
Toilet protest in Cape Town in 
2010, organised by the Social 
Justice Coalition.
Photograph: Justin van Zyl & 
Social Justice Coalition ©
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Background
Many of the problems that beset the 
South African education system today 
are a direct consequence of apartheid 
and its use of education as a tool of 
oppression. As the rest of society, the 
education system was segregated along 
racial lines, with schools for children 
classified as white far better resourced, 
and with inferior curricula prescribed 
at schools for children classified as 
black, Indian or coloured. Although 
these policies have long been abolished, 
their legacy is reflected in the state 
of historically disadvantaged schools 
today. As then Justice Kate O’Regan put 
it in 2008:
[…] although the law no longer 
compels racially separate institutions, 
social realities by and large still do.150
The problems faced by the education 
system are manifold. In 2012, in an 
open letter to the Minister of Basic 
Education penned by a number of 
public interest organisations, the 
following issues were highlighted:
•  the appalling state of school 
infrastructure at township and rural 
schools across the country, especially 
150  MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal & Others v 
Pillay op.cit., paragraph 24.
in regards to sanitation;
•  the lack of norms and standards for 
school infrastructure;
•  the critical shortage of desks and 
chairs in schools throughout the 
nation;
•  the failure to combat the rise 
of sexual violence and corporal 
punishment in schools;
•  the non-delivery of workbooks and 
textbooks to thousands of learners 
across the country;
•  the lack of access to libraries, 
particularly where this means that 
home language texts cannot be 
accessed;
•  the failure to revise the national 
policy on learner pregnancies;
•  inadequate public school funding 
and the placement of schools in 
inappropriate quintiles,151 directly 
impacting the school’s [sic] funding;
•  the failure to provide learner 
transport in accordance with policy;
•  the failure to issue norms and 
151  The quintile system divides all government 
schools into five quintiles, with quintile 1 
schools being the poorest and quintile 5 schools 
the least poor. Lower quintile schools qualify 
for higher levels of state funding than higher 
quintile schools. The latter are expected to raise 
significant funding through the charging of 
school fees.
standards regarding admission 
policy;
•  the delivery of education related 
services to children being interrupted 
through problems with tenders;
•  the lack of any discernable success 
in the Department’s section 100(1)
(b)152 intervention in Limpopo and 
the Eastern Cape, where substantial 
problems remain in school nutrition, 
scholar transport, and textbook 
delivery;
•  the failure to implement the 2012 
post provisioning in the Eastern 
Cape, leaving many schools without 
enough educators; and
•  the lack of a pro-poor teacher 
post-provisioning scheme, meaning 
a failure to draw quality teaching 
into township and rural schools, and 
the lack of training, support and 
accountability for teachers in these 
schools.153
It is not immediately clear to what 
152  Refers to Section 100(1)(b) of the Constitution, 
which gives national government the right to 
assume direct responsibility for a provincial-level 
constitutional obligation, if a province fails to 
deliver on it.
153  Open Letter to the Minister of Basic Education 
and the Director General of the Department of 
Basic Education from Centre for Child Law, CALS, 
EE, EE Law Centre, Section27 and LRC, www.
equaleducation.org.za: 25 June 2012.
Despite Section 29(1)(a) of the Constitution, which 
provides everyone with the right to a basic education, 
and despite the severe challenges facing many learners 
and schools throughout the country, there was no 
meaningful litigation around government’s positive 
obligations to provide basic education until 2010.
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extent these problems result from 
resource constraints, lack of human 
capacity, lack of political will or even 
active political obstruction – or some 
combination thereof. In terms of 
litigation, the causes of a particular 
problem will have a bearing on 
the manner in which the matter is 
approached and the relief that is sought 
to remedy it.
In considering the cases that follow, 
a significant feature is the fact that 
Section 29(1)(a) of the Constitution 
deals with the right to basic education 
differently from provisions on rights 
of access to housing, water, food and 
social security. This was addressed by 
the Constitutional Court in the Juma 
Musjid case. This case concerned 
the eviction by a private landowner 
(a trust) of a school on its property. 
However, the Court – particularly after 
encouragement from two amici curiae – 
nevertheless pronounced emphatically 
on the nature of the positive obligations 
resting on government in this regard:
It is important, for the purpose of this 
judgment, to understand the nature 
of the right to “a basic education” 
under section 29(1)(a). Unlike some of 
the other socio-economic rights, this 
right is immediately realisable. There 
is no internal limitation requiring that 
the right be “progressively realised” 
within “available resources” subject to 
“reasonable legislative measures”. The 
right to a basic education in section 
29(1)(a) may be limited only in terms 
of a law of general application which 
is “reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom”. 
This right is therefore distinct from the 
right to “further education” provided 
for in section 29(1)(b). The state is, in 
terms of that right, obliged, through 
reasonable measures, to make further 
education “progressively available and 
accessible.154
The mud schools 
case
In 2010, the LRC launched proceedings 
on behalf of the Centre for Child Law 
(CCL) and seven schools in the Eastern 
Cape to compel government to rebuild 
South Africa’s ‘mud schools’.
The case was ideal in that speeches 
and policy documents by government 
officials themselves conceded that 
154  Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary 
School & Others v Essay N.O. & Others op.cit., 
paragraph 37.
the conditions at these schools were 
unacceptable and constituted a 
breach of the state’s duties under the 
Constitution. Yet, despite repeated 
requests for assistance, the schools 
received no help.
Using government’s 2005 school 
district profiles, the LRC identified the 
worst-off mud schools and visited 20 
of them in July 2009. Comprehensive 
interviews with teachers and school 
governing bodies at each school were 
conducted and a decision was taken 
to assist seven schools in litigation 
against the state for failing to provide 
the schools with adequate and safe 
infrastructure, sufficient desks and 
chairs, and potable water. 
The seven applicant schools were 
located in one of the poorest areas 
in South Africa, around the towns of 
Libode and Ngqeleni in the Nyandeni 
Local Municipality/Oliver Tambo 
District Municipality in the Eastern 
Cape. The parents of the learners 
were predominantly indigent. Six of 
the seven schools had been placed by 
government in quintile 1 (the quintile 
representing the poorest schools). 
The schools were constructed of mud, 
cinder blocks and branches and were 
among the most under-resourced in the 
Bomvini Senior Primary School, 
Libode, Eastern Cape.
Photograph: Equal Education ©
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country. The structures were unstable, 
doing very little to protect students and 
teachers from the elements and (to the 
extent that they were even useable) 
they were massively overcrowded. All 
of the seven schools also faced a severe 
lack of desks and chairs, and adequate 
access to potable water. They relied on 
tanks to catch rainwater but this meant 
that during the dry winter months there 
was no water available at the schools. 
Learners were forced to get water from 
streams 1-2km away and the water was 
often not suitable for drinking. 
The applicants, including the 
CCL (which played the role of an 
institutional applicant in the public 
interest) argued that these conditions 
were unsafe and prevented effective 
teaching and learning. As such, they 
constituted a breach of the state’s duties 
under the Constitution. Despite this, it 
appeared that national and provincial 
government did not have plans in place 
to remedy the conditions at these seven 
schools. The repeated written and verbal 
pleas by the schools for assistance 
fell on deaf ears – no responses were 
received from government, and the 
schools remained unaware as to 
whether the conditions would be 
addressed in the future, and if so, when. 
It was also clear from the Eastern 
Cape Department of Education’s own 
documents that the budget allocated 
for school infrastructure was “totally 
inadequate”,155 and the province had 
placed a moratorium on infrastructure 
projects for the foreseeable future.
While at one point it was suggested by 
some members of the legal team that 
this was the ideal case to establish the 
minimum core approach156 as part of 
South African law, it was ultimately 
agreed that such an approach would be 
both unhelpful and counterproductive. 
Instead, given that the founding papers 
were drafted and filed prior to the 
decision in Juma Musjid, the case was 
built to demonstrate that government’s 
failure to provide proper school 
infrastructure was unreasonable, in 
line with the Grootboom and TAC 
precedents. The papers were replete 
with vivid details of the appalling 
conditions under which the learners 
concerned had to seek education, 
coupled with the repeated failure by 
government to remedy or plan to 
155  Ann Marie Skelton on behalf of the Centre 
for Child Law and others, Founding Affidavit, 
Eastern Cape High Court in Bhisho, paragraph 
22.4.
156  The minimum core approach is explained above 
in the context of the Mazibuko case study.
remedy these problems.
The application focused on the seven 
applicant schools and the need to 
remedy their situation. The idea was 
to begin with these seven schools 
and establish a precedent regarding 
government’s duties in this regard. 
Consequently, the applicants sought an 
order that:
•  declared unconstitutional and 
unlawful the failure of national and 
provincial government to provide 
the schools with proper facilities, 
furniture and access to water, as well 
as the failure to develop a plan to 
do so;
•  directed the national and provincial 
education departments, in 
consultation with the seven schools, 
to formulate a plan to provide the 
schools with proper facilities and 
adequate access to potable water;
•  directed the national and provincial 
education departments to provide 
the schools with sufficient desks and 
chairs; and that
•  required the respondents to file 
reports on affidavit with the court 
and the applicants’ attorneys at least 
every three months, setting out 
the progress that had been made 
pursuant to the other orders.
The mud schools case was ideal in that speeches and 
policy documents by government officials themselves 
conceded that the conditions at the schools concerned 
were unacceptable and constituted a breach of the state’s 
duties under the Constitution.
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After the founding papers had been 
filed, the respondents endeavoured 
on a number of occasions to avoid 
filing an answering affidavit. They did 
so both by taking technical points 
and then by repeatedly calling for 
settlement discussions. The applicants, 
however, were anxious that engaging 
in settlement discussions before the 
respondents had committed to a version 
on oath would be disadvantageous.  
They therefore insisted that the 
respondents file an answering affidavit 
before any settlement discussions took 
place. This ultimately proved a decisive 
moment because the answering affidavit 
that was eventually filed essentially 
disclosed no defence of substance.
Against this backdrop, the parties 
then engaged in negotiations and 
settled the matter without a court 
hearing. The terms of the agreement 
constituted a resounding success for 
the applicants. Government agreed to 
provide both temporary and permanent 
infrastructural relief to the seven mud 
schools. Relief took the form of mobile 
classrooms, desks and chairs, and access 
to water in the interim, to be followed 
by the construction of permanent 
classrooms from 31 May 2011. An 
even greater success was national 
government’s commitment (recorded in 
the agreement) to allocate R8.2 billion 
to rebuild inadequate school structures 
across the country – with R6.26 billion 
of this amount earmarked for the 
rebuilding of schools in the Eastern 
Cape. Government’s programme 
became known as the Accelerated 
Schools Infrastructure Development 
Initiative.
Implementation of this initiative has 
commenced and although the LRC 
has reported various delays, substantial 
progress appears to have been made. 
By the end of 2013, reconstruction of 
the seven applicant schools had neared 
completion, replacement/construction 
of more than 90 other schools had 
commenced, and approximately 200 
‘mud schools’ had received temporary 
pre-fabricated classrooms.
In 2014, as part of the follow-up effort, 
the LRC and the CCL launched a 
‘mud schools 2’ case. This case is far 
narrower in its aims. It seeks an order 
compelling government to make full 
disclosure of its school infrastructure 
plans so that schools and relevant 
NGOs can consider them and make 
representations, as well as urgent relief 
for some schools with particularly dire 
infrastructural needs. At the time of 
finalising this publication, the case had 
not yet been heard.
Binding minimum 
norms and standards
EE (Equal Education) is a Cape Town-
based social movement which seeks 
to remedy inequalities in education. It 
was formed in 2008 and sees itself as a 
‘grass-roots response to this inequality’. 
As Brad Brockman, its General 
Secretary, has explained:
The way in which we approach 
the problem is primarily through 
community organising. What that 
means is really to organise the 
people who are most affected by this 
inequality, which are children who 
attend schools in townships […] and 
very poor rural schools. 
[T]hese students and parents become 
members of the organisation and the 
organisation acts like a vehicle which 
organises […] shares and educates 
students and parents about the 
education system, inequality within 
the education system and how it 
is structured, how it is perpetuated 
and also explains to them about 
law, activism and history, and how – 
through coming together, through […] 
March for school libraries in 
Cape Town organised by Equal 
Education, 21 March 2010.
Photograph: Equal Education ©
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research, through organising, through 
using campaigns, through using 
litigation, one can actually achieve 
change within individual schools and 
across the education system.
The principle of organising is really to 
start where people are at, and to take 
up the issues that they can understand, 
that affect them and that they want 
to act to change, and use that as 
a basis to build and develop more 
consciousness of education equality, 
and what are all the different factors 
which go into creating this particular 
system.157
In March 2012, EE and two public 
schools in the Eastern Cape instituted 
legal proceedings to compel the Minister 
of Basic Education to publish binding 
minimum norms and standards for 
school infrastructure in South Africa. 
Represented by the LRC, the applicants 
argued that the unacceptable conditions 
in many public schools violate the 
constitutional rights of learners, as the 
conditions prevent effective learning and 
teaching and pose a real risk to the health 
and safety of learners.
157  Transcribed from the audio version of the 
discussion on Social Mobilization and Strategic 
Litigation for Equal Education in South Africa, 
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/events: 5 June 
2014.
Legal action was brought in response to 
the gross inadequacy of infrastructure 
in schools across the country. The 
Department of Basic Education’s 
National Education Infrastructure 
Management System Reports, published 
in May 2011, highlight the pervasiveness 
of these conditions. Of the 24 793 public 
ordinary schools in the country:
•  over 3 500 did not have electricity;
•  more than 2 400 had no water 
supply;
•  over 900 did not have any ablution 
facilities, while 11 450 schools were 
still using pit latrines; and
•  more than 2 700 schools had no 
fencing at all.158
The applicants took the view that 
establishing binding standards which 
stipulate the structures and facilities 
that each school must have was a 
necessary step to improving these 
conditions, for three reasons:
•  Binding regulations provide 
government with a clear legal 
standard and a mechanism to meet 
its constitutional obligations. The 
standard clarifies what constitutes 
an adequate education and ensures 
158  Department of Basic Education, NEIMS (National 
Education Infrastructure Management System) 
Reports, May 2011.
that the demands of equality are 
met. Government can use the 
standards to guide its infrastructure 
planning and its spending priorities.
•  Binding norms and standards 
provide learners, parents, teachers 
and civil society organisations with 
a clear indication of what they are 
entitled to. Communities are able 
to measure the performance of 
government against a clear standard 
and hold it accountable to that 
standard.
•  Binding standards are tools of 
top-down accountability. They 
enable the Minister to set a clear 
policy framework with defined 
and measurable targets. Provincial 
education departments are thereby 
given a definite goal to work towards 
and a legal standard to which they 
are bound.159 
Long before legal action was instituted, 
however, EE had launched an extensive 
and powerful political campaign on 
these issues. The norms and standards 
campaign arose out of EE’s national 
campaign for school libraries, which 
was launched in 2009. In May 2010, 
in a letter responding to EE about 
159  Email communication circulated by EE on 8 
August 2013.
In March 2012, Equal Education and two public schools 
in the Eastern Cape instituted legal proceedings to 
compel the Minister of Basic Education to publish 
binding minimum norms and standards for school 
infrastructure in South Africa.
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school libraries, the Minister of Basic 
Education, Angie Motshekga, wrote 
that government’s response to the 
issue of libraries would be to adopt 
a national school infrastructure 
policy, and norms and standards for 
school infrastructure. It was at that 
stage that EE started looking into 
norms and standards and discovered 
a comprehensive draft released by 
former Minister of Education,160 Naledi 
Pandor, in 2008. EE came to realise 
the value and power of having norms 
and standards which would establish a 
legally binding, minimum standard for 
school infrastructure, and which would 
in the long term also address the lack of 
libraries.
EE consequently shifted the focus of 
its campaign and advocacy work to 
norms and standards. In mid-2010, the 
Minister of Basic Education indicated 
both formally and in engagements with 
EE that norms and standards would be 
adopted by 1 April 2011. On 21 March 
2011, EE organised 20 000 protestors 
in a march to Parliament – EE’s first 
160  Until May 2009, South Africa had one national 
Ministry and Department of Education. Following 
elections in May 2009, however, the national 
education portfolio was split in two, with a 
Ministry and Department of Basic Education and 
a Ministry and Department of Higher Education 
and Training.
public action in the campaign – as a 
‘reminder’ to the Minister to make good 
on her promise. Even after the march, 
the Minister and her officials reassured 
EE that the norms and standards were 
on their way.
From EE’s perspective, non-binding 
guidelines were unacceptable, and 
it decided to resort to legal action as 
it became increasingly clear that the 
Minister had no intention of prescribing 
binding regulations. Hence, in March 
2012, an application was launched in the 
Bhisho High Court.
The application included affidavits from 
26 schools that gave vivid, personal 
accounts of the dreadful conditions 
experienced by learners. They also 
emphasised how government’s failures 
impact most harshly on the poorest 
schools in the country.
In conjunction with its application 
to court, EE intensified its public 
campaign. It organised a number of 
marches, put out advertisements in 
newspapers and on radio, distributed 
posters and pamphlets, and arranged 
for protestors to camp outside the High 
Court for the duration of the hearing, 
which was scheduled for 20 November 
2012.
On the eve of the hearing, the Minister 
capitulated and a settlement agreement 
was entered into. In terms of the 
agreement (dated 19 November 2012), 
the Minister undertook to publish a 
draft set of regulations for comment 
by 15 January 2013 and adopt binding 
standards by 15 May 2013. In the event 
of non-compliance with any of the 
terms of the undertaking, the agreement 
provided that the applicants were 
entitled to approach the High Court on 
an expedited basis for appropriate relief.
Draft guidelines were published within 
the specified time frame. In response to a 
relatively weak and unsatisfactory draft, 
EE and a number of other organisations 
submitted comprehensive comments. 
This followed EE organising public 
workshops on the draft in five provinces 
– the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and Gauteng 
– to inform poor rural and township 
communities about the draft and enable 
them to give their input in the public 
participation process. More than 500 
individual comments arose from these 
workshops, which were submitted 
together with EE’s official submission.
Much to the chagrin of all involved, 
the Minister missed the 15 May 2013 
deadline for final publication and 
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insisted on an extension of six months. 
Her reasons for the extension were 
unconvincing and lacked legal or 
practical basis. Hence, EE approached 
the Bhisho High Court for an order 
to convert the 19 November 2012 
agreement into a court order.
Before the matter reached the Court, 
EE intensified the public pressure on 
the Minister – for example, via the very 
effective videos we have referred to in 
Chapter 1.161 On 17 June 2013, EE held 
mass marches in Pretoria and Cape 
Town, and on 18 June 2013, it held 
another in Bhisho. Following this mass 
action and the publicity it generated, 
the Department of Basic Education 
released its extraordinary (and baseless) 
public statement that: 
[…] to suddenly see a group of white 
adults organizing black African 
children with half-truths can only be 
opportunistic, patronizing and simply 
dishonest to say the least.162
There was widespread condemnation of 
the statement, which in fact generated 
161  Build the Future and #FixOurSchools: Norms 
& Standards for School Infrastructure Now! 
(both available on YouTube), as well as Equal 
Education’s Campaign to Build the Future 
(available at www.atlanticphilanthropies.org).
162  Equal Education is disingenuous: Minister 
Motshekga op.cit.
more support for EE and led the 
Deputy Minister of Basic Education 
to convene an extraordinary meeting 
between EE, the Minister, Deputy 
Minister and provincial education 
MECs shortly thereafter.
Following agreement between the 
parties, the Court then ordered the 
Minister to issue a revised draft for 
comment by 12 September 2013 and to 
promulgate final binding regulations by 
30 November 2013.
Despite its success in court, however, 
EE persisted with its public campaign 
to maintain political pressure on the 
Minister. 
Ultimately, the campaign proved to 
be an outstanding success. On 29 
November 2013, the Minister complied 
with the court order and published 
legally binding minimum norms and 
standards for school infrastructure.163 
These provide that all schools must have 
access to sufficient water, electricity, 
sanitation, safe classrooms with a 
maximum of 40 learners, internet, 
security, and thereafter libraries, 
163  Department of Basic Education, South African 
Schools Act (84/1996): Regulations relating 
to minimum uniform norms and standards 
for public school infrastructure, Government 
Gazette, Vol. 581, No. 37081, 29 November 
2013.
computer and science laboratories, and 
recreational facilities. They also provide 
time frames for implementation, 
ranging from three to 17 years (based 
on the type of services or resources 
needed) and require provincial 
education departments to report 
annually on progress in implementing 
the norms and standards.
While certainly not perfect, the 
published norms and standards are a 
vast improvement on previous versions 
and will provide a powerful tool for 




While both of the cases referred to 
above garnered significant public and 
media attention, it is fair to say that the 
case which caused the greatest public 
reaction and outrage was the Limpopo 
textbook case.164  
In this case, the applicants – including 
Section27 (formerly the ALP) – 
challenged government’s protracted 
failure to deliver textbooks to schools 
164  Section27 & Others v Minister of Basic Education 
& Another [2012] ZAGPPHC 114; 2013 (2) SA 
40 (GNP).
Equal Education’s campaign proved to be an outstanding 
success. On 29 November 2013, the Minister of Basic 
Education complied with the court order and published 
legally binding minimum norms and standards for 
school infrastructure, stipulating among other things 
that all schools must have access to sufficient water, 
electricity and sanitation. 
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in the Limpopo province for the 2012 
academic year. The case was marred by 
failed negotiations, unfulfilled promises 
and the flagrant disregard of court 
orders. Ultimately, the applicants were 
able to secure the timely delivery of 
textbooks for the 2013 academic year 
and the implementation of a catch-up 
programme for the 2012 academic year.
The case began in January 2012. 
Having been alerted to the issue by 
media reports, Section27 initiated an 
investigation into textbook deliveries. 
It made visits to a number of schools 
in Limpopo during February 2012 and 
found that none had received textbooks. 
Section27 then sent enquiries to the 
Department of Basic Education and 
met with the head of the departmental 
intervention team that had taken 
control of the provincial education 
department in Limpopo. Section27’s 
concerns were noted and it was given 
an undertaking that deliveries would 
be completed by mid-April 2012 at the 
latest.
What followed was a string of broken 
promises and missed deadlines by 
the Department. Follow-up visits 
to Limpopo schools in late April 
confirmed that deliveries had still not 
been made. CALS, representing the 
applicants, sent letters to the provincial 
education department and the national 
Department of Basic Education, 
demanding delivery by 2 May 2012. 
Government’s failure to meet this 
deadline spurred Section27 to resort 
to legal action. Together with two co-
applicants (a secondary school and a 
mother of two primary school learners, 
all of whom had not received any 
textbooks for the 2012 academic year), 
it launched an urgent application in the 
Pretoria High Court.
The relief sought by the applicants was 
carefully crafted. It only requested the 
delivery of textbooks to those learners 
who were most severely impacted – 
learners in Grades R, 1, 2, 3 and 10, 
who had just started a new curriculum. 
Further, the applicants requested that 
government develop a catch-up plan for 
the Grade 10 learners to regain ground 
lost in the months when they did not 
have textbooks. Finally, the applicants 
requested a supervisory order to 
monitor the implementation of the 
relief sought.
The High Court handed down 
judgment on 17 May 2012, granting 
all aspects of the relief sought by the 
applicants. It noted that textbooks are 
an: 
[…] essential component of the right 
to basic education [and that their 
provision] is inextricably linked to the 
fulfilment of the right.165 
The Court ordered that a catch-up plan 
be developed immediately and that 
government commence delivery of 
textbooks urgently, completing it by no 
later than 15 June 2012.
The judgment received widespread 
media coverage and was heralded as 
a victory for the rights of learners. 
Despite this, the Department of Basic 
Education failed to meet the 15 June 
deadline. A number of schools reported 
that they had not received textbooks or 
any information from the Department 
regarding future deliveries. In addition, 
many principals and teachers reported 
that they had been threatened with 
disciplinary action if they reported the 
non-delivery.
At this point, Section27 was faced with 
the choice of whether or not to launch 
contempt of court proceedings. It 
decided against doing so on the ground 
that its aim was not to embarrass the 
Department, but to ensure the delivery 
of textbooks to Limpopo schools. 
165  Section27 & Others v Minister of Basic Education 
& Another op.cit., paragraph 25.
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The antagonistic nature of contempt 
proceedings would undoubtedly end 
all prospects of co-operation with the 
Department, which was necessary to 
secure delivery.166 Instead, Section27 
entered into negotiations with the 
Department on 21 June 2012 and 
extracted a new deadline (27 June 
2012) which was made an order of 
court by consent of the parties on 5 July 
2012.
Again, however, the state failed to 
comply with the court order. While 
the Department reported on 28 
June 2012 that delivery had neared 
completion, Section27 received reports 
of substantial non-delivery from a 
number of schools. The progress 
reports submitted by the state were also 
riddled with inconsistencies. Given 
these inconsistencies, the parties agreed 
to appoint an independent verification 
team to assess the true state of delivery. 
Professor Mary Metcalfe (former MEC 
for Education in Gauteng) and her 
team confirmed that, by 27 June 2012, 
there was substantial non-delivery of 
both textbooks and catch-up plans to 
schools. The team also reported that 
orders for books had only been placed 
with the publishers in the first week of 
166 Veriava op.cit., page 30. 
June 2012.167
The pattern of undertakings by the 
Department, unfulfilled promises and 
unaddressed concerns continued. As 
a result, Section27 launched a second 
application to the Pretoria High 
Court in September 2012. It sought a 
declaratory order that the Department 
had failed to comply with the court 
orders of 17 May and 5 July 2012 
(the settlement agreement), and a 
mandatory order directing government 
to deliver textbooks for the 2012 and 
2013 academic years within specified 
timelines (agreed by the parties) 
and develop catch-up plans in terms 
of the previous order. It also sought 
a supervisory order regarding the 
delivery of 2013 textbooks and, finally, a 
punitive costs order against the Minister 
of Basic Education. On 4 October 2012, 
Judge Kollapen handed down judgment 
and issued the declaratory and 
mandatory orders sought. However, the 
Court declined to make a punitive costs 
order.168
Although the litigation failed to achieve 
delivery of textbooks in Limpopo 
for the 2012 academic year, it had 
167 Veriava op.cit., page 22.
168 Veriava op.cit., pages 25-27.
a dramatic impact on improving 
deliveries for the 2013 academic year. 
In addition, the litigation caused a 
media furore that focused the public’s 
attention on the deeper problems that 
gave rise to the failed deliveries and put 
the inadequacy of education into the 
public domain in a remarkable manner. 
Concerns were raised about potential 
corruption in the award of the tender to 
EduSolutions (the textbook provider) 
and about general dysfunction and 
corruption in the Limpopo education 
department. The intense media scrutiny 
and criticism led President Jacob 
Zuma to appointment a task team to 
investigate the causes of the delays. 
Regrettably, however, even this did 
not fully resolve the problem of non-
delivery of textbooks in Limpopo.
One of the positive effects of the initial 
litigation though was the formation 
of Basic Education for All (BEFA), 
a community-based organisation 
dedicated to promoting and protecting 
the right to basic education in 
Limpopo. In early 2014, BEFA and 
22 school governing bodies launched 
an application in the High Court for 
further relief on the textbook issue. On 
5 May 2014, the High Court upheld 
It is fair to say that the case which caused the greatest public 
reaction and outrage was the Limpopo textbook case, 
where the applicants – including Section27 – challenged 
government’s protracted failure to deliver textbooks to 
schools in the Limpopo province.
87Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Changing trends in the South African public interest litigation environment Chapter 2
the application.169 The order granted 
included the following relief:
1. It is declared that the content of the 
right to basic education in s 29(1)(a) of 
the Constitution includes:
1.1. the right of every learner at a 
public school as contemplated in the 
Schools Act, 84 of 1996, in Limpopo 
to be provided with every textbook 
prescribed for that learner’s grade;
1.2. the right of every such learner 
to be provided with every such 
textbook before the teaching of the 
curriculum for which such textbook 
is prescribed is due to commence.
2. It is declared that the non-delivery 
to certain of such learners of certain 
textbooks prescribed for such learners’ 
grades in the 2014 academic year 
before the teaching of the curricula 
for which such textbooks were 
prescribed was due to commence was 
a violation of such learners’ rights 
to a basic education in s 29(1)(a) of 
the Constitution and of their rights 
to equality and dignity in ss 9 and 10 
respectively of the Constitution.170
The court order also noted 
169  Basic Education for All & Others v Minister of 
Basic Education & Others [2014] ZAGPPHC 566; 
2014 (4) SA 274 (GP).
170 Ibid.
undertakings by the respondents to 
deliver textbooks by various dates in 
May and June 2014 and directed the 
respondents to affidavits setting out 
various steps taken with regard to the 
delivery of textbooks for both the 2014 
and 2015 academic years.
The respondents then sought leave to 
appeal to the Constitutional Court 
against this judgment. At the time of 
writing, the Court had not decided 
whether to grant such leave to appeal.
Teacher vacancies in 
the Eastern Cape
A protracted problem facing the 
education system in the Eastern Cape 
has been vacant teacher posts at various 
schools across the province. These 
vacancies mean that learners are left 
without the necessary teachers, or 
that schools are themselves forced to 
employ temporary teachers with their 
own limited resources in circumstances 
where government is legally responsible 
for doing so.
The problem is not, however, that there 
are too few teachers in the Eastern Cape 
– indeed, there is a surplus of teachers 
– but that the provincial Department 
of Education has been unwilling or 
unable to move these surplus teachers 
(or ’teachers in excess’) to the schools 
where they are actually required. This 
is so even though the Department has 
formally recognised that these schools 
require the teachers concerned.
The process that is meant to resolve this 
problem is called ‘post-provisioning’. 
It is the process whereby a provincial 
department of education decides how 
many teaching posts each public school 
in the province is entitled to, appoints 
teachers to these posts and pays them. 
Over a decade of ineffective post-
provisioning has had the result that 
some schools have more teachers than 
necessary, while others have too few.
Thus, in 2012, there were more than 
4 000 vacant teacher posts and at the 
same time over 7 000 surplus teachers 
in the Eastern Cape.
The provincial Department of 
Education’s failure to move surplus 
teachers placed many schools in a 
position of severe financial strain. 
In 2011 and 2012, many fee-paying 
schools were forced to step into the 
shoes of government and appoint 
educators with their own funds as a 
stop-gap measure. However, these 
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funds were soon depleted. Schools were 
brought to the brink of bankruptcy by 
their attempts to mitigate the provincial 
Department’s failure to pay educators.
No-fee schools (the poorest schools 
in the province) were placed in an 
intolerable position because they 
were unable to pay their government-
appointed teachers. As a result, teachers 
across the Eastern Cape were left to 
stay at home, unpaid, or to work for 
as little as a bus fare, and hundreds of 
learners were left without instruction, 
particularly in vital subjects such as 
mathematics and sciences.171
However, the disastrous consequences 
extended beyond the lack of teachers. 
Because many schools were financially 
crippled by their attempts to pay 
teachers, they were unable to fund 
critical facilities and resources such as 
nutrition programmes (which provided 
a meal per day for school children), 
textbooks, stationary, infrastructure and 
school transport schemes.
Litigation was instituted when a 
number of schools approached the 
LRC to seek assistance. The LRC sent 
171  Sarah Sephton on behalf of the Governing Body 
of Linkside High School in Port Elizabeth and 
others, Founding Affidavit, Eastern Cape High 
Court in Grahamstown, paragraph 103 and 113.
a letter requesting that the provincial 
Department take steps to remedy the 
situation immediately. On 31 May 
2012, having received no satisfactory 
response, the LRC (acting on behalf of 
the CCL and various school governing 
bodies) launched an application in the 
Grahamstown High Court. The relief 
sought was as follows:
•  The Minister of Basic Education 
or the head of the provincial 
Department of Education was to fill 
all the vacant posts with permanent 
appointments within three months 
of the order. In the interim, teachers 
were to be appointed to vacant posts 
on a temporary basis within one 
month of the order.
•  The salaries of all teachers that were 
appointed were to be paid from the 
day on which they assumed duty.
•  Recognising the need to monitor 
compliance, the applicants sought 
a supervisory order requiring the 
provincial Department to report on 
its progress.
The LRC’s past experience with the 
Department suggested that the terms 
of the application would be accepted 
and a settlement agreement reached. As 
a consequence, the LRC was relatively 
bold in its claims.172
As predicted, the LRC’s terms were 
largely accepted by the respondents 
and were made an order of court 
on 3 August 2012. The only issue 
that remained in contention was the 
appointment of non-educator posts, 
which became the subject of a court 
hearing and a judgment in the High 
Court in favour of the applicants.173
In the months that followed, the 
provincial Department passed a budget 
that made provision for the posts and 
made progress in appointing and paying 
some temporary teachers. However, 
it failed to appoint and remunerate 
educators on a permanent basis, 
as required by the court order. The 
Department raised no legal defence 
for its inaction. Rather, the reports 
that it submitted made it clear that 
the non-compliance was a result of 
incompetence, inefficiency and trade 
union resistance.
Meanwhile, the situation in the Eastern 
Cape worsened. By 2013, the number 
of vacant teacher posts had risen to 
172  Legal Resources Centre, Ready to Learn op.cit., 
page 66.
173  The Centre for Child Law & Others v Minister of 
Basic Education & Others [2012] ZAECGHC 60; 
2013 (3) SA 183 (ECG).
A protracted problem in the Eastern Cape has been 
vacant teacher posts at various schools across the 
province. These vacancies mean that learners are left 
without the necessary teachers, or that schools are 
themselves forced to employ temporary teachers with 
their own limited resources in circumstances where 
government is legally responsible for doing so.
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more than 8 400, and schools remained 
in a position of financial peril due to the 
Department’s failure to pay teachers. 
This occurred despite the active efforts 
of the LRC to assist the Department 
in achieving compliance with the 
court order. From the date of the first 
court order, the LRC maintained a 
constant stream of communication with 
the Department, informing it of the 
circumstances in schools, warning it of 
anticipated violations, and advising it 
on the scope of the court order.174 Given 
the lack of responsiveness from the 
Department and its flagrant disregard 
of the court order, the LRC and the 
CCL felt that they had no option but to 
return to court.
In strategising for the second round 
of litigation, the LRC and the CCL 
recognised that this was an unusual 
situation. The Department would 
almost certainly have no legal defence 
at all and, moreover, was likely to 
again settle at the doors of the court. 
However, the Department would then 
likely fail to comply with the resultant 
order. As is explained by the LRC:
As it is in the game of chess, successful 
litigation requires planning several 
174  Legal Resources Centre, Ready to Learn op.cit., 
page 67.
moves ahead. […] A case has to be 
built on the basis that it may be 
contested in court, while at the same 
time recognising that the Eastern Cape 
Department of Education will likely – if 
its track record is anything to go by 
–– agree to the LRC’s terms which will 
then be made an order of court.
Then, over and above the usual 
considerations requisite for building 
a robust case, experience has shown 
that measures must be built into 
one’s case in anticipation that the 
Department will fail to comply with 
the court order. In crafting these 
measures, the LRC has had to ensure 
that they are forceful without being 
inflexible. Furthermore, given the 
myriad of potential ways a party may 
find themselves in breach, the LRC has 
had to craft ways to coerce compliance 
while reserving scope to facilitate its 
continued constructive involvement in 
the matter.175
The LRC and the CCL took the 
view that a second order against the 
government would be futile if it was 
granted in the same terms as the 
first. It was clear from the provincial 
Department’s behaviour to date that 
175  Legal Resources Centre, Ready to Learn op.cit., 
page 65.
the threat of a contempt of court order 
would not provide sufficient incentive 
for it to act.
Consequently, the LRC and the CCL 
worked to formulate a new order 
that did not rely on positive action 
from the Department to achieve the 
desired result. Rather, the proposed 
order put in place a number of default 
consequences that would be triggered if 
government failed to take positive steps. 
In other words, the proposed order was 
formulated to shift the onus onto the 
Department – the desired result would 
be achieved even if the Department 
failed to act.176 
The new approach consisted of two 
phases. The first phase concerned the 
appointment of teachers on a temporary 
basis, and the second the appointment 
of teachers on a permanent basis.
In respect of the first phase, the 
LRC consulted with a selection of 
schools and compiled a list of over 
140 candidates for appointment as 
temporary teachers. Thereafter, a 
settlement agreement was reached with 
the respondents for the temporary 
appointment of specific teachers 
to named schools. Importantly, 
176 Ibid.
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the agreement stipulated that the 
Department would remunerate the 
appointees from the date that they 
assumed duty. The agreement was made 
an order of court on 7 March 2013.
The Department failed, however, to pay 
the teachers appointed by the agreed 
deadline. Given the terms of the order, 
the LRC was able to apply to court for 
the payment of the teachers’ salaries. 
The effect was that the respondents 
were liable for an ascertainable debt, 
which was enforceable in terms of 
the State Liability Act 20 of 1957. 
This effectively meant that state assets 
could be attached to satisfy the debt. 
The threat of execution on state assets 
was sufficient incentive to spur the 
Department into action. It made the 
requested payments.177
A similar approach was adopted in 
the second phase (the appointment of 
teachers on a permanent basis). Lists of 
permanent appointees were compiled, 
a settlement agreement was reached 
regarding their appointment and 
remuneration, and the agreement was 
made an order of court on 6 June 2013. 
In addition, schools that still had vacant 
posts were given the power to advertise, 
177  Legal Resources Centre, Ready to Learn op.cit., 
page 68.
shortlist, interview and recommend 
candidates for appointment. If the 
Department failed to decide on 
recommendations within a specified 
period of time, the candidates would be 
deemed to be appointed.178 The second 
court order also provided that, should 
the Department fail to pay salaries, they 
would be declared an ascertainable 
debt, executable in terms of the State 
Liability Act. Hence, in the event of 
non-payment, there was no need for 
the LRC to return to court for such a 
declaration.179
The orders obtained have provided 
effective relief for a significant number 
of schools in the Eastern Cape. 
However, the problem of teacher 
vacancies and the failure to implement 
post-provisioning remains a very 
serious one. Moreover, the scale of 
the problem is so significant that it 
made it hard to use traditional forms of 
litigation to address it.
Accordingly, in 2014, the LRC brought 
a fresh application in which it sought 
immediate relief for some schools, but 
more importantly, certification from the 
court for an ‘opt-in’ class action. This 
took advantage of recent developments 
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
in South African law which made 
clear that the use of class actions was 
permissible.180 The relief sought in 
this class action involves both the 
repayment of schools for the amounts 
they have paid to temporary teachers 
and the appointment (if necessary, on a 
deemed basis) of temporary teachers to 
remaining vacancies.
The advantage of this opt-in class 
action – the first of its kind in South 
Africa – is that it created a way for the 
LRC to publicise the litigation to the 
various schools potentially affected, and 
produced an efficient way for the LRC 
to act on their behalf and claim relief 
for them, despite the magnitude of the 
problem. The High Court duly granted 
the certification order on an unopposed 
basis, and since then 90 schools have 
opted into the class action. At the time 
of writing, the merits of the class action 
had not yet been determined.
Lessons 
A number of useful lessons emerge 
from these four examples of litigation 
on the right to basic education.
180 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Although effective relief has been obtained for a 
significant number of schools in the Eastern Cape, the 
problem of teacher post-provisioning persists and on 
a scale that makes it hard to use traditional forms of 
litigation to address it. Accordingly, in 2014, the Legal 
Resources Centre brought an application seeking 
certification from the court for an ‘opt-in’ class action.
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The benefits of an 
incremental approach
The first lesson is about the advantages 
of an incremental approach. In the 
education litigation cases above, 
although the right to basic education 
is immediately realisable, civil society 
organisations have opted to take an 
incremental approach to litigation and 
have used the standard of ‘adequacy’. 
This incremental approach is evident 
in the choice of cases that have been 
brought. The first cases thus dealt 
with the poorest of the poor and most 
vulnerable.
The schools chosen for the mud schools 
case, for example, are situated in the 
Eastern Cape (one of the country’s 
poorest provinces) and were among the 
worst-off schools in the province. There 
was little doubt that the court would find 
in favour of the applicants when faced 
with the dire conditions at these schools.
Similarly, the norms and standards 
case dealt with the absolute minimum 
standards required for teaching and 
learning, including access to potable 
water, functioning toilets, buildings that 
protect students from the elements, 
and classrooms that contain desks and 
chairs.
Thus, the approach has been to give 
content to the right to basic education 
by gradually building it up from the 
absolute minimum. This has the 
advantages of the minimum core 
approach – it provides clear content to 
the right and gives communities and 
courts a definite standard against which 
to measure government’s performance. 
However, unlike the minimum core, it 
does not risk stagnating or becoming 
fixed. The minimum standard will rise 
with every new case that is brought and 
won.
Moreover, by forcing government itself 
to set the minimum requirements, the 
norms and standards case avoided the 
repeated refrain from the courts that 
judges are not well placed to set such 
standards. This was a far more effective 
way of proceeding than, for example, 
asking the courts for broad systemic 
infrastructural relief on an unrealistic 
scale.
Litigating parties have used the 
standard of adequacy when assessing 
the constitutionality of government’s 
provision of education. The standard 
of adequacy is arguably more fixed 
than that of reasonableness. This 
is particularly true if one takes the 
approach described above. While 
reasonableness shifts constantly, 
depending on the circumstances of 
a particular case and government’s 
resources at the time, adequacy 
represents a defined threshold that 
has been developed through case law. 
At present, an adequate education is 
constituted by instruction in a school 
with safe infrastructure, sanitation, 
potable water, sufficient security, 
textbooks, and a permanent teacher 
(among other things). This standard 
is immediately realisable, in line with 
the wording of Section 29(1)(a) of the 
Constitution.
The advantages of narrow 
litigation
A second lesson concerns the advantages 
of narrowly-focused litigation. Each 
of the cases described above takes on 
a specific issue, provides extensive 
evidence regarding that issue and seeks 
a clear order in relation thereto. In our 
view, there are a number of strategic 
shortcomings in pursuing a contrasting, 
overly broad relief:
•  Courts will be reluctant to grant 
sweeping and vaguely defined orders 
for fear that they might intrude into 
the policy-making domain of the 
legislature and executive.
Child walking to school in a 
village outside Mthatha in the 
Eastern Cape.
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•  By seeking too much too early, the 
applicants risk a refusal and thereby 
creation of a negative precedent that 
will close off litigation on certain 
issues in the future.
•  A broad order does not give clear 
guidance to government officials as 
to the steps that they should take. 
An order in specific terms increases 
the likelihood of compliance when 
the state’s failures were caused by 
the incapacity, incompetence or 
inattention of officials. The same 
holds true when failures result 
from active political opposition or 
a lack of political will. A clear and 
specific order removes the space for 
uncooperative government officials 
to delay or avoid acting.
•  The magnitude of the issues 
addressed and the relief claimed 
would make a supervisory order a 
daunting prospect for any court.
•  Communities will be unable to 
monitor the implementation of an 
order made in broad, ill-defined 
terms.
In particular, it must be emphasised that 
a case that aims to attain everything is at 
risk of achieving nothing.
It is for this reason that we have to 
record our concerns about the strategy 
informing the ongoing litigation 
in Pease v Government of South 
Africa.181 This case is brought against 
the national government, as well 
as the MEC for Education in each 
province. The applicants, an education 
specialist and the Progressive Principals 
Association, claim that the respondents 
have breached their duties under no 
less than 12 different Sections in the 
Constitution by failing to:
•  equip the majority of learners 
in South African schools with 
sufficient literacy and numeracy 
skills to attain functional literacy;
•  deliver textbooks and learning 
materials timeously, in appropriate 
quantities and in appropriate 
languages;
•  address teacher absenteeism, lack of 
professionalism and lack of training;
•  promote and provide mother-
tongue education; and
•  make available comprehensive 
early childhood development 
programmes to children under five 
years of age.
The applicants seek an order that 
national government must:
181  Pease & Another v Government of South Africa 
& Others, Western Cape High Court, Case No. 
18904/13.
[…] take all such steps, including 
urgent and interim steps, as may be 
necessary to address reasonably and 
responsively each and every failure 
and/or omission [as listed above] by 
taking reasonable and accountable 
steps to remedy the conditions 
[referred to above].182
In addition, the applicants seek a 
supervisory order whereby government 
would report to the court on the steps 
that it has taken and the progress that it 
has made.
At the time of writing, the matter had 
been argued in the High Court, but no 
judgment had yet been delivered. We 
therefore express no view on the merits 
of this case.
However, the strategy underlying the 
litigation appears to us to be seriously 
questionable. In view of the difficulty 
of persuading courts to even make 
narrow, precise orders and then to get 
government to properly implement 
them, we have doubts about the 
effectiveness of this approach.
182  Notice of Motion, Pease & Another v 
Government of South Africa & Others, Western 
Cape High Court, Case No. 18904/13, paragraph 
3.
Although the right to basic education is immediately 
realisable, civil society organisations have opted to take 
an incremental approach to litigation and have used 
the standard of ‘adequacy’. Their approach has been to 
give content to the right to basic education by gradually 
building it up from the absolute minimum.
93Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Changing trends in the South African public interest litigation environment Chapter 2
Building a record
A third lesson is the significance of 
building a record, as illustrated by the 
mud schools and Limpopo textbook 
cases. In the latter, for example, 
Section27 took steps to create a record 
of correspondence showing:
•  attempts to resolve the dispute prior 
to resorting to litigation;
•  the history of misrepresentation and 
unfulfilled promises by government; 
and
•  government’s lack of responsiveness 
to the queries and concerns raised 
by communities.
A record of this nature significantly 
increases the likelihood that a court will 
intervene and issue a mandatory order 
directing government to take specific 
action.
Close ties with affected 
communities
The fourth lesson relates to the 
maintenance of a close connection 
with the communities affected by the 
litigation, which is vital for gathering 
information and for monitoring 
compliance. EE’s approach in the norms 
and standards case is a shining example 
of this.
Also, in the Limpopo textbook case, 
Section27 relied on reports from 
schools, teachers and parent members 
of school governing bodies to monitor 
compliance with court orders. Without 
such careful and attentive monitoring, 
the continued lack of delivery would 
have gone unnoticed and the issue 
would not have been pursued.183
Likewise, in the mud schools case, the 
LRC and the CCL worked with the 
relevant schools and communities to 
enumerate the needs of the schools 
and formulate petitions to be signed by 
members of the communities.184
The significance of public 
mobilisation
A fifth lesson centres on the importance 
of public mobilisation. Public interest 
litigation is most effective when it is 
only one part of an overall campaign. 
This is demonstrated most emphatically 
by the norms and standards case.
Similarly, public interest litigation must 
(where possible) successfully marshal 
the support of the general public 
through media and other strategies. 
This is especially the case on an issue 
183 Veriava op.cit., page 36.
184  Legal Resources Centre, Ready to Learn op.cit., 
page 19.
such as lack of access to education for 
poor children, where public support 
is virtually guaranteed provided that 
the public understands the nature 
of the case. This is demonstrated by 
each of the four cases above. All of the 
organisations involved have spent time 
and effort to ensure that the media 
understands and reports on their 
cases – even where, as in the teacher 
post-provisioning case, the issues are 
technical and need to be simplified in 
order to attract public attention.
The use of creative 
remedies
The sixth lesson is also illustrated 
well by the teacher post-provisioning 
case, namely the value of flexibility 
and willingness to make short-term 
concessions in the name of long-term 
gains, and the use of creative remedies.
In this case, the different approach 
taken in the second round of litigation 
required the applicants to narrow 
the scope of their case. Rather than 
applying for relief for all schools in the 
Eastern Cape, the applicants narrowed 
their focus to secure the appointment 
of teachers at a specified list of schools. 
This concession paid dividends later. 
Having won the relief with regard to 
Photograph: Annalisa Burrello ©
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specific schools in the first phase, the 
LRC and the CCL were able to expand 
the relief sought to a wider group of 
schools in the second phase. Hence, 
in the second phase they sought (and 
won) an order giving schools the power 
to permanently appoint candidates 
to teaching positions if the provincial 
Department of Education had failed 
to make a decision on the schools’ 
recommendations.
Moreover, the repeated non-compliance 
with court orders led the parties 
involved to develop creative remedies 
designed to fit the anticipated state 
response, rather than the overly blunt 
mechanism of contempt proceedings. 
For example, the use in the Limpopo 
textbook case of an independent 
verification mechanism was extremely 
effective, as was the approach of relying 
on deemed appointments and the right 
to attach state property in the teacher 
post-provisioning case.
Knowing when and how to 
accept settlement
A final important lesson that emerges 
from these education litigation 
examples is that public interest litigants 
must know when to accept settlement 
offers to achieve their aims. This is 
demonstrated most emphatically by the 
mud schools case. While this case had 
initially been built in the hope that it 
would achieve a binding legal precedent 
on the state’s duties in relation to the 
right to basic education, the matter 
was ultimately settled. The decision by 
the litigants to settle was undoubtedly 
correct. The terms of the settlement 
agreement were far more extensive than 
they could ever have hoped to obtain 
from a court order. The absence of a 
reasoned judgment – while regrettable 
– could never justify proceeding with 
the litigation.
However, the education litigation 
cases also demonstrate the need for 
litigants to be tactically astute when 
settlement prospects arise. The decision 
in the mud schools case to refuse to 
entertain settlement discussions until 
an answering affidavit was filed was 
an important one, as it altered the 
approach of the parties to settlement. 
Equally critical was the repeated 
decision by the litigants in the teacher 
post-provisioning case to ask for very 
extensive relief which anticipated 
eventual non-compliance by the state. 
This approach meant that practical 
results were achieved from the litigation 
– even in the face of apparently 
intransigent respondents.
Iqonce High School (shack 
school) in King William’s Town, 
Eastern Cape.
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D
rawing on the case studies 
presented in Chapter 2, as well 
as our evaluation as a whole, 
we conclude that for public interest 
litigation to achieve maximum success 
in advancing social change, it ought to 
take place in combination with three 
other strategies. These are:
•  conducting public information 
campaigns to achieve rights 
awareness;
•  providing advice and assistance to 
people in claiming their rights; and
•  making use of social mobilisation 
and advocacy to ensure that 
communities are actively involved 
in asserting rights inside and outside 
the legal environment.
We do not suggest that it is essential 
that a single organisation itself be 
integrally involved in each of these 
four strategies (litigation being the 
fourth strategy). Indeed, often this 
is not possible and we readily accept 
that specialist litigation organisations 
frequently have a vital role to play. As 
one of our respondents put it:
The ‘successful’ combination is not a 
paint-by-numbers one, but very much 
depends on the issue. However, the 
history of social change has proven 
many times over that a single action 
strategy – whether litigation on its 
own, or activism on its own, will always 
fail.
Indeed, as the Rural Women’s Action 
Research Programme has correctly 
explained, these strategic processes 
should not be directed by lawyers as 
‘experts’ or outsiders:
[I]t is our experience that in order to 
successfully achieve social change, 
these strategic processes need to be 
framed by the initiatives and actions 
of community members and leaders, 
not by ‘experts’. These processes 
may indeed require support from 
‘expert’ partners, but the terms of the 
interaction should be governed by a 
frame and agenda that is set by the 
community. This approach increases 
Four key strategies for 
using rights to achieve 
social change
One of the main questions Atlantic raised with us was which 
combination of strategies has been most effective in using rights to 
achieve social change, as well as the relationship of public interest 
litigation to various aspects of social mobilisation. In this regard, we 
understand social change to refer simply to whether rights have been 
used to produce a tangible and sustainable impact on the ground for 
those who ought to benefit from them. 
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the likelihood that the interaction 
and its outcome will constitute best 
practice.185
A similar conclusion is reached by 
Lucie White and Jeremy Perelman after 
considering four case studies regarding 
economic and social rights in different 
parts of Africa. In respect of those 
involved, they conclude that: 
[these activists] are among a new 
generation of social justice activists 
who have seized upon human rights 
values, language, and tactics to 
challenge the realities of extreme 
poverty. All in this new generation 
share a striking similarity in how they 
do their work. Although embracing 
human rights values, they reject 
traditional notions of human rights 
practice as a top-down, lawyer-driven, 
professional “game”. Each of these 
advocates has understood human 
rights activism as political practice.186
185  Aninka Claassens, Monica de Souza, Mazibuko 
Jara & Dee Smythe, Advancing the Human Rights 
of the Rural Poor: Building Resources for Local 
Activism, Strategic Litigation and Law Reform, 
unpublished: June 2011, page 23.
186  Lucie E White & Jeremy Perelman (eds), Stones 
of Hope: How African Activists Reclaim Human 
Rights to Challenge Global Poverty, Stanford 
University Press: 2010, page 3.
■ 
Strategy 1 – 
public 
information
A public information campaign that 
informs ordinary people of their rights 
is an essential component of any effort 
to achieve social change on rights issues.
When asked about the major obstacles 
to using the law to achieve social 
change, virtually all our respondents 
identified lack of knowledge about 
rights as the primary obstacle. As one 
respondent explained:
Few of the poor and marginalised 
(especially those in rural areas that 
lack access to information and 
communication technology) are aware 
of their rights, know the law, or have 
been informed that the law may be 
able to help change their situation.
Another respondent made the same 
point with regard to expanding the use 
of socio-economic rights: 
The first step necessary to achieve 
this expansion is the creation of a 
system wherein the people know 
their rights and begin to assert them. 
This empowerment of the citizenry 
will necessitate capacity-building of 
grassroots organisations, so that these 
groups may develop the skills needed 
to educate people about their rights 
and assist them in situations where 
their rights are being violated.
A public information campaign is 
valuable in itself in terms of changing 
attitudes and empowering individuals, 
but it is also essential if people are to 
understand the role that law and legal 
rights can play in achieving social change. 
Somewhat surprisingly, a number of 
respondents suggested that even certain 
well-organised civil society bodies are 
insufficiently aware or persuaded of 
the role that legal rights could play in 
assisting them to achieve their goals. 
In respect of ordinary citizens and 
communities, the lack of knowledge is 
far more severe.
The need for public information is 
brought home forcefully by the example 
of the Grootboom case. There, until the 
Magistrate of his own accord referred the 
community to a lawyer, they apparently 
had no idea that they had legal rights 
which might assist them in preventing 
eviction. As a result, they did not seek 
legal advice, let alone make adequate use 
of the legal rights that they had.
Sisters Manoko and Elizabeth 
Dolo pictured in 2003. They were 
unable to attend school near 
Mokopane in Limpopo because 
their mother could not afford 
school fees for all her seven 
children.
Photograph: Sydney Seshibedi ©
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This is true of many areas of South 
African life where statutes or the 
Constitution confer rights on people, 
but they are unaware of these rights and 
therefore cannot make use of them. This 
is so even when the rights are explicit 
and contained in legislation.
For example, one respondent 
emphasised that although the South 
African Schools Act 84 of 1996 provides 
substantial protection for children 
whose parents have not paid school fees, 
the majority of families who have had 
their children threatened or sent home 
from school due to unpaid fees do not 
know that they have any legal recourse.
Another example is the fact that some 
municipalities have indigent persons 
policies that allow poor people to obtain 
free or reduced-rate municipal services 
such as electricity and water. Generally, 
however, the municipalities appear to 
have made no effort to alert consumers 
to this and, as a result, consumers are 
simply unaware of this route as an 
option. The indigent persons policies 
remain in by-laws only, with poor people 
having their electricity and water cut off 
due to non-payment.
The kind of public information required 
is demonstrated by the TAC example. 
The TAC engaged in extensive public 
information campaigns, both directed at 
its own members and the general public, 
explaining what the rights of HIV-
positive individuals are. Moreover, as the 
case study discussion demonstrates, this 
public information campaign continued 
even after the litigation had been 
launched, with numerous workshops 
conducted by TAC volunteers to explain 
the case.
Similarly, in the case on norms and 
standards for school infrastructure, 
EE engaged in a sustained public 
information and protest campaign. This 
included leading school children and 
supporters in a number of marches, 
going door-to-door in communities 
to explain the issues and garner 
support, taking out full page adverts in 
newspapers, putting adverts on radio, 
releasing an animated video explaining 
the campaign, and organising a ‘Ten 
Days of Action’ project in schools 
(filling each day with a different activity 
to draw attention to the campaign 
such as the production of a play to 
inform learners about the case). As EE’s 
General Secretary, Brad Brockman, has 
explained, however, this is not always 
easy:
We made a very conscious effort to 
keep our members involved and to give 
them a say in terms of the campaign, 
including when we decided to actually 
go to court. So, by the time we actually 
made the decision to go to court, we 
had actually been campaigning for 
about two years. And by that time our 
members were ready and they agreed 
and felt it was time to take the Minister 
to court. […]
[I]n the middle of 2013 [the Minister of 
Basic Education] asked for an extension 
to adopt norms and standards, and 
we took that to the membership, and 
we asked the membership how they 
felt about that particular request – 
and overwhelmingly they said that 
we shouldn’t give the Minister an 
extension. As the leadership of the 
organisation, we consulted with them, 
but in actual fact we decided to give 
the Minister a limited extension. 
[O]n the one hand we were informed 
by what the members felt, but also 
we felt very strongly together with 
our lawyers […] that if we didn’t give 
the Minister this extension and if the 
matter were to go to court, the judges 
may be very sympathetic to what the 
Minister was saying. [W]e might even 
get in a situation where the judge 
gives [the Minister] a much longer 
extension than we would have given 
[…] and agreed to in the first place. So, 
A public information campaign that informs ordinary 
people of their rights is an essential component of any 
effort to achieve social change on rights issues.
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that created a lot of tension within the 
organisation. It was important for us 
to consult and also important for us 
afterwards to explain our particular 
choice. And, in the end, I think we 
made the right choice.187
Nevertheless, such public information 
strategies are crucial in increasing the 
likelihood of public interest litigation 
succeeding. If ordinary people do not 
understand and buy into the litigation, 
those conducting it are unable to obtain 
the required information to launch 
litigation and are unlikely to generate 
substantial support from ordinary 
people, which in turn plays an important 
role in perceptions of the litigation by 
courts, the public and government.
Moreover, where litigation succeeds, it 
is essential that people are aware of the 
success in order to pursue their rights 
and transform the victory into concrete 
progress on the ground, or in order to 
inform the public interest organisations 
involved if the victory, for whatever 
reason, is not leading to tangible social 
change on the ground.
187  Transcribed from the audio version of the 
discussion on Social Mobilization and Strategic 
Litigation for Equal Education in South Africa 
op.cit.
■ 
Strategy 2 – 
advice and 
assistance
Once people are aware of their rights, it 
is critical that a strategy enabling people 
to claim these rights is developed.
Of course, all public interest litigation 
is notionally about enabling people 
to claim their rights. However, we 
conclude that something beyond this 
– and separate from it – is necessary. 
Litigation cannot and should not be the 
only way in which people are enabled to 
claim their rights.
Instead, it is essential that there are 
intermediary organisations which 
support people to claim their rights, 
through giving advice, directing them to 
appropriate institutions, assisting them 
with the formulation of their claims, 
and taking matters up on their behalf 
– all of which can be done successfully 
without necessarily engaging in 
litigation.
The need for such advice centres is 
made clear by the efforts of public 
interest organisations under apartheid. 
A number of our respondents 
emphasised the important role played 
by advice offices in this period. This 
meant that organisations such as 
the Black Sash, which did not itself 
undertake litigation, could nevertheless 
provide legal assistance to large 
numbers of people and channel cases 
that required litigation to lawyers in 
private practice.
The end of apartheid, however, saw the 
dwindling of such advice centres. This 
was highly problematic as it meant that 
indigent people either had to access 
fully fledged lawyers or, for the most 
part, were left without any legal advice 
at all.
As one respondent explained, reflecting 
on the situation in the mid-2000s and in 
answer to the question of how poor and 
marginalised communities have used 
the law to access rights and services:
They have used the law very effectively 
when they have access to advice 
offices, the LRC and other free legal 
services. But the major problem is 
access.
There have since been substantial efforts 
to repair this situation. As mentioned 
earlier, ProBono.Org was established in 
Parents in Shallcross, near 
Durban, protesting against the 
imposition of school fees in 
November 2006.
Photograph: Abhi Indrarajan ©
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2006 to facilitate legal pro bono support 
to the poor by law firms and private 
practitioners. This was followed in 2007 
by the launch of the National Alliance 
for the Development of Community 
Advice Offices (NADCAO) – an 
alliance of NGOs and donors seeking 
to strengthen the community advice 
office sector and broaden access to 
justice. Recently, LASA has also begun 
to increase its involvement in civil 
cases and has struck a co-operation 
agreement with NADCAO involving 
legal back-up services by LASA to 
community advice offices, and referrals 
from these offices to LASA’s Justice 
Centres and Satellite Offices. In sum, 
while there is undoubtedly always more 
that can be done, these developments 
are important in enabling people to 
claim their rights.
It bears emphasis that community-
based advice centres need not be staffed 
by lawyers. Many of the issues raised by 
clients may not even need legal advice. 
In many instances, people simply 
do not know where to go to claim a 
service from a particular government 
department or do not know the services 
to which they are entitled. Proper 
advice on these issues could mean a 
significant change in people’s lives, 
without a lawyer’s letter ever being 
written – let alone litigation being 
launched. As one respondent who runs 
such advice centres explained:
Of the 10 000 cases we see per year, 
only a small portion require the 
assistance of a pro bono attorney. Still 
fewer form part of test cases seeking to 
change the law.
However, it is important that advice 
centres either be staffed by paralegals 
or at least have staff who are sufficiently 
trained to see what legal routes are 
available. This is demonstrated by the 
Grootboom case. Had the Grootboom 
community not been referred by the 
Magistrate to Julian Apollos, they would 
likely have been left unrepresented and 
entirely unable to resist the eviction. 
This demonstrates the valuable role of 
advice and support to people wishing to 
assert their rights.
Advice centres thus play a 
fundamentally important role, for 
example, in referring people to litigation 
organisations. In doing so, they provide 
an essential feeding ground for future 
litigation – by identifying the core or 
most serious issues that are affecting 
large numbers of ordinary people. 
This allows public interest litigation to 
be effectively designed and targeted 
to achieve maximum impact. It also 
provides a wide range of possible 
applicants to participate in litigation 
and sustains the factual contentions 
necessary to make such litigation 
successful.
Equally important, advice centres 
play a crucial role in ensuring that a 
substantial victory in a landmark case 
actually translates into tangible benefits 
far beyond those directly involved in the 
case. A socio-economic rights victory in 
the Constitutional Court is meaningless 
if the news of this is not disseminated 
and acted upon – for example, by 
writing letters reminding the relevant 
department of the Court’s decision 
and its effect. An advice and assistance 
strategy is therefore essential, if we 
are to avoid having jurisprudentially 
important cases that have little practical 
impact on the ground.
It is essential that there are intermediary organisations which 
support people to claim their rights, through giving advice, 
directing them to appropriate institutions, assisting them 
with the formulation of their claims, and taking matters 
up on their behalf – all of which can be done successfully 
without necessarily engaging in litigation.
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It is clear from our study that rights 
generally are most effectively asserted 
by social movements. This point is well 
demonstrated by the case studies in 
Chapter 2 as well as other examples, and 
is a view shared by virtually all of our 
respondents.
Importantly, it appears that this 
conclusion is not limited to South 
Africa. Instead, comparative foreign 
experience demonstrates the same 
trend, a point emphasised by Geoff 
Budlender in his paper from 2000, 
Using the South African Constitution as 
a Mechanism for Addressing Poverty, on 
which we draw here.
The view that litigation by itself is 
generally insufficient to produce social 
change and that social mobilisation is 
essential has been particularly forcefully 
expressed in the Indian context. As 
former Chief Justice PN Bhagwati of the 
Supreme Court of India expresses it:
We must always remember that 
social action litigation is a necessary 
and valuable ally in the cause of the 
poor, but it cannot be a substitute 
for the organisation of the poor, 
development of community self-
reliance and establishment of 
effective organisational structures 
through which the poor can combat 
exploitation and injustice, protect and 
defend their interests, and secure their 
rights and entitlements.188
The same point is made even more 
forcefully by Indian public interest 
litigation activist, Vasudha Dhagamwar:
For the downtrodden of the world, we 
secure their rights by law, exactly as 
though they had the same privileged 
background as we, and then, outside 
the courtroom we leave them to their 
separate ways […] Their grim, hostile 
world, which recedes while we are 
present, returns with a vengeance. This 
is why our legal victories turn out to 
be pyrrhic and dangerous to the poor. 
There is a real danger if legal activists 
continue to interfere haphazardly, on 
a short term, case-wise basis with the 
lives of the downtrodden. It is time we 
learn that it is not enough to expose 
188  Quoted from Jeremy Cooper, Public interest law 
revisited, in Commonwealth Law Bulletin. Vol. 
25, Issue 1: 1999, page 140.
the innumerable and appalling social 
evils through the courts and the media. 
We must link up with social activists 







The use of litigation may even distract 
from and undermine other activities of a 
social movement which seek to enforce 
rights. As Richard Abel explains:
The legal representation of similarly 
situated individuals, even when it takes 
the form of a “class” action, tends 
to substitute for, rather than foster, 
organisation […] The inescapable 
conclusions, however reluctant we may 
be to draw them, are that the clientele 
of legal aid does not lend itself to 
organisation, and that the offer of legal 
assistance actually may undermine 
collective action.190
189 Cooper op.cit., page 139.
190  Richard L Abel, Law without Politics: Legal 
Aid under Advanced Capitalism, in UCLA Law 
Review, Vol. 32: 1985, pages 496-497.
Farmworkers are among 
the most vulnerable, and 
community advice offices 
often play an important role in 
enforcing their rights.
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Almost precisely the same view was 
expressed by one of our respondents:
The potential exists for litigation 
and mobilisation to be in tension, 
if recourse to the courts leads to 
resources being devoted only to 
litigation, at the expense of other 
strategies, leading to demobilisation. 
This can also involve lawyers and 
intellectuals taking the lead in devising 
strategies and making key decisions, 
at the expense of decision-making by 
communities or their representatives. 
This danger needs to be guarded 
against.
The scepticism of NGOs with regard 
to the use of litigation is relatively 
widespread and ultimately not 
surprising. In the context of the 
Mazibuko case, for example, one 
respondent explained that the APF was 
initially resistant to being associated 
with litigation and engaged in extensive 
conversations and deliberations 
about the ‘turn to the courts’. Even 
organisations that have litigated in their 
own names remain cautious on this 
score. As EE has explained:
One of the dangers […] that you face 
when deciding to take a campaign 
case to court is that you then get a 
process pretty much stuck in the court 
system. [This is] one of the reasons 
why you have to be quite careful and 
think about when it is that you choose 
to take on strategic litigation, because 
you in essence are now taking away 
certain space within which to engage 
and ultimately get potentially stuck 
in what could be a long, drawn-out 
court process. [This] is again a caution 
to any of us when making these 
decisions.191
What all of this makes clear is that 
making use of litigation can never 
suffice as an alternative to or substitute 
for proper social mobilisation on rights 
issues. Rights have to be asserted both 
outside and inside the courts. Laws 
and policies have to be developed in 
a manner which has proper regard to 
rights. Even when litigation results in 
a major breakthrough, there has to be 
organisation to ensure that it is properly 
implemented.
It is therefore critical that public interest 
litigation be seen as merely one facet – 
albeit an important one – of broader, 
more varied efforts to achieve social 
change. In particular, public interest 
191  Transcribed from the audio version of the 
discussion on Social Mobilization and Strategic 
Litigation for Equal Education in South Africa 
op.cit.
litigation achieves maximum social 
impact when it complements and assists 
other advocacy strategies, including 
efforts to achieve social change via 
formal and informal political processes 
as well as public pressure. As Geoff 
Budlender explains, there is a need for 
social movements that:
[…] identify issues, mobilise support 
around them, place pressure on the 
political system, use the legal system 
as a means of achieving this, and 
monitor and enforce favourable laws 
and orders by the courts. The best 
legal work supports the development 




The proper relationship between 
mobilisation and litigation is 
demonstrated by a number of South 
African examples. Some of these 
examples demonstrate how, skilfully 
managed, litigation can contribute as 
one aspect of a broader mobilisation 
process. Other examples demonstrate 
192  Geoff Budlender, Using the South African 
Constitution as a Mechanism for Addressing 
Poverty, unpublished: 2000.
Public interest litigation achieves maximum social impact 
when it complements and assists other advocacy strategies, 
including efforts to achieve social change via formal and 
informal political processes as well as public pressure.
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the negative consequences that result 
when this is not done.
An especially good example of 
combining mobilisation and litigation 
is that of the TAC case. The TAC saw 
litigation as one facet of a much bigger 
political fight over the availability 
of HIV and AIDS drugs. For years 
before the case commenced, the TAC 
had been engaging in substantial 
social mobilisation of its members 
and the broader public in an effort to 
put pressure on government. Geoff 
Budlender makes this point:
The TAC built a strong alliance with 
key pillars of civil society – trade 
unions, churches and media. It built 
a genuine social movement and 
showed how the Constitution, which 
represents the best ideals and values 
of our country, can be a powerful tool 
for holding government to those ideals 
and values.
In some ways, the final judgement of 
the Constitutional Court was simply 
the conclusion of a battle that the TAC 
had already won outside the courts, 
but with the skilful use of the courts as 
part of a broader struggle.193
193  Geoff Budlender in A paper dog with real teeth, 
Mail & Guardian: 12 July 2002.
Other examples of successful political 
and social mobilisation emerge in the 
litigation around the right to education.
During the Limpopo textbook 
litigation, for example, Section27 
launched an extensive media campaign 
that put pressure on government 
respondents to act. The organisation 
relied on both traditional and social 
media platforms. Section27 thus 
released press statements, held press 
conferences, wrote opinion pieces and 
provided updates via social media. 
The political pressure resulted in 
government interventions beyond 
those sought in the litigation, including 
the appointment by President Zuma of 
a task team to investigate the causes of 
delayed deliveries.
Similarly, in the norms and standards 
case, EE used its public campaign 
to build grass-roots support for the 
movement. As a result, there was 
significant pressure brought to bear 
on the Minister of Basic Education to 
uphold her commitment to publish 
binding minimum norms and standards 
for school infrastructure. Moreover, 
EE grew its support base significantly 
and gained momentum for its other 
education campaigns.
The Grootboom case also presents an 
important example. In this case, there 
was initially active social mobilisation 
and protest.
A few days after being evicted, the 
community organised a march to the 
offices of the Oostenberg Municipality, 
forced their way into a council meeting 
and demanded that something be 
done about their plight. This ultimately 
did not secure them any assistance – 
although it did put them in contact 
with the ANC politician who later 
encouraged them to launch the court 
action.
However, once the litigation began, 
the social mobilisation appeared to 
dissipate, with the community relying 
largely on the legal process to resolve 
the dispute. This had a number of 
negative effects, including that by the 
time judgment was handed down, the 
community was no longer in a strong 
position actively to assert and enforce 
its rights.
The weak and temporary nature of the 
social mobilisation in the Grootboom 
case was, regrettably, symptomatic of 
a lack of mobilisation in the land and 
housing sectors more generally. As one 
of our respondents explained of the 
Protest against ‘corrective rape’ 
in East London in May 2011, 
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land sector in 2007:
The key weakness in South Africa’s 
land sector to date has clearly been 
the lack of an organised political 
constituency in rural society, 
articulating a powerful rural voice able 
to counter the persistent urban bias in 
the country’s politics and economics. 
Land sector NGOs have consistently 
advocated pro-poor policies and 
greater levels of state investment in 
rural areas, but their reach is limited 
and their impact on policy has been 
uneven and often very limited. 
Rural social movements pushing for 
fundamental change did not emerge 
on any scale in the 1990s, and an 
attempt in 1999 to foster such a 
movement, undertaken by an alliance 
of NGOs under the umbrella of the 
Rural Development Initiative, came to 
naught.
This may well explain why, by 2007, 
the land and housing cases brought 
under the Constitution had all related 
to individual communities often faced 
with an immediate threat of eviction. 
This was in stark contrast to the careful 
strategy of the TAC, for example.
Thankfully, this situation has begun to 
change. Increasingly, significant efforts 
are being made to engage in social 
mobilisation strategies, particularly 
among rural communities. The careful 
and sustained efforts to resist the 
negative effects of the Communal 
Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 are good 
examples, ultimately ending in a 
victory in the Constitutional Court in 
Tongoane v Minister of Agriculture 
and Land Affairs,194 albeit only on 
procedural grounds.
194  Tongoane & Others v National Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs & Others [2010] 
ZACC 10; 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC).
It is important to understand, however, 
that the effect of this victory went 
far beyond merely setting aside the 
legislation on procedural grounds:
Court victories are often important 
in illuminating for poor people that 
victories against powerful actors – 
such as the state – are possible and 
within their grasp. This is critically 
important in contexts where the power 
of the state has previously seemed 
impregnable. The impact works 
both ways in the sense that often 
state officials are disproportionately 
disheartened by losing cases. In this 
sense the symbolic impact of victories 
and successes may be disproportionate 
to the narrow focus of the issue being 
litigated. This changed perception of 
the balance of power builds confidence 
and inspires people to engage actively 
in struggles for change – including 
non-legal on-the-ground struggles. 
Success breeds confidence which is 
important in and of itself in processes 
of local struggle. […]
Despite the generally limited scope of 
the content dealt with in judgments, 
the symbolic impact of a court victory 
often goes beyond that which is 
contained in the judge’s final decision. 
The recent constitutional court case 
of Tongoane […] is illustrative of 
this point. Judgment was delivered 
in favour of the applicants and the 
Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 
2004 was declared unconstitutional 
in its entirety. However, judgment was 
delivered only in respect of procedural 
irregularities in the parliamentary 
drafting of the Act, not in respect 
of more substantive arguments put 
forward by the applicants about 
the content of the Act. Despite this, 
the applicants (and other persons 
similarly placed) regard the judgment 
as a symbolic victory which precludes 
the inclusion of any of the opposed 
provisions’ content in future versions of 
the Act.195
Equally important and impressive 
were extensive efforts to oppose the 
Traditional Courts Bill.196 These efforts 
resulted in the Bill notionally ‘lapsing’ 
in Parliament in February 2014 – but 
it is quite clear that it was the extensive 
organised resistance to the Bill that 
produced this result. As explained by 
Nomboniso Gasa from the Centre 
for Law and Society, which has been 
actively involved in many of these 
campaigns:
Who killed the [Traditional Courts 
Bill]? The people who took great 
risks and refused to be hoodwinked 
into believing that the bill was about 
their culture, custom and affirmation 
of traditional leadership. These are 
the people who travelled to hearings 
again and again, thirsty, without 
travel money, and relied on the help of 
others. […]
To go with the story that “the 
[Traditional Courts Bill] lapsed” is 
to deny the courage of these people 
in face of great humiliation and 
intimidation in some of the public 
hearings, including in Parliament. 
They are South Africans who live in 
the “back of beyond”, who are often 
blurred in national consciousness. 
Despite being told in public hearings, 
“Tata, asithethi ngezikhalazo zakho 
phatsi kwentlalo yeNkosi” (Father, 
we are not speaking about your 
complaints about your chief here), they 
were not deterred. They continued to 
195 Claassens et al. op.cit., pages 23-24.
196  Traditional Courts Bill [B1-2012], formerly 
[B15-2008].
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give their reasons for rejecting the bill. 
They know their customs and live in 
these communities.197
Turning to the gay and lesbian 
litigation, the NCGLE was initially 
very active and effective at lobbying at 
a political level and at ensuring a public 
presence – for example, at the court 
hearings that took place in the sodomy 
matter. This public presence waned over 
time, although it was revived to some 
extent briefly by the gay marriage case 
and its aftermath.
However, our respondents in the gay 
and lesbian sector made clear to us that 
a lack of social mobilisation and public 
engagement on gay and lesbian issues 
was a major problem for the sector, 
notwithstanding the string of emphatic 
court victories. As one respondent 
explained:
Litigation strategies must be coupled 
with community-based activism and 
popularisation of legal advocacy 
to allow a deepening of public 
engagement with the issue of socio-
economic rights. Rights are not only 
won through the courts, for they are 
only as lasting and meaningful as the 
197  Nomboniso Gasa in Who killed the Traditional 
Courts Bill, Sunday Independent: 2 March 2014.
extent to which they can be accessed. 
In our sector, an over-reliance of legal 
means to facilitate social change has 
meant that we now have a large gap 
between the policy and the personal 
reality, on a range of rights issues. […] 
The LGBT sector has largely won 
its gains through the courts, with 
little engagement with affected 
constituencies or the broader public. 
The disparity that exists between law 
change and the practical outcomes this 
will affect is glaring. Implementation 
is key and the human factor mediates 
here, so unless we engage with the 
social attitudes and perceptions 
that make up this human factor, the 
effects of law in action will be limited. 
Administrative barriers are key here, 
and civil society organisations and 
service providers have a critical role 
to play.
It is thus clear that even in the gay 
and lesbian litigation – which we have 
argued was as carefully thought out and 
well run as any of which we are aware 
– a solid litigation strategy was not 
sufficient to compensate for a lack of 
social mobilisation.
The lack of mobilisation is even starker 
in other areas – particularly and not 
surprisingly those involving individual 
litigants. Thus, for example, there have 
been a series of decisions by the courts 
in favour of individual women who have 
been subjected to violence and abuse by 
the police or due to state inaction such 
as in Carmichele v Minister of Safety 
and Security,198 and K v Minister of 
Safety and Security.199
These were landmark and 
groundbreaking judgments which held 
the state accountable and awarded 
substantial damages – but as one of our 
respondents asked:
[W]here has this had any impact on 
the way in which ordinary women are 
treated in general or by the state in 
particular?
While these judgments and monetary 
damages awarded may have vindicated 
the rights of the individual women 
concerned, they appear to have had 
little impact on a broader scale.
The same emerges from litigation 
under apartheid. Though the legal and 
political environment was substantially 
different to the present, an examination 
of Richard Abel’s excellent book Politics 
198  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security & 
Another [2001] ZACC 22; 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC). 
199  K v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] ZACC 
8; 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC).
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by Other Means: Law in the Struggle 
Against Apartheid, 1980-1994200 makes 
it clear that legal work under apartheid 
was most likely to be successful in an 
enduring way when it was supported 
by political or social movements 
or organisations, to the extent then 
possible.
The lesson in our view is clear – it is the 
combination of complementary social 
mobilisation and litigation strategies 
that has the greatest potential to alter 
laws and policies.
Litigation as an 
entry-point for 
mobilisation?
One respondent suggested to us that 
one could successfully use litigation 
as an entry point for large-scale 
mobilisation. While this may occur in 
unusual cases, we doubt that it is likely 
to be successful in general.
For example, there can be no question 
that the TAC case vastly increased the 
public profile of the TAC and assisted 
in widening its existing mobilisation 
process. Nevertheless, it is important 
200 Abel, Politics by Other Means: Law in the 
Struggle Against Apartheid 1980-1994 op.cit.
to bear in mind that – at least initially – 
the TAC used a model of ‘mobilisation 
first, litigation second’. As another 
respondent put it:
[…] litigation can only catalyse 
mobilisation that is already taking 
place, it cannot create a movement 
where there was none.
While much will depend on the specific 
circumstances of the organisation, 
community and cause involved, we are 
of the view that for many communities 
and organisations, until there is 
sufficient mobilisation, litigation will 
not even be a possible option. This 
is demonstrated by the Grootboom 
example.
In the Grootboom case, the 
community’s decision to embark on 
legal action only occurred when a 
prominent provincial ANC politician 
became involved and supported such 
a course, thinking it would assist the 
ANC to embarrass the NNP. Until that 
point, litigation was not on the agenda 
– even though the community was now 
legally represented.
This strongly suggests that the litigation 
may not have happened in the same 
way or even at all had the community 
(generally strong ANC supporters) not 
been spurred on by the ANC politician 
and had the primary target not been the 
NNP-run local municipality.
A similar issue is raised by the TAC case 
where, as Heywood explains:
[t]here was reluctance publicly to 
endorse taking ‘our’ government 
to court. Therefore the right of civil 
society to use litigation to claim and 
enforce rights had to be argued in 
meetings and workshops against 
those who considered it ‘disloyal’ 
or ‘unpatriotic.’ Although COSATU 
welcomed each judgment in TAC’s 
favour, it never openly supported the 
litigation.201
Indeed, these concerns may well have 
been exacerbated by the fact that, over 
the past five years, opposition political 
parties have turned to the courts with 
increasing frequency in an effort to 
challenge government conduct and a 
range of laws. This has prompted Judge 
Dennis Davis to remark that:
[t]here is a danger in South Africa […] 
of the politicisation of the judiciary, 
drawing the judiciary into every and all 
political disputes, as if there is no other 
forum to deal with a political impasse 
relating to policy, or disputes which 
201 Heywood op.cit., page 300.
A lack of social mobilisation and public engagement on 
gay and lesbian issues was a major problem for the sector, 
notwithstanding the string of emphatic court victories.
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clearly carry polycentric consequences 
beyond the scope of adjudication.202 
Whatever the origin of the concerns, 
they may in part go some way in 
explaining the relatively limited 
litigation by poor communities against 
government, particularly given that all 
three spheres of government are in most 
areas ANC-controlled.
While the loyalty of various 
communities to the ANC is not 
surprising, it strongly supports the 
argument that at least some degree of 
social mobilisation of communities is 
essential before litigation can even be 
placed on the table as a viable option.
■ 
Strategy 4 – 
litigation
The final of our four proposed strategies 
is that of litigation. While we have 
repeatedly stressed that successful 
litigation must not be seen as an end 
in itself, it can play a pivotal role when 
202  Mazibuko, Leader of the Opposition in the 
National Assembly v Sisulu MP Speaker of the 
National Assembly & Others (21990/2012) [2012] 
ZAWCHC 189; 2013 (4) SA 243 (WCC). 
used in combination with the three 
strategies set out above.
The advantages of using litigation 
as a complement to the three other 
strategies are well explained by the 
Rural Women’s Action Research 
Programme:
This approach to litigation is attractive 
because it implicitly acknowledges the 
systemic disadvantages suffered by 
many communities in South Africa, 
and incorporates mobilisation and 
other community-based strategies 
into the litigation process so that 
community members themselves 
(in partnering with lawyers) can 
be empowered to overcome these 
disadvantages. In the words of two 
‘community lawyers’ from the USA: 
“In this model, rather than saviors or 
gatekeepers, lawyers are tacticians 
in the struggle for change. We call it 
community lawyering”.203 And later: 
“... fundamentally we believe that 
lawyers are most effective when 
they assist those most impacted by 
marginalization and oppression to lead 
their own fights for justice”.204
203  Purvi Shah & Charles Elsesser, Purvi & Chuck: 
Community Lawyering, 1 June 2010 (available at 
www.organizingupgrade.com).
204 Claassens et al. op.cit., page 20.
All our respondents, in different 
guises, supported the proposition that, 
properly used, public interest litigation 
enables poor or marginalised groups to 
achieve impact and success that would 
often not be available to them if they 
were limited only to the three strategies 
set out above.
At some stage, however, even this 
starting point has proved controversial 
in certain parts of the world, 
particularly in the US. In the 1990s, a 
furious academic debate took place over 
whether litigation could produce social 
change, sparked by Gerald Rosenberg’s 
work The Hollow Hope: Can Courts 
Bring About Social Change?205 However, 
even Rosenberg does not contend that 
litigation can never produce social 
change. As he explains:
Courts influence events all the time. 
The claim The Hollow Hope makes 
is that only under certain specified 
conditions can courts further 
significant social reform. Without the 
presence of those decisions, court 
influence will still be felt, but it won’t 
205  Rosenberg op.cit. (1st Edition, University of 
Chicago Press: 1991).
Treatment Action Campaign community 
outreach in the Buhle Park township in 
south-eastern Johannesburg, February 2011.
Photograph: Luckyboy Mkhondwane & 
Treatment Action Campaign ©
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contribute very much to producing 
significant social reform.206
This is not the place for a detailed debate 
over the correctness of Rosenberg’s 
arguments and views and, even 
more critically, the extent of their 
applicability in a South African context. 
Such a debate would be particularly 
unnecessary because, in truth, virtually 
no one seriously contends that public 
interest litigation is inherently incapable 
of bringing about social change.
Moreover, even a brief consideration 
206  Gerald Rosenberg, Knowledge and Desire: 
Thinking about Courts and Social Change, in 
David A Schultz (ed), Leveraging the Law: Using 
the Courts to Achieve Social Change, 1st Edition, 
Peter Lang Publishing Inc., New York: 1998, page 
255.
of the practical consequences of the 
case studies discussed in Chapter 2 
demonstrate the social change that can 
result from public interest litigation. 
These consequences include:
•  Millions of people are now on ARVs 
and countless babies have been 
saved.
•  Learners have been given access 
to textbooks, teachers and proper 
school infrastructure.
•  Poor people have obtained 
increased security of tenure.
•  Gay and lesbian couples are now 
able to get married, adopt children, 
and receive pension and inheritance 
benefits from their partner.
This does not suggest, of course, that 
the litigation has produced a radical 
reordering of our society. It does make 
clear, however, that public interest 
litigation can, when used appropriately, 
produce social change as we have 
defined it above – that is, a tangible and 
sustainable impact on the ground for 
those who ought to benefit from the 
rights concerned.
The real question, therefore, is in which 
circumstances and in conjunction 
with which other strategies such social 
change is most likely to occur.
2007: The light towers of the 
Constitutional Court rise above 
the barbed wire fortification of 
Section Four at the Johannesburg 
Fort (an apartheid-era prison).
Photograph: Gerald Kraak ©
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T
he seven factors identified and 
addressed in this chapter are:
• proper organisation of clients;
• overall long-term strategy;






Somewhat unsurprisingly, our 
assessment is that where public interest 
litigation takes place in combination 
with the first three strategies set out 
in the preceding chapter, these seven 
factors are far more likely to be present 
than where public interest litigation is 
seen as a strategy and an end in itself.
Before we discuss each of these seven 
factors in turn, we make two points.
The first is to recognise that litigation 
can be either proactive or defensive. 
In the former case, the parties and 
their advisers are able to control the 
litigation. In the latter, the public 
interest component may arise by way of 
a defence, or even the intervention of an 
amicus curiae. The approach we advance 
applies to both proactive and defensive 
litigation, but is certainly of easier 
application to the former.
The second point is that we have noted 
the criticism by Jackie Dugard and 
Malcolm Langford of the use of the 
seven factors following the 2008 report. 
They conclude:
[Our] examination of Mazibuko and 
Joseph has indicated the complexity of 
the causal connection between public 
interest litigation and both successful 
judicial outcome and maximal social 
impact. Regarding successful judicial 
outcome, while various factors are 
relevant in specific cases (particularly 
retrospectively), the litigation process 
is too unpredictable to rely on any 
pre-conceived formula. As Mazibuko 
has shown, you can tick all the 
conventional boxes and still lose in 
court. Or, as Joseph has shown, you 
can sometimes win in court without 
ticking all the boxes.
This is not to imply that there are 
not better or worse ways to do 
public interest litigation. Clearly, the 
more immersed in the area you are 
litigating the better. As with any kind 
Seven factors to maximise 
the prospect of ensuring 
that public interest 
litigation succeeds and 
achieves social change
What remains to be considered is in which manner litigation is most 
likely to succeed and achieve social change. In this chapter, we set out 
seven factors which we consider critical in this regard. In particular, it 
is vital that litigation be properly conceptualised, run and followed up.
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of litigation, this includes conducting 
ongoing research, coordinating with 
stakeholders and learning from 
being a repeat player. In this respect, 
there is mounting evidence that civic 
action requires long-term strategic 
thinking based on thorough contextual 
and structural analyses. These are 
habits worth acquiring. However, as 
evidenced in Mazibuko, such factors 
might not be enough to ensure a 
successful judicial outcome. Judicial 
outcome depends ultimately on the 
judges themselves. In this regard, 
studying trends and patterns might 
offer some clues as to how judges 
might adjudicate. However, in the case 
of the South African Constitutional 
Court, particularly in relation to socio-
economic rights claims such as those 
pursued in Mazibuko and Joseph, the 
Court’s jurisprudence is still too sparse 
and inconclusive to provide concrete 
direction.207
We disagree with the assessment that 
Mazibuko ticked all the boxes while 
207 Dugard & Langford op.cit., page 63.
Joseph did not.208 However, the more 
critical point is that, in setting out 
these seven factors, we do not purport 
to provide a mathematical formula 
for success in litigation. Nor could we 
ever do so. Litigation is subject to so 
many variables that outcomes are never 
certain.
This is not to say, though, that litigation 
can or should be reduced to a lottery. 
Every day, lawyers provide advice based 
on their reasonable prediction of how 
the highest court would decide the issue 
in question. That advice presupposes a 
measure of consistency and continuity 
in the legal system based on a system 
208 To provide two examples:
Dugard and Langford conclude that Mazibuko 
fully met the timing factor because all attempted 
political engagement had failed by the time of 
the launch of the litigation. However, a number 
of our respondents disagreed. They emphasised 
that the first case on access to water should not 
have been one brought on behalf of people with 
access to running water in their homes, and that 
political engagement in relation to the City of 
Johannesburg’s indigence measures regarding water 
had not occurred at all.
Dugard and Langford contend that the 
characterisation factor in Joseph was only partially 
satisfied because the applicants characterised 
the case as a ‘right to housing’ case and the 
Constitutional Court then sidestepped that 
characterisation. That is not correct. The applicants 
were at pains to avoid characterising the case as a 
right to housing case and repeatedly emphasised 
that the case was about administrative justice and 
procedural fairness, a characterisation that was 
ultimately accepted by the Court.
of precedent and rules of evidence 
and procedure. Advancing a litigation 
strategy is, in principle, no different.
This does not mean that courts will 
inevitably decide matters in a particular 
way. It means only that it makes sense 
to adopt a litigation strategy that has 
the best prospects of succeeding and to 
do so in a way that maximises the social 
change which will likely result.
Against this backdrop, we turn to the 
seven factors concerned.
■




An important point that arises for 
consideration is which types of clients 
are most likely to lead to the most 
successful public interest litigation? In 
our view, the ideal public interest client 
has two characteristics:
•  Firstly, generally speaking, public 
interest litigation is likely to 
A young illegal immigrant on 
the deportation train from South 
Africa to Mozambique in 2000.
Photograph: Nadine Hutton ©
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achieve greater social change when 
the client is a collective entity 
(organisation or movement) with a 
direct interest in the matters being 
litigated, rather than, for example, a 
few disparate individuals.
•  Secondly, public interest litigation 
is likely to achieve greater social 
change when the client plays an 
active and engaged role, rather than 
allowing legal representatives to 




With regard to the first issue, we 
have already touched on examples of 
litigation that, while achieving impact 
for the individuals concerned, have 
apparently not had any lasting social 
impact. These are the women’s rights 
cases mentioned earlier – Carmichele v 
Minister of Safety and Security, and K v 
Minister of Safety and Security.
The difficulty, of course, is that an 
individual litigant generally has 
an individual and narrow interest. 
He or she (or they in the case of a 
community) wishes to achieve an 
award of damages or avoid eviction, for 
example, but there is often no greater 
cause at stake that is being asserted. As 
a result, the conceptualisation of the 
case, the scope of the legal debate and 
any remedy awarded tends to be narrow 
and individualistic, thus reducing the 
prospects of achieving social change.
A good example of this is the 
Grootboom case. Until the LRC 
became involved in representing the 
amici, the case focused exclusively 
on the position of the Grootboom 
community and whether they should 
receive housing or shelter. Had the 
LRC not intervened, and even if the 
Grootboom community had succeeded, 
it is very likely that the result would 
have been a narrow judgment and order, 
focusing only on the community’s 
limited circumstances and affording 
them some narrow relief. As a result, 
while they may have achieved success, 
the broad effect and prospects for social 
change would have been minimal.
The LRC’s intervention shifted the 
focus from a narrow case to a broader 
cause. It resulted in a judgment setting 
out principles and precedent far 
beyond the narrow circumstances of 
the Grootboom community and gave a 
broad declaratory order stating that the 
housing policy in the entire Western 
Cape province failed to comply with 
the Constitution. We deal with the 
effect of declaratory orders later in this 
chapter, but for present purposes suffice 
it to say that the Grootboom order, if 
used properly by organisations such 
as the SAHRC, could have provided 
an ideal springboard for achieving 
substantial social change. This situation 
was only made possible by the LRC’s 
intervention, broadening the focus of 
the case.
Some of the litigation that has been 
undertaken on behalf of individually 
detained asylum seekers and refugees 
demonstrates the same point. As Roni 
Amit explains, in respect of various 
court victories – including in the 
Supreme Court of Appeal: 
[…] while the individual on whose 
behalf the cases was brought generally 
obtained some relief, similarly situated 
asylum seekers and refugees have 
continued to confront the same illegal 
practices.209
This is not, of course, to deny the 
importance of vindicating the 
individual rights of those who have 
209  Roni Amit, Winning Isn’t Everything: Courts, 
Context and Barriers to Effecting Change 
Through Public Interest Litigation, in South 
African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 27, Part 1: 
2011, page 16.
Litigation is likely to achieve greater social change when 
the client is a collective entity with a direct interest in the 
matters being litigated.
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been unlawfully detained, but it points 
to the difficulty of obtaining systemic 
relief and producing meaningful social 
change when cases are only brought on 
an individual basis. 
In response to this difficulty, LHR 
has recently launched litigation as 
an institutional litigant seeking to 
challenge the constitutionality of 
certain provisions of the Immigration 
Act 13 of 2002 on the basis that they 
fail to adequately safeguard the rights 
of detainees. It is hoped that this will 
produce greater systemic benefits to 
those affected.
Even where an individual litigant does 
seek to bring a case with a broader 
goal in mind, the narrowness of his 
or her direct interest can undermine 
these efforts. Faced with a settlement 
proposal that would resolve the 
immediate and individual concern, 
most clients (and their lawyers who are 
ethically obliged to act in their interests) 
will have little option but to accept 
the settlement proposal, thus putting 
paid to the case and meaning that the 
broader cause cannot be furthered.
Indeed, this has become an almost 
inevitable tactic of certain government 
departments. Faced with the prospect 
of an adverse judgment or order 
that may have negative implications, 
certain departments tend to litigate 
vigorously – taking every technical 
point imaginable – until shortly before 
the matter is to go to court. Then, a few 
days before the court hearing or even 
on the day of the hearing on the steps 
of the court, a settlement offer is made 
to resolve the position of the individual 
litigants. This offer, if accepted, means 
that there is not even a precedent set 
because no judgment is issued, let alone 
a broad remedial order granted. This 
tactic is particularly frequently used 
by the Department of Home Affairs in 
dealing with refugee matters.
However, where individual clients truly 
seek to act in the public interest as well, 
tactics can be devised to minimise this 
risk. This is demonstrated by the case 
of Tafira v Ngozwane210 run by the 
Wits Law Clinic and dealing with the 
unlawfulness of procedures in place at 
refugee reception offices.
In this case, the seven individual 
applicants – all of whom were seeking 
refugee status – made clear that they 
acted in their own interest in reviewing 
and setting aside the unlawful decisions 
210 Tafira v Ngozwane [2006] ZAGPHC 136.
made in respect of them, but also used 
South Africa’s broad standing provisions 
to act in the public interest in seeking 
wide-ranging general relief consisting 
of declaratory and mandatory orders in 
order to resolve systemic problems.
This meant that although government 
conceded the individual relief very early 
on, the case proceeded to obtain a full 
judgment in favour of the applicants, 
together with granting of the general 
relief.
Another tactic is to take on a mix of 
clients, representing individuals who 
are directly affected by the offending 
law or practice as well as one or more 
organisations that represent the public 
interest in the matter. This allows public 
interest litigators to accept a settlement 
for the benefit of the individuals, while 
continuing to litigate for the broader 
relief on behalf of the organisations. 
This strategy was employed in the 
school infrastructure norms and 
standards case discussed in Chapter 2.
The case was brought on behalf of 
two schools and EE. Both schools had 
suffered serious infrastructural damage 
caused by severe weather storms and 
fire. Consequently, the relief sought was 
split into two parts – the first seeking 
Tents at a refugee camp in 
Midrand, Gauteng in 2008. A 
wave of rioting and xenophobic 
violence swept through South 
Africa in May 2008.
Photograph: 
NJR ZA/www.wikimedia.org ©
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emergency relief for the two schools 
and the second relating to the failure 
by the Minister of Basic Education to 
make regulations prescribing minimum 
norms and standards for school 
infrastructure applicable to all public 
schools in South Africa.
After a settlement agreement was 
entered into on 19 November 2012, 
the Minister fulfilled her obligations in 
relation to the two applicant schools, 
thus providing sufficient classrooms, 
security fencing, toilets, water and 
furniture. However, the case did not 
end there. When the Minister failed to 
publish final regulations by the agreed 
deadline, EE and the LRC returned to 
court to pursue the second part of the 
relief.
Hence, the inclusion of an institutional 
applicant like EE was crucial for the 
continuation of the case and the 
attainment of broader relief. However, 
the importance of including the 
two schools as applicants must not 
be underestimated. Their inclusion 
allowed the LRC to place specific and 
concrete evidence before the court. 
This evidence painted a vivid and 
personal account of the severe hardship 
and indignity experienced by learners 
and teachers as a result of inadequate 
infrastructure. This, in turn, set the tone 
and created the context for argument 
on the broader question of national 
regulations for school infrastructure.
Such tactics, however, will not 
always be successful. Government 
departments often seek to settle the 
case as a whole by agreeing to the 
individual relief, only if the general 
relief is abandoned. Nevertheless, this 
represents a valuable tactic to consider.
A final point to be considered on 
the organisational nature of clients 
is that it is not always necessary for 
organisations to represent all those 
affected. Coalitions of different 
organisations can work just as well. 
What is critical, however, is that the 
relevant organisations or movements 
must be respected as legitimate and 
credible by as many people involved as 
possible. Without this legitimacy, it is 
difficult for organisations to properly 
co-ordinate and plan litigation as there 
is always a risk of other, potentially 
damaging, litigation being brought 
simultaneously on similar issues.
The NCGLE presents an excellent 
example of this: If the Coalition had 
not had the necessary legitimacy to 
persuade the foreign gay couple to 
allow the Coalition’s litigation strategy 
to run its course, the strategy could 
have been severely undermined.
Involved clients
The second aspect of client organisation 
is that public interest litigation generally 
works best and achieves maximum 
social impact when it involves clients 
who are well organised and able 
to provide proper instruction and 
direction to legal representatives, 
combined with proper follow-up after 
the litigation. In other words, public 
interest litigation – like other forms of 
litigation – should ideally be run by 
clients, not by lawyers.
Regrettably, but unsurprisingly, this has 
generally not been the case. As Jonathan 
Berger explained in 2007:
Many claims for [socio-economic] 
benefits at state expense are 
the domain of the poor and the 
marginalised. As such, it is not 
surprising that much of the litigation 
conducted on behalf of rights 
claimants is conducted with little 
of their input insofar as lawyering 
is concerned. While a few notable 
exceptions – such as TAC – may exist, 
the bulk of cases analysed follow this 
trend to a greater or lesser extent.211
Increasingly, however, there are 
important exceptions to this approach. 
Apart from the TAC case cited by 
Berger and the NCGLE cases, EE 
now provides an ideal example of 
community organisations playing a 
vital and central role in conceptualising, 
running and following up litigation.
Where litigation is led primarily by 
lawyers, it runs a substantially greater 
risk of producing a case and a judgment 
that is removed from the reality on 
the ground and that does not achieve 
tangible social change. Even with the 
best intentions in the world, lawyers 
generally see things from a legal 
perspective first, in contrast with clients 
who want to see an impact on their lives 
or those of their constituencies.
On the other hand, for instance, it 
is notable that for all the difficulties 
of the Grootboom case, one of the 
key factors that allowed the litigation 
to succeed as much as it did was the 
high degree of organisation in the 
community. Though the role played by 
the community appears to have waned 
somewhat once litigation was underway 
– a regular difficulty – the Grootboom 
community’s level of organisation was 
important in getting the litigation off 
the ground.
A similar example is provided by Berger 
in respect of another case concerning 
a poor community seeking to obtain 
211 Berger op.cit., page 88.
Public interest litigation generally works best and 
achieves maximum social impact when it involves 
clients who are well organised and able to provide proper 
instruction and direction to legal representatives.
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security of tenure – President of the 
Republic of South Africa v Modderklip 
Boerdery.212 As Berger explains:
[This is] an interesting example of how 
a small firm – led by a larger-than-
life, tenacious attorney – collaborated 
with the residents of the informal 
settlement: the disciplined Gabon 
community. It confirms what many 
litigators understand that large groups 
of people cannot be well-represented 
unless they are well-organised, able 
to take decisive action and resilient 
to undue pressure. Making use of an 
outdoor ‘community office’ where 
meetings were held, the community 
took decisions on the basis of 
consensus-building and inclusivity. 
For their part, the lawyers provided 
free legal services all the way to the 
Constitutional Court. To date, they 
continue to assist as the community 
successfully asserts its claims to free 
basic municipal services.213
In this regard, a key difficulty is 
the relative lack of appropriate 
organisations presently operating in 
South African civil society that can take 
212  President of the Republic of South Africa & 
Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd [2005] 
ZACC 5; 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC).
213 Berger op.cit., page 89.
on this role as active clients. As one of 
our respondents put it in 2007:
The major obstacle post-2000 is the 
lack of mobilisation and organisation 
at the community level. It may sound 
alarmist, but at some levels it will be 
correct to talk of the collapse of civil 
society.
Since then, the founding of 
organisations such as EE, the Social 
Justice Coalition and others has been 
an important step in redressing this 
problem. However, given the focused 
substantive areas in which these 
organisations operate, this issue remains 
a cause for concern.
One final point should be made with 
regard to the ideal client: credibility 
with the court is crucial.
This is perhaps best demonstrated by 
the recent case of Teddy Bear Clinic,214 
which concerned a constitutional 
challenge to a statute criminalising 
consensual sexual behaviour between 
children under the age of 16.
In this case, the two applicants were the 
214  Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children & 
Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development & Another op.cit.
Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children 
and RAPCAN.215 They were challenging 
a statute which was ostensibly enacted 
for the protection of vulnerable 
children, but which the applicants 
contended was in fact deeply harmful to 
those children.
In this regard, it was of considerable 
importance that the applicants had a 
stellar track record in protecting the 
kinds of children involved. As the 
Constitutional Court remarked:
Both applicants have over twenty 
years’ experience in attempting to curb 
the scourge of sexual abuse of children, 
and in dealing with its consequences.216
By contrast, with regard to the 
Mazibuko case, one of our respondents 
speculated that including the APF as a 
co-applicant would have undermined 
the credibility of the case in view 
of the fact that the APF had already 
had an interdict granted against it for 
vandalising PPMs.
215  Resources Aimed at the Prevention of Child 
Abuse and Neglect.
216  Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children & 
Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development & Another op.cit., paragraph 6.
‘We Are Watching’ march in Cape 
Town in 2009 organised by the 
Treatment Action Campaign and 
the AIDS and Rights Alliance for 
Southern Africa. The march was 
part of a campaign to challenge 
irresponsible government spending 
in light of health priorities.
Photograph: Samantha Reinders & 
Treatment Action Campaign ©
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■
Factor 2 – 
overall long-
term strategy
Where public interest litigation achieves 
maximum social impact, it is invariably 
not by virtue of a single case. Rather, it 
tends to require a series of cases brought 
on different but related issues over a 
substantial period of time. Earlier cases 
thus act as vital building blocks for more 
complex and difficult later cases.
We therefore conclude that it is critical 
that organisations seeking to utilise 
public interest litigation to achieve social 
impact do not attempt to rely on ‘one-
shot’ success. Rather, they must develop 
a coherent long-term strategy that allows 
them to benefit from the substantial 
advantage that derives from being a 
‘repeat player’ in court.
The concepts of ‘one-shotters’ and 
‘repeat players’ come from a famous 
article by Marc Galanter entitled Why the 
‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change.217
217  Published in Law & Society Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, 
Autumn: 1974, pages 95-160. 
In this article, Galanter demonstrated 
the advantages which repeat players 
have in litigation over one-shotters. 
Parties that repeatedly litigate in the 
same area have the advantages of 
developing specialised expertise and 
enjoying economies of scale as well as 
low start-up costs.
Moreover, and critically, repeat players 
need not seek to achieve their goals 
immediately and in every piece of 
litigation. Rather, they can develop 
long-term litigation strategies aimed at 
maximising the achievement of their 
long-term goals in an incremental 
fashion.
Though Galanter’s article was 
not focusing on public interest 
organisations, it applies with at least 
equal force to them. Indeed, his theories 
demonstrate precisely why, as Geoff 
Budlender puts it:
[p]ublic interest law centres can often 
‘punch above their weight’ – the 
impact of their work can be far beyond 
the size of the organisations.218
The best example of such a repeat player 
in the South African public interest 
218  Geoff Budlender, Access to Justice: Lessons 
from South Africa’s Land Reform Programme, 
American Bar Foundation: undated, page 8.
sector was the NCGLE. As Chapter 2 
makes clear, the Coalition adopted a 
long-term incremental strategy which, 
ultimately, resulted in massive success 
– a string of seven unanimous victories 
from the Constitutional Court. Though 
not all of those cases were NCGLE 
cases, it was the Coalition’s strategy of 
‘easier cases first, more difficult cases 
later’ that allowed this success.
Another repeat player is the handful 
of NGOs (collectively) that have 
engaged in incremental litigation in the 
education cases covered in Chapter 
2. They have taken on a number of 
narrow issues in a series of cases, which 
together have gradually given content to 
the right to basic education.
This should be contrasted with the 
effect of the Soobramoney case, for 
example. As noted in Chapter 1, this 
was the Constitutional Court’s first 
judgment on socio-economic rights, in 
which it refused an application brought 
by a severely ill man who needed renal 
dialysis treatment but did not qualify in 
terms of the criteria set out by the state. 
The problem was that these criteria 
were almost entirely beyond reproach 
and had been developed in order to deal 
with the limited availability of medical 
equipment and staff.
It is critical that organisations seeking to utilise public 
interest litigation to achieve social impact do not attempt 
to rely on ‘one-shot’ success. Rather, they must develop 
a coherent long-term strategy that allows them to benefit 
from the substantial advantage that derives from being a 
‘repeat player’ in court.
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Though one cannot blame Mr 
Soobramoney – who died shortly after 
judgment was delivered – the fact of 
the matter is that, as Jonathan Berger 
explains, the Soobramoney case shows 
what can happen when the ‘wrong’ 
cases are litigated.219
The failure of the Soobramoney case 
not only appears to have discouraged 
socio-economic rights litigation, but 
it also led to a perception that cases 
seeking actual medical treatment 
would not be able to succeed. Though 
the losses in the Soobramoney case 
were painstakingly ‘clawed back’ via 
Grootboom, TAC and other High 
Court litigation, it is plain that running 
the wrong case undermines the broader 
cause.
A repeat-player organisation, properly 
advised, would have made the 
agonising, but ultimately correct, 
decision that running the Soobramoney 
case would set back the cause of 
achieving social change and should not 
occur.
The education cases in Chapter 2 
demonstrate the same point. The 
decision by the LRC and EE to litigate 
to compel the issuing of norms and 
219 Berger op.cit., page 82.
standards plainly involved viewing the 
problems of school infrastructure as a 
long-term problem. They resisted the 
urge to bring one massive case seeking 
to resolve infrastructural problems 
in one shot. Instead, they viewed the 
litigation as only the first step in a much 
longer process. This was plainly realistic 
and the correct approach.
Similarly, we referred earlier to the 
litigation being initiated by LHR to 
challenge the detention provisions 
of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002. 
This constitutional challenge was only 
instituted after painstakingly laying 
the groundwork over a number of 
years by bringing case after case to free 
individual detainees. The founding 
papers from LHR place great emphasis 
on the fact that even after succeeding 
in 136 separate cases (involving 167 
clients), the problems of unlawful 
detention still persist. It is hoped that 
this will demonstrate compellingly to 
the Constitutional Court the need for a 
systemic solution.
Two last points should be made about 
the advantages of repeat players.
The first is that if they perform 
successfully, they tend to have great 
credibility with the courts. Perhaps 
the best example of this is the CCL, 
a highly-skilled organisation which 
both litigates in its own name and 
represents clients. Over the last ten 
years, the Centre has not only carefully 
implemented a strategy to develop the 
jurisprudence on children’s rights, but 
in doing so, it has built an outstanding 
reputation in the courts as having both 
expertise in and a practical approach 
to children’s rights. This is a substantial 
advantage for the Centre when it 
litigates cases.
The second point is that an 
organisation’s repeated involvement in 
specialised areas allows it to identify 
both the core issues that require 
litigation and the ideal cases to do so.
This is demonstrated in the context 
of litigation around the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
(PAIA). Two of the organisations most 
actively engaged in PAIA requests are 
the South African History Archive 
(SAHA) in respect of public bodies, 
and the Centre for Environmental 
Rights (CER) in respect of mainly 
private bodies. They have each engaged 
in or are in the process of engaging 
in litigation which seeks to remedy 
key obstacles to PAIA requests being 
properly dealt with. The potential effect 
Photograph: Wired 
Communications ©
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of this could be significant, as was 
demonstrated by the recent success of 
the CER in requiring Eskom, without 
litigation, to provide under PAIA a 
report indicating the number of deaths 
caused by air pollution from Eskom.220
■





An interesting issue emerging from 
this study is that in virtually any given 
area of public interest litigation there 
are multiple organisations with similar 
aims all seeking to achieve success via 
litigation. This is both unsurprising and 
desirable given that many organisations 
are operating in different parts of the 
country.
Nevertheless, it raises the concern that 
if there is insufficient co-ordination 
220  How Eskom’s coal kills, Mail & Guardian: 20 June 
2014.
and information-sharing among these 
organisations, there is a real danger that 
resources will not be used effectively 
and, even more damaging, viable 
cases will be undermined by other 
conflicting cases being brought by 
other organisations simultaneously or 
beforehand.
An example of what can go wrong in 
this context is the case of Hoffmann 
v South African Airways.221 This case 
concerned the practice of South African 
Airways to refuse to employ HIV-
positive individuals as cabin attendants. 
The case was litigated by the LRC.
However, at around the same time, the 
ALP was litigating precisely the same 
issue for another cabin attendant in A v 
South African Airways.222
The difficulty was that although the 
Hoffmann case was the first to reach 
the Constitutional Court, it appeared to 
lack certain important medical evidence 
on the transmission, progression and 
treatment of HIV, as well as the ability 
of people with HIV to be vaccinated 
against yellow fever, an important issue 
in the case. In contrast, the case of A 
221  Hoffmann v South African Airways [2000] ZACC 
17; 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC).
222  A v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd, Labour 
Court, Case No. J1916/99.
v South African Airways contained 
precisely such evidence.
Ultimately, the difficulty was avoided 
when the ALP applied to be an amicus 
in the Hoffmann case and successfully 
sought to place the relevant evidence 
before the Constitutional Court. The 
Court ruled in favour of Hoffmann, 
relying substantially on the evidence 
from the ALP.
The case thus ended in a victory for all 
concerned. However, it demonstrates 
the danger of insufficient co-ordination 
among public interest litigation 
organisations. If the ALP had not 
intervened and if the Constitutional 
Court had held that the absence 
of the necessary medical evidence 
meant that the discrimination against 
Hoffmann was justified, this would 
have represented a major setback for 
organisations in this sector. It could also 
have irreparably damaged the A v South 
African Airways case, even though the 
relevant evidence was available.
It is therefore crucial that there be 
proper information-sharing and 
co-ordination among different 
organisations. We appreciate that this 
is not always easy when organisations 
find themselves competing for 
If they perform successfully, repeat players tend to have 
great credibility with the courts. Also, an organisation’s 
repeated involvement in specialised areas allows it to 
identify both the core issues that require litigation and 
the ideal cases to do so.
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funding from the same funders. 
However, some funders have now 
actively emphasised the need for their 
grantees to work together with other 
organisations in certain areas. Provided 
that this does not impede effective 
progress, and provided that the mode 
of co-ordination is flexible rather 
than formalistic, this is a welcome 
development.
Happily, since the 2008 report, there 
has been a significant increase in 
information-sharing and co-ordination 
in different areas. For example:
•  For the last four years, a number of 
key public interest organisations 
have jointly organised an annual 
‘Public Interest Law Gathering’. 
This gathering allows public interest 
litigators and others to meet and 
discuss a wide range of issues, 
including in sessions devoted to 
specific areas of public interest 
litigation. It is also a very effective 
mechanism of getting law students 
engaged in public interest issues.
•  The Socio-Economic Rights 
Institute of South Africa, arguably 
the leading public interest 
organisation in the country in 
the area of housing litigation, has 
co-ordinated a series of quarterly 
meetings around evictions, 
alternative accommodation and 
related issues. These have included 
other key players in this area.
•  In July 2014, four organisations – 
Section27, EE, the EE Law Centre 
and the LRC – jointly hosted a 
conference on the now enacted 
Norms and Standards for School 
Infrastructure.
■
Factor 4 – 
timing
Timing is an essential element in any 
public interest litigation that is to 
have meaningful impact. Litigation 
should not commence until and unless 
the climate is right and the relevant 
evidence is in place. The damaging 
effects of running litigation too soon 
can be disastrous – particularly as an 
unsuccessful piece of public interest 
litigation could, in practice, permanently 
foreclose the issue from being re-
litigated.
It is also very helpful to be able to 
demonstrate that court action has 
not been the first (or at least not the 
first and only) port of call for the 
parties involved. Where litigation is 
against government on controversial 
issues, courts will tend to be far more 
receptive and sympathetic where it 
can be demonstrated that the litigants 
have repeatedly sought to engage with 
government to achieve a solution, but 
that this has not resulted.
In this regard, the TAC case provides 
an ideal example of launching litigation 
at the right time. As Jonathan Berger 
explains:
Timing played a crucial factor in TAC, 
which was launched only after a long 
four-year history of engagement on 
the specific issue. In addition, it built 
on the organisation’s previous work to 
reduce ARV medicine prices, as well 
as scientific developments regarding 
the proven efficacy of a simple 
and affordable MTCT prevention 
intervention. Equally important, the 
TAC did not act until it had given 
the state a reasonable opportunity 
to explain why – in the face of the 
available evidence – it continued 
to refuse to permit the use of ARV 
medicines for MTCT prevention outside 
of a limited number of ‘pilot’ sites, 
let alone to provide the medicines at 
Arthur Chaskalson, President of 
the Constitutional Court from 
1994 to 2001 and Chief Justice 
of South Africa from 2001 to 
2005, presided over some of 
the Constitutional Court’s most 
groundbreaking judgments.
Photograph: Helen MacDonald ©
120 Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Chapter 4
state expense. Simply put, litigation 
came onto the agenda when all other 
options had been exhausted. [emphasis 
added]223
The TAC case demonstrates that public 
interest litigation cannot and should 
not be the starting point and exclusive 
strategy for an organisation wishing to 
achieve social change. Rather, it should 
be used carefully where a process of 
social mobilisation has begun, and yet 
where attempts to achieve social change 
via the political route appear to have 
failed.
This is in line with the approach of 
well-known American lawyer and law 
professor Gary Bellow: 
The worst thing a lawyer can do is to 
take an issue that could be won by 
political organisation and win it in the 
courts.224
There are many reasons for only using 
litigation to achieve social change once 
the political route has failed. Prime 
among them is that this approach 
affords two separate opportunities to 
achieve goals. Provided there is real 
possibility of progress on the political 
223 Berger op.cit., page 87.
224  Quoted from Philip B Heymann & Lance Liebman, 
Social Responsibilities of Lawyers, Foundation 
Press: 1988, page 24.
front, it would be highly risky to 
abandon this option and rely purely 
on litigation instead. Not only may the 
litigation fail, but if this took place, the 
chances of reviving a political victory 
would generally be substantially 
reduced. Other considerations 
favouring using the political route first 
include:
•  The chances of succeeding 
in litigation are substantially 
increased if government has had an 
opportunity to resolve the issue, 
but has failed to do so without 
justification.
•  It conserves the limited political 
capital that courts have by only 
asking them to come into conflict 
with government when absolutely 
necessary.
•  It ensures that the primary focus 
of an organisation or movement – 
mobilising members and supporters 
to achieve change – is not overrun 
by litigation taking centre stage.
The approach of the LRC and EE 
regarding the norms and standards 
litigation is a particularly good example 
of the correct approach – pursuing 
the political route vigorously and only 
turning to litigation when it is quite 
clear that the political route has failed.
It should be noted, however, that 
deciding to bring litigation at the right 
time is often easier said than done. 
In the TAC case, for instance, very 
difficult decisions had to be made at 
various points  – notably the decision 
not to proceed with litigation when 
government appeared to be making 
some progress, and later the decision 
to follow counsel’s advice that litigation 
would likely not succeed unless and 
until the MCC registered Nevirapine 
for use to prevent MTCT. These 
decisions were agonising given the lives 
at stake and provoked criticism from 
some of the TAC’s allies. Nevertheless, 
with hindsight, they were absolutely 
correct. Had the case been run any 
sooner and then lost, that would have 
been the end of the matter – there 
would have been no way of recovering.
■
Factor 5 – 
research
A critical but often neglected facet of 
successful public interest litigation 
is the need for detailed research in 
advance of and during litigation. We 
Timing is an essential element in any public interest 
litigation that is to have meaningful impact. Litigation 
should not commence until and unless the climate is 
right and the relevant evidence is in place.
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conclude that two different types of 
research are needed: legal research and 
factual research.
The legal research is essential if public 
interest litigation is to be given a proper 
theoretical foundation. It involves a 
particular emphasis on making use of 
foreign and international law, which is 
often not easily accessible but can play a 
pivotal role.
The need for access to proper factual 
research is just as acute. Particularly in 
cases on socio-economic rights, many 
of the factual issues will be highly 
specialised and complicated, involving 
statistical, medical, social science or 
other information. Those engaged in 
running such litigation must have access 
to relevant research capabilities – either 
within their own organisation or via 
alliances with other organisations. 
An excellent example of this is the 
Limpopo textbook litigation initiated by 
Section27, where expert evidence was 
adduced to demonstrate how critical 
it was that learners had proper access 
to textbooks if they were to receive a 
meaningful education.
At present, in the South African public 
interest litigation environment, there 
appears to be a relative absence of 
appropriate organisations engaged in 
such research. In this regard, one of 
our respondents stressed the need for 
funding of:
[…] multidisciplinary and multiskilled 
organisations to have capacity to do 
socio-economic research as well as 
legal research and litigation.
■
Factor 6 – 
characterisation
A substantial component of any 
successful case is the ‘characterisation 
debate’. This is particularly important 
given that any case – especially when in 
the public eye – might be viewed and 
perceived in multiple ways by the courts 
and by the public.
A particularly good example in this 
regard is the case of Minister of 
Education, Western Cape v Governing 
Body, Mikro Primary School.225 This 
case concerned the right of an Afrikaans 
language school (with largely white 
learners) to refuse to admit various 
225  Minister of Education, Western Cape, & Others 
v Governing Body, Mikro Primary School, & 
Another [2005] ZASCA 66; 2006 (1) SA 1 (SCA).
English-speaking learners (all of whom 
were black).
While the case could be seen as being 
about language rights (the issue 
the courts ultimately held as being 
implicated) there was a real risk of the 
school’s approach being seen to be 
motivated by racism instead. Thus, as 
Jonathan Berger explains:
The importance of public opinion 
was well-understood in Mikro. Much 
time was spent by the litigants trying 
to win the media over, with a key 
spokesperson deliberately making 
himself available for more than just 
answering questions. This approach 
seems to have borne fruit – an initially 
hostile mainstream media warmed 
to the school’s position over time. 
This was crucial given the perception 
that the school’s conduct was racially 
motivated – a big and powerful white 
school refusing to admit small and 
weak black children.226
It is thus extremely important for 
those involved in public interest 
litigation to demonstrate to both the 
courts and the public that the issues 
at stake are critical, that the assertion 
of fundamental rights is being used to 
226 Berger op.cit., page 91.
A Treatment Action 
Campaign demonstration in 
Cape Town in 2007.
Photograph: Treatment 
Action Campaign ©
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redress unfairness and inequality rather 
than to perpetuate it, and that there are 
numerous, real people being affected on 
a daily basis.
Moreover, there are often multiple ways 
of presenting a case.
In Joseph, for example, the applicants 
were alive to the fact that contending 
that access to electricity formed part 
of the right of access to housing was 
a significant bridge to cross. For 
that reason, the case was primarily 
characterised as being about 
administrative justice and procedural 
fairness – not the right to housing. 
Thus, the heads of argument in the 
Constitutional Court characterised the 
crisp issue before the Court as being:
[I]s it lawful for the respondents to 
disconnect the electricity supply to a 
residence without complying with the 
recognised components of the right 
to procedural fairness as envisaged 
by the PAJA and the Constitution 
in respect of the residents affected 
and without even considering their 
circumstances? 227
While the applicants did refer to the 
right to housing in their heads of 
argument (along with their right to 
dignity and their contractual rights), 
this was only for the purpose of 
satisfying the requirement that, to be 
administrative action, the decision 
had to adversely affect the rights of the 
residents. Indeed they were at pains 
to limit the emphasis on the right to 
housing, meaning that this issue took 
up only two pages of the heads of 
argument.
Ultimately, the Court accepted this 
characterisation by upholding the 
227  Applicants’ Heads of Argument, Joseph & Others 
v City of Johannesburg & Others op.cit.
contentions based on administrative 
justice and declining to decide whether 
the right to housing was implicated at all.
Similarly, in Teddy Bear Clinic, the 
applicants had to choose between two 
ways of characterising the case. The first 
was to contend that the provisions in 
the statute they were challenging were 
unconstitutional because they would 
violate the autonomy rights of children. 
The second was to contend that the 
provisions were unconstitutional 
because they caused damage to precisely 
the very vulnerable children that they 
were meant to protect.
While the applicants ran both 
arguments, they placed considerably 
greater emphasis on the latter issue. This 
was due to the strong jurisprudence 
that had already been developed by 
the applicants’ attorneys (the CCL) 
around the protection of children 
and also because it was felt that the 
Constitutional Court would find this 
argument less controversial.
The Court ultimately upheld both 
arguments, but plainly accepted the 
characterisation of the issue proposed 
by the applicants, as appears from the 
beginning of its judgment:
Children are precious members of 
our society and any law that affects 
them must have due regard to their 
vulnerability and their need for 
guidance. We have a duty to ensure 
that they receive the support and 
assistance that is necessary for their 
positive growth and development. 
Indeed, this Court has recognised 
that children merit special protection 
through legislation that guards and 
enforces their rights and liberties. We 
must be careful, however, to ensure 
that, in attempting to guide and protect 
children, our interventions do not 
expose them to harsh circumstances 
which can only have adverse effects on 
their development. […]
At the outset it is important to 
emphasise what this case is not 
about. It is not about whether children 
should or should not engage in sexual 
conduct. It is also not about whether 
Parliament may set a minimum age 
for consensual sexual conduct. Rather, 
we are concerned with a far narrower 
issue: whether it is constitutionally 
permissible for children to be subject 
to criminal sanctions in order to deter 
early sexual intimacy and combat the 
risks associated therewith.228
■
Factor 7 – 
follow-up
Perhaps the most critical factor of all in 
ensuring that public interest litigation 
achieves maximum social change is the 
issue of proper follow-up after litigation.
Compliance and 
assessment 
Most critically, follow-up involves 
ensuring that a litigation victory is put 
into effect by the relevant government 
departments, thus translating the legal 
success into practical benefits for a 
large number of people on the ground, 
including those not directly involved in 
the litigation. It also involves identifying 
the extent to which the litigation has 
had limited success, and which issues 
therefore need attention in further 
228  Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children & 
Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development & Another op.cit., paragraphs 1 
and 3.
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litigation or advocacy campaigns. 
This need for proper follow-up is well 
explained by one of our respondents:
The ability of litigation to effect real 
social change depends in large part on 
the government’s willingness to respect 
and implement the court’s judgments. 
By raising awareness and mobilising 
the public around an issue, civil society 
groups can bring enough pressure 
on government to compel it to make 
concrete changes.
The views of this respondent, which 
were shared by many others, also make 
it clear that in follow-up, as in litigation, 
a combination of strategies is likely to 
be most successful.
Trying to rectify government’s non-
compliance with a court order by using 
only legal mechanisms – contempt of 
court proceedings, court inspections, 
more detailed orders – can succeed but 
faces significant difficulties. Among 
these is the fact that many courts are 
(correctly) slow to use their limited 
political capital to threaten government 
officials with incarceration, as well as 
obstacles arising from the State Liability 
Act 20 of 1957, which limits actions 
that can be taken against government. 
Most of all, however, there is significant 
difficulty in getting any compliance 
out of a government opponent that 
is recalcitrant and does not want to 
respond.
In contrast, using public pressure 
and mobilisation – combined 
where necessary with further legal 
mechanisms – has a far higher 
likelihood of success, because if the 
pressure is effective, government will 
have no option but to comply.
This is what occurred in the case of N 
v Government of Republic of South 
Africa229 and the sequels thereto. In 
these cases, the applicants successfully 
obtained an order requiring the state 
to provide ARV treatment for HIV-
positive prisoners at the Westville 
Prison in Durban. Despite government’s 
deeply hostile attitude on the issue, as 
Berger points out:
[…] persistent follow-up and skilful 
media and legal work has resulted 
in significant – albeit insufficient – 
compliance [with court orders].230
The same is true of pressure brought 
to bear on the state in the Mikro case 
concerning language rights in schools, 
229  N & Others v Government of Republic of South 
Africa & Others (No. 1) 2006 (6) SA 543 (D).
230 Berger op.cit., page 77.
to which we have already referred. 
There, pressure placed on government 
by the parents of both sets of learners 
resulted in compliance with the order 
granted.
Similarly, in the Limpopo textbook case, 
Section27 decided against proceeding 
with a contempt application, even 
though grounds for contempt existed. 
Section27 reasoned that the highly 
adversarial and antagonistic contempt 
proceedings would eliminate any 
possibility of co-operation with 
government officials. It weighed up 
the strategic advantage of the court 
officially recognising the recalcitrance 
of government, and the potential media 
and social mobilisation that would 
result, against the benefit that would be 
gained from co-operation. It concluded 
that co-operation was more valuable. 
Ultimately, the overwhelming media 
attention and public pressure pushed 
unresponsive government officials into 
complying with the court orders.
This can be contrasted with a range 
of other cases in which effective 
follow-up was not present, and as a 
result, substantial legal victories either 
produced no effect on the ground or 
took years to do so. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the Grootboom case is an 
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example of this much broader trend.
The importance of social mobilisation 
and advocacy in the follow-up process 
is particularly well illustrated by one of 
our respondents in the refugee sector:
In the use of litigation as a catalyst for 
social change, it is necessary to have 
strong representative organisations on 
the ground to ensure implementation 
of the gains made through litigation.
However, [in the refugee sector, the] 
ability to ensure ongoing monitoring of 
the actions of the Department of Home 
Affairs has been circumscribed by 
the weakness of refugee and migrant 
organisations in the country.
Refugee communities, in particular, 
often embody many of the divisions 
that led them to flee their countries 
in the first place. Much of their time 
is also devoted to securing their own 
individual survival and access to 
documentation rather than striving for 
the protection of the rights of asylum 
seekers and refugees as a group. 
Moreover, asylum seekers and refugees 
are an extremely vulnerable group who 
often refrain from engaging in active 
advocacy activities for fear that this will 
affect decisions on their asylum claims 
or lead them to be arrested by law 
enforcement authorities.
Thus, [despite refugee information 
networks] in Johannesburg, Cape 
Town and Durban […] the lack of 
strong refugee-run organisations 
limits the ability to ensure that the 
Department of Home Affairs and other 
law enforcement authorities actively 
implement court orders and decisions.
It should be noted that there are some 
cases which do not require a great deal 
of follow-up – in other words, obtaining 
the judgment has a sufficient effect on 
its own.  However, it would be a mistake 
in our view to conclude, as one of our  
respondents did, that civil and political 
cases generally require no follow-up 
whereas socio-economic rights cases do.
This is demonstrated by the aftermath 
of the Constitutional Court’s decision 
to invalidate the death penalty in S v 
Makwanyane.231 Virtually everyone 
took the view that the Constitutional 
Court order removing the death penalty 
from the statute books would be the 
end of the matter. However, the process 
of substituting sentences for those 
sentenced to death prior to 1995 where 
these sentences had not been carried 
out, took inordinate time and effort. 
231  S v Makwanyane & Another [1995] ZACC 3; 
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
Indeed, it took three further judgments 
from the Constitutional Court (in 
Sibiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Johannesburg232 and its sequels), a 
structural interdict and a 10-year delay 
before this occurred.
Similarly, in Nkuzi Development 
Association v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa233 – a 
decision which upheld a right to legal 
representation in certain eviction cases 
– it was only after tenacious follow-
up and pressure on government that 
the Department of Land Affairs and 
the Department of Justice began to 
implement the judgment.
Thus, in cases involving a classic civil or 
political right – the death penalty and the 
right to legal representation – extensive 
follow-up was also required for the 
judgments to be effective.
Remedy
A final issue on the question of follow-up 
is the relationship between follow-up and 
the remedies issued by courts. Following 
232  Sibiya & Others v Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Johannesburg, & Others [2005] ZACC 6; 2005 (5) 
SA 315 (CC).
233  Nkuzi Development Association v Government of 
the Republic of South Africa & Another [2002] 
ZALCC 20; 2002 (2) SA 733 (LCC).
Perhaps the most critical factor of all in ensuring that public 
interest litigation achieves maximum social change is proper 
follow-up. This involves ensuring that a litigation victory is 
put into effect by the relevant government departments, and 
identifying the extent to which the litigation has had limited 
success, and which issues therefore need attention in further 
litigation or advocacy campaigns.
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the Constitutional Court’s refusal to 
grant more than a declaratory order in 
the Grootboom case, for instance, there 
was a groundswell of academic opinion 
and litigation efforts seeking to obtain 
more creative and/or intrusive orders 
from courts. Generally, the orders sought 
fall into two categories, often sought 
together:
•  mandatory orders – directing 
government to take certain defined 
steps, often within specified time 
frames; and
•  supervisory orders – requiring 
government to report back to 
litigants and/or the court as to the 
steps taken in fulfilment of an order. 
Since the decision in the TAC case, 
it has been beyond doubt that South 
African courts have the power to grant 
such orders. The courts also appear to 
be shedding their reluctance to grant 
these types of orders in practice. This 
is demonstrated, for example, by the 
Constitutonal Court’s recent decision to 
grant a supervisory order in the context 
of an extensive tender dispute which had 
the potential to affect millions of people 
on social grants.234
234  Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
& Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency & Others (No. 2) 
[2014] ZACC 12; 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC).
Perhaps in response, there has 
also recently been an increasing 
willingness on the part of public 
interest organisations to consider more 
creative remedies. This is demonstrated 
particularly by the teacher post-
provisioning litigation discussed in 
Chapter 2. There, the remedies sought 
included the deemed appointment 
of educators, orders allowing the 
attachment of state property, and now 
(in the pending class action) even the 
appointment of a special master to 
manage the distribution of funds if the 
class action succeeds.
The question of which order is 
appropriate in any specific case depends 
on the circumstances of that case, 
including the attitude of government. 
This is a point well made by Kent Roach 
and Geoff Budlender,235 who seek to 
distinguish between three types of 
government respondents – those that are 
‘inattentive’, those that are ‘incompetent’ 
and those that are ‘intransigent’ – and set 
out their views on which remedies are 
appropriate in each case.
However, a point made powerfully to 
235  Kent Roach & Geoff Budlender, Mandatory 
Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When Is 
It Appropriate, Just and Equitable?, in South 
African Law Journal, Vol. 122: 2005, pages 325-
351.  
us by one of our respondents was that 
while the use of innovative and wide-
ranging remedial powers by the courts 
is important in terms of achieving social 
impact, it is arguably less important 
than the capacity and willingness of 
the organisations involved to properly 
follow-up and enforce whatever order is 
granted.
Even an order that combines both 
mandatory and supervisory elements 
will likely achieve little in the way of 
social change and will be rendered 
meaningless if the organisations 
involved fail to properly follow up and 
enforce it, ideally via a combination of 
legal and political pressure.
By contrast, a declaratory order need 
not be seen as inherently ineffective. 
Properly used, it too can form the basis 
for a sustained and effective campaign 
of legal and political follow-up.
In this regard, declaratory orders appear 
to have been written off by numerous 
organisations, including by some of our 
respondents, substantially on the basis 
that the decision in the Grootboom 
case – which involved a declaratory 
order – has failed to produce any or 
adequate social change.
However, it appears that the blame in 
Photograph: Section27 ©
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this regard cannot be laid exclusively at 
the door of the declaratory order issued 
by the Constitutional Court.
Indeed, in its judgment in Grootboom, 
the Court emphasised the role of the 
SAHRC in monitoring government’s 
compliance with the judgment:
The Human Rights Commission is an 
amicus in this case. Section 184 […] of 
the Constitution places a duty on the 
Commission to ‘monitor and assess 
the observance of human rights in 
the Republic’ [and gives it] the power 
to investigate and to report on the 
observance of human rights [and] 
to take steps to secure appropriate 
redress where human rights have been 
violated. Counsel for the Commission 
indicated during the argument that 
the Commission had the duty and was 
prepared to monitor and report on the 
compliance by the state of its Section 
26 obligations. In the circumstances, 
the Commission will monitor and, if 
necessary, report in terms of these 
powers on the efforts made by the 
state to comply with its Section 26 
obligations in accordance with this 
judgment.236
Regrettably, this came to naught. 
Though the SAHRC did issue some 
reports on the progress of government, 
it seems to have construed its role as an 
extremely narrow one – focusing only 
on the Grootboom community and not 
on the effects of the order in general 
– and its monitoring had little, if any, 
effect on government’s response to the 
judgment. The Commission’s approach 
and the Court’s refusal to give a more 
236  Government of the Republic of South Africa & 
Others v Grootboom & Others op.cit., paragraph 
97.
powerful supervisory remedy have been 
forcefully criticised.237
There is no reason that a declaratory 
order granted by a court – provided 
that it is sufficiently specific as to 
government’s obligations – cannot be 
properly enforced, followed up and 
used as a basis for social change.
Thus, while public interest litigants 
should continue to push for mandatory, 
supervisory and creative orders in 
appropriate cases to assist in achieving 
tangible results, and while courts 
should be prepared to grant such orders 
in appropriate circumstances, the 
particular remedy granted can never 
become an excuse for a failure to engage 
in proper follow-up.
237  See for example: Kameshni Pillay, Implementing 
Grootboom: Supervision needed, in ESR Review, 
Vol. 3, No. 1: July 2002, pages 16-18.
Bomvini Senior 
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his chapter therefore considers 
three procedural mechanisms 
in place in South Africa which 
promote effective public interest 
litigation. This is important for two 
reasons.
Firstly, for foreign readers in 
jurisdictions with less generous 
procedural regimes, it provides an 
insight into possible procedural reforms 
to be suggested to promote effective 
public interest litigation in their 
jurisdictions.
Secondly, for South African as well as 
foreign readers, it seeks to consider 
how to take full advantage of these 
mechanisms when designing and 
engaging in public interest litigation.
The three procedural mechanisms we 
deal with are:
• broad rules of standing;
• a protective costs regime; and
•  significant opportunities for 
interventions by amicus curiae.
■
Broad rules of 
standing
Under common law prior to 1994, the 
courts took a restrictive approach to 
standing. A person approaching a court 
for relief was required to establish a 
personal and direct interest in the relief 
sought.
However, this position was changed 
radically in 1994 when a supreme 
Constitution and a justiciable Bill of 
Rights were enacted. Standing cases 
concerning the Bill of Rights are now 
governed by Section 38 (enforcement 
of rights) of the Constitution, which 
provides:
Anyone listed in this section has the 
right to approach a competent court, 
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights 
has been infringed or threatened, and 
the court may grant appropriate relief, 
including a declaration of rights. The 
persons who may approach a court 
are—
(a) anyone acting in their own 
interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of 
Procedural mechanisms 
which promote effective 
public interest litigation
When presenting the 2008 report to public interest litigators in other 
jurisdictions, we were struck by the fact that the South African public 
interest litigation environment is, from a procedural point of view, a 
very generous one.
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another person who cannot act in 
their own name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or 
in the interest of, a group or class of 
persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public 
interest; and
(e) an association acting in the 
interest of its members.238
The Constitutional Court has 
emphasised that this introduces a:
[...] radical departure from the 
common law in relation to 
standing.239
The standing requirements of this 
Section are as broad as in any other 
country of which we are aware.
That this is entirely appropriate in the 
context of constitutional litigation has 
been made clear by the Constitutional 
Court:
Existing common-law rules of standing 
have often developed in the context 
of private litigation. As a general rule, 
private litigation is concerned with the 
determination of a dispute between 
two individuals, in which relief will 
238  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
op.cit., Section 38.
239  Kruger v President of the Republic of South 
Africa & Others [2008] ZACC 17; 2009 (1) SA 
417 (CC), paragraph 22.
be specific and, often, retrospective, 
in that it applies to a set of past 
events. Such litigation will generally 
not directly affect people who are 
not parties to the litigation. In such 
cases, the plaintiff is both the victim 
of the harm and the beneficiary of 
the relief. In litigation of a public 
character, however, that nexus is 
rarely so intimate. The relief sought is 
generally forward-looking and general 
in its application, so that it may 
directly affect a wide range of people. 
In addition, the harm alleged may 
often be quite diffuse or amorphous. 
Of course, these categories are ideal 
types: no bright line can be drawn 
between private litigation and 
litigation of a public or constitutional 
nature. Not all non-constitutional 
litigation is private in nature. Nor 
can it be said that all constitutional 
challenges involve litigation of a 
purely public character: a challenge 
to a particular administrative act or 
decision may be of a private rather 
than a public character. But it is clear 
that in litigation of a public character, 
different considerations may be 
appropriate to determine who should 
have standing to launch litigation.240
240  Ferreira v Levin NO & Others; Vryenhoek & 
Others v Powell NO & Others [1995] ZACC 13; 
In determining whether an applicant is 
acting in the public interest, the courts 
have taken into account a range of 
factors, including:
•  whether there is another reasonable 
and effective manner in which the 
challenge can be brought;
•  the nature of the relief sought and 
the extent to which it is of general 
and prospective application;
•  the range of persons or groups 
who may be directly or indirectly 
affected by any order made by the 
courts and the opportunity that 
those persons or groups have had to 
present evidence and argument to 
the courts;
•  whether the case is brought as an 
abstract challenge or live case;
•  the degree of vulnerability of the 
people affected; and 
•  the nature of the right said 
to be infringed as well as the 
consequences of the infringement of 
the right. 241
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), paragraph 229, later 
endorsed by the full Court in Kruger v President 
of the Republic of South Africa & Others op.cit., 
paragraph 23.
241  Lawyers for Human Rights & Other v Minister of 
Home Affairs & Other [2004] ZACC 12; 2004 (4) 
SA 125 (CC), paragraphs 16-18.
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The effect of broad 
standing provisions
There is no doubt that these broad 
standing provisions and the generous 
way in which they have been applied 
have facilitated effective public interest 
litigation and allowed important matters 
to reach the courts.
This is demonstrated, for example, by 
the large number of cases which have 
been brought by institutional litigants 
acting in either the public interest or on 
behalf of a group of people affected. In 
many of those cases, finding individual 
applicants to bring the cases would have 
potentially proved very difficult.
For example, in the NCGLE litigation, 
it might have been possible to find a 
gay rights activist who was willing to 
admit to committing a crime in order to 
demonstrate his interest in challenging 
the laws criminalising sodomy. However, 
this would have been far more difficult 
to achieve, for instance, in the Teddy 
Bear Clinic case mentioned earlier, 
where it would have been necessary 
to have a child (or his/her parents or 
guardians) admit to committing a crime 
by engaging in various forms of sexual 
acts.
The difficulties that would arise with 
strict standing requirements are also 
demonstrated by the case of Centre 
for Child Law v Minister of Justice242 
– a challenge to statutory provisions 
which imposed a system of minimum 
sentences on child offenders. There, 
the broad standing provisions meant 
that government was forced to abandon 
its technical objection that there was 
no individual child before the court 
who was complaining about a sentence 
against him or her. The Constitutional 
Court was emphatic that this was the 
appropriate approach:
[I]n this Court the Minister did not 
persist with his challenge to the 
Centre’s legal standing, or with the 
contention that the issues were purely 
academic. That approach was in my 
view correct. Although the Centre 
did not act on behalf of (or join) any 
particular child sentenced under the 
statute as amended, its provisions are 
clearly intended to have immediate 
effect on its promulgation. So the 
prospect of children being sentenced 
under the challenged provisions was 
immediate, and the issue anything 
but abstract or academic. The Centre’s 
242  Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development & Others [2009] 
ZACC 18; 2009 (6) SA 632 (CC).
stated focus is children’s rights, and 
in this case it has standing to protect 
them. It was thus entitled to take up the 
cudgels. To have required the Centre 
to augment its standing by waiting for 
a child to be sentenced under the new 
provisions would, in my view, have been 
an exercise in needless formalism.243
Even in the TAC case, it might have 
been very difficult to find an individual 
to act as an applicant who satisfied the 
common law test for standing if applied 
strictly. While countless HIV-positive 
pregnant women were of course affected 
by government’s policy and while 
some might have been willing to act as 
applicants, there is the obvious problem 
that they would all have given birth by 
the time the case had made its way to the 
Constitutional Court. This would have 
led to absurd and unnecessary debates 
about whether those women still had 
the necessary legal interest to proceed 
with the case in their own interests, and 
whether that interest extended to those 
women seeking a declaration that the 
policy was invalid as a whole – or merely 
that they themselves were entitled to 
Nevirapine.
243  Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development & Others op.cit., 
paragraph 11.
There is no doubt that the broad standing provisions 
contained in the Constitution and the generous way in 
which they have been applied have facilitated effective 
public interest litigation and allowed important matters 
to reach the courts.
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This demonstrates that the broad 
standing provisions are often particularly 
important where government conduct 
(as opposed to law) is being challenged. 
Thus, in the Limpopo textbook case, 
for instance, the absence of broad 
standing provisions may have prevented 
vindication of the rights of the learners 
concerned. Section27 would then have 
been precluded from participating as 
a litigant, and only schools or learners 
themselves could have litigated. In 
respect of these learners or schools, they 
would not have had a sufficient direct 
interest in the provision of textbooks to 
other schools or learners – meaning that 
the bulk of the schools and learners in 
Limpopo would have received no relief.
Similarly, there are some instances 
of unlawful or unconstitutional 
government conduct which do not 
affect any person in particular. In those 
situations, strict standing requirements 
might prevent the issues being litigated 
at all. Examples of this include the 
following cases:
•  Glenister244 where a businessman 
successfully challenged laws which 
disbanded the Scorpions (a specialist 
244  Glenister v President of the Republic of South 
Africa & Others [2011] ZACC 6; 2011 (3) SA 347 
(CC).
corruption-fighting body);
•  Justice Alliance of South Africa245 
where three NGOs successfully 
challenged the validity of a law 
allowing the President to extend the 
term of office of the Chief Justice;
•  Democratic Alliance246 where 
a political party successfully 
challenged the appointment of 
the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions; and
•  Kruger247 where an attorney 
successfully challenged unlawful 
conduct by the President in bringing 
into force certain amendments to the 
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996.
What is particularly notable is that some 
of these cases relied on provisions of 
the Constitution lying outside the Bill 
of Rights, meaning that the standing 
provisions in Section 38 did not apply. 
Nevertheless, in the Kruger case the 
Constitutional Court made it clear that 
even in such situations it was appropriate 
to adopt a broad approach to standing:
Section 38 […] is not of direct 
245  Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of 
Republic of South Africa & Others [2011] ZACC 
23; 2011 (5) SA 388 (CC).
246  Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa & 
Others [2012] ZACC 24; 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC). 
247  Kruger v President of the Republic of South 
Africa & Others op.cit.
application in this case as it does 
not concern a challenge based on a 
right in chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, in my view, we should 
adopt a generous approach to standing 
in this case. In so doing, I am mindful of 
the fact that constitutional litigation is 
of particular importance in our country 
where we have a large number of 
people who have had scant educational 
opportunities and who may not be 
aware of their rights. Such an approach 
to standing will facilitate the protection 
of the Constitution.
Mr Kruger asserts locus standi on 
two grounds: a direct and personal 
interest and as a person acting in the 
public interest. Although Mr Kruger 
may not have established standing on 
either basis under the restricted rules 
of standing operative at common law, 
I am persuaded that an expanded 
understanding of what constitutes a 
direct and personal interest should be 
adopted in this case.248
Thus, there is no doubt that broad 
standing provisions are critical tools 
in promoting access to justice and the 
vindication of rights.
248  Kruger v President of the Republic of South 
Africa & Others op.cit., paragraphs 23-24.
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Class actions
Until recently, the one provision of 
Section 38 that had received little 
judicial attention was Section 38(c), 
entitling someone to approach a court: 
[…] acting as a member of, or in 
the interest of, a group or class of 
persons.249
Common law in South Africa did not 
allow for class actions, and prior to 
1994 class actions were entirely foreign 
to South African law. In 1998, the South 
African Law Commission published 
a draft bill on public interest and class 
actions.250 It was intended to allow for 
and regulate class actions. However, 
the bill was never enacted, despite the 
Commission’s recommendation that the 
bill and the necessary rules of court be 
enacted as a matter of urgency.
Prior to 2012, the leading case on class 
actions was Ngxuza.251 The applicants 
in this case were recipients of social 
249  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
op.cit., Section 38(c).
250  Project 88 –The Recognition of Class Actions 
and Public Interest Actions in South African Law, 
South African Law Commission: August 1998.
251  Ngxuza & Others v Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, & Another 
2001 (2) SA 609 (E); and Permanent Secretary, 
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, & Another 
v Ngxuza & Others [2001] ZASCA 85; 2001 (4) 
SA 1184 (SCA).
grants which were unlawfully cancelled, 
without notice, without reasons, and 
without giving them the opportunity 
to be heard. Both the High Court and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld 
the right of the applicants to proceed 
by way of a class action. However, the 
case only dealt with class actions in the 
context of the Bill of Rights – and not 
common law – and did not spark much 
reliance on the class action procedure.
This situation changed in 2012 and 
2013 when two cases dealing with class 
actions reached the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the Constitutional Court. 
Both cases arose from breaches of the 
Competition Act 89 of 1998 by bread 
manufacturers. This led to applications 
seeking certification of two classes – a 
class of bread consumers and a class of 
bread distributors.
In the Children’s Resource Centre 
case,252 dealing with the application 
of the bread consumers, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal for the first time 
recognised that opt-out class actions 
were sustainable in South African law 
for Bill of Rights claims and for ordinary 
common-law claims. An opt-out class 
action is one where members of the 
252  Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food 
[2012] ZASCA 182; 2013 (2) SA 213 (SCA).
class must be given the opportunity to 
choose to be excluded from the class. 
The Court held that:
[…] it would be irrational for the court 
to sanction a class action in cases 
where a constitutional right is invoked, 
but to deny it in equally appropriate 
circumstances, merely because of the 
claimants’ inability to point to the 
infringement of a right protected under 
the Bill of Rights. The procedural 
requirements that will be determined 
in relation to the one type of case can 
equally easily be applied in the other. 
Class actions are a particularly 
appropriate way in which to vindicate 
some types of constitutional rights, but 
they are equally useful in the context 
of mass personal injury cases or 
consumer litigation.253
The Court went on to confirm that class 
actions would first have to be certified 
by a court, and then laid down the 
requirements for such certification.254
However, in the companion case of 
Mukaddam,255 the Supreme Court of 
253  Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food 
op.cit., paragraph 21.
254  Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food 
op.cit., paragraph 26.
255  Mukaddam & Others v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd 
& Others [2012] ZASCA 183; 2013 (2) SA 254 
(SCA).
Broad standing provisions are often particularly 
important where government conduct (as opposed to 
law) is being challenged.
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Appeal, largely rejected opt-in class 
actions, requiring that exceptional 
circumstances had to be shown for such 
a class action to be permitted. An opt-in 
class action is one where members of 
the class are required to join the class.
This was overturned on appeal to the 
Constitutional Court, which held that:
•  The certification requirements 
delineated by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal were largely appropriate 
provided that they were flexibly 
applied.256
•  However, the requirement of 
certification had no application 
at all to class actions in which the 
enforcement of rights entrenched in 
the Bill of Rights was sought against 
the state.257
•  There was also no reason to 
limit opt-in class actions only 
to cases involving exceptional 
circumstances.258
It is too soon and beyond the scope of 
this publication to discuss in detail the 
effect of these judgments. Suffice it to 
256  Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd & 
Others [2013] ZACC 23; 2013 (5) SA 89 (CC), 
paragraphs 34-39.
257  Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd & Others 
op.cit., paragraphs 40-41.
258  Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd & Others 
op.cit., paragraph 55.
say that there are now two substantial 
applications for certification of a 
class action pending in the courts 
– one involving claims against gold 
mining companies by miners who 
have contracted silicosis, and another 
involving claims by pensioners against 
transport and logistics parastatal 
Transnet’s pension fund.
How the different 
grounds of standing 
fit together
The recognition of the availability of class 
actions by the highest courts and the 
provision of much-needed certainty as 
to how this occurs raises a key question: 
Is this likely to alter the manner in which 
public interest litigation should take 
place, and if so, how?
In our view, the availability of class 
actions is an important and welcome 
change for public interest litigation. 
However, in the majority of cases, it will 
not be necessary to rely on class actions.
This is demonstrated by considering 
to what extent the cases covered 
in Chapter 2 might have been run 
differently had it been clear that the 
class action route was available. In the 
vast majority of the cases – NCGLE, 
Grootboom, TAC, Mazibuko, Joseph 
and Nokotyana – we consider that 
using the class action route would not 
have provided any material advantage. 
These cases were brought either on 
behalf of the individual applicants or 
communities involved, or as cases in the 
public interest. There was no respect in 
which this approach constrained the 
applications.
We therefore consider that in most 
public interest litigation cases, the 
appropriate route will be to continue 
to rely on Sections 38(a), (b) and (d) 
of the Constitution – that is, where 
the applicants act in their own interest, 
in the interests of others who cannot 
do so, and in the public interest. We 
emphasise that there is no reason that 
these three grounds of standing cannot 
be pleaded simultaneously, as was done 
in various of the cases considered.
It seems to us that class actions come to 
the fore in a relatively narrow category 
of cases, namely where the aim is to 
seek specific relief, including awards of 
damages, in respect of large numbers of 
unnamed individuals or entities.
This is demonstrated by the teacher 
post-provisioning case study in 
‘One Billion Rising’ protest 
against rape at Wits University in 
Johannesburg, February 2013.
Photograph: Gay and Lesbian 
Memory in Action ©
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Chapter 2. There, the initial cases were 
brought without any use being made 
of the class action procedure. While 
they obtained effective relief for many 
learners and schools, it became clear 
that further litigation would have to 
take place, which would be very difficult 
to manage given:
•  the large number of schools 
involved, many of which were not in 
communication with the LRC;
•  the fact that each school’s individual 
circumstances varied materially (for 
instance, how many vacant teacher 
posts and how much had been spent 
by the school governing body on 
paying temporary teachers); and
•  the fact that it seemed unrealistic 
to expect that a blanket order 
compelling the provincial education 
department to fill all vacant teacher 
posts would ever be implemented.
In this context, the use of an opt-in 
class action proved ideal as it had the 
following advantages:
•  It provided a mechanism whereby 
the litigation could be launched 
without all affected schools being 
on board.
•  The notice requirements of a class 
action provided a helpful way 
of attracting the attention of the 
schools concerned.
•  The opt-in procedures allowed the 
schools to join the litigation and 
place their own information before 
the court.
•  If the case succeeds on the merits, 
the 90 schools that have opted in 
will each have discrete orders in 
their favour entitling them to have 
their specific number of vacant 
teacher posts filled (whether 
via deemed appointments or 
otherwise) and to claim fixed 
amounts from the provincial 
education department as repayment 
for the payments made to 
temporary teachers. The prospects 
of such orders being implemented 
are far greater than if there had 
been a blanket order compelling 
the provincial department to fill all 
vacant teacher posts.
We thus consider the teacher post-
provisioning case to be an ideal example 
of the role that can be played by class 
actions in bringing about effective 
public interest litigation. This is in 
addition to the more traditional use 
of class actions for claims for damages 
against wrongdoers such as in the miner 




A second procedural respect in 
which the South African legal system 
promotes public interest litigation 
concerns costs awards.
The ordinary and almost invariable 
approach is that costs follow results. 
This means that the losing litigant is 
required to pay the taxed costs of the 
successful litigant. While taxed costs 
normally only amount to approximately 
40% of the actual costs, this can 
obviously still be a very sizeable figure – 
especially where the litigation has gone 
through multiple courts.
For this reason, the prospects of an 
adverse costs award would ordinarily 
constitute a significant disincentive 
to public interest litigation. Given the 
unpredictability of litigation, there are 
very few cases where one can be certain 
of winning, and an adverse costs order 
on a sufficient scale could bankrupt the 
individual or organisation concerned.
From the outset, the Constitutional 
Court has been alive to the potential 
chilling effect of adverse costs orders 
and therefore developed an approach to 
guard against it. However, it was in the 
Biowatch matter259 that the Court most 
comprehensively and emphatically 
laid down the proper approach to 
costs in constitutional matters. The 
Court articulated four principles of 
importance.
Firstly, the Court held that: 
[…] as a general rule in constitutional 
litigation, an unsuccessful litigant in 
proceedings against the state ought 
not to be ordered to pay costs.260
This would generally only be departed 
from where the litigation was:
[...] frivolous or vexatious [or where 
there was] conduct on the part of the 
litigant that deserves censure.261
In the absence of such circumstances, 
the ordinary order should be that there 
is no order as to costs.
Secondly, and equally important, 
the Court confirmed that where the 
litigant asserting constitutional rights 
succeeded, the state should be directed 
to pay the costs. This is important 
because it ultimately increases the 
ability and likelihood of public interest 
organisations bringing litigation. This 
is not only because they receive costs 
awards when successful, but also 
because it makes it easier for them to 
259  Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources & 
Others [2009] ZACC 14; 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC). 
260  Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources & 
Others op.cit., paragraph 21.
261 Ibid.
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persuade counsel to take cases on the 
basis of a ’no-win, no-fee’ arrangement.
The effect of these two rules taken 
together is that, in general, if 
government loses, it is required to pay 
the costs; and if government wins, each 
party pays its own costs.
The Constitutional Court articulated 
the need for this approach as follows:
The rationale for this general rule is 
three-fold. In the first place it diminishes 
the chilling effect that adverse 
costs orders would have on parties 
seeking to assert constitutional rights. 
Constitutional litigation frequently 
goes through many courts and the 
costs involved can be high. Meritorious 
claims might not be proceeded with 
because of a fear that failure could lead 
to financially ruinous consequences. 
Similarly, people might be deterred 
from pursuing constitutional claims 
because of a concern that even if they 
succeed they will be deprived of their 
costs because of some inadvertent 
procedural or technical lapse. Secondly, 
constitutional litigation, whatever the 
outcome, might ordinarily bear not 
only on the interests of the particular 
litigants involved, but on the rights 
of all those in similar situations. 
Indeed, each constitutional case that 
is heard enriches the general body 
of constitutional jurisprudence and 
adds texture to what it means to be 
living in a constitutional democracy. 
Thirdly, it is the state that bears primary 
responsibility for ensuring that both the 
law and state conduct are consistent 
with the Constitution. If there should 
be a genuine, non-frivolous challenge 
to the constitutionality of a law or of 
state conduct, it is appropriate that 
the state should bear the costs if the 
challenge is good, but if it is not, then 
the losing non-state litigant should be 
shielded from the costs consequences 
of failure. In this way responsibility for 
ensuring that the law and state conduct 
is constitutional is placed at the correct 
door.262
Thirdly, the Court held that this 
approach applied even where the 
litigation between a private party and 
the state also involved other private 
respondents:
The fact that more than one private 
party is involved in the proceedings 
does not mean […] that the litigation 
should be characterised as being 
between the private parties. In essence 
262  Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources & 
Others op.cit., paragraph 23.
the dispute turns on whether the 
governmental agencies have failed 
adequately to fulfil their constitutional 
and statutory responsibilities. 
Essentially, therefore, these matters 
involve litigation between a private 
party and the state, with radiating 
impact on other private parties. 
In general terms costs awards in 
these matters should be governed 
by the over-arching principle of 
not discouraging the pursuit of 
constitutional claims, irrespective of 
the number of private parties seeking 
to support or oppose the state’s 
posture in the litigation.263 
Lastly, the Court stressed that this 
approach applied irrespective of whether 
the litigant asserting constitutional 
rights was a public interest litigant or 
not. It held that:
Equal protection under the law requires 
that costs awards not be dependent on 
whether the parties are acting in their 
own interests or in the public interest. 
Nor should they be determined by 
whether the parties are financially 
well-endowed or indigent or, as in the 
case of many NGOs, reliant on external 
funding. The primary consideration 
263  Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources & 
Others op.cit., paragraph 28.
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in constitutional litigation must be 
the way in which a costs order would 
hinder or promote the advancement of 
constitutional justice.264
The costs regime laid down in Biowatch 
has been of significant importance in 
promoting public interest litigation. 
Prior to this decision, there was 
considerable anxiety – especially among 
institutions litigating in the public 
interest – about the prospect of an 
adverse costs order being made against 
them. There can be little doubt that 
this had a very real and chilling effect 
on public interest litigation, and either 
prevented or impeded some of this 
litigation from occurring.
Moreover, there has been no suggestion 
of which we are aware that the costs 
regime articulated in Biowatch 
has produced a spate of baseless 
constitutional litigation.
Regrettably, the one cost issue on which 
the Constitutional Court has been 
somewhat inconsistent is the question 
of costs in constitutional litigation 
between private parties, where there is 
no state involvement. This is a difficult 
area because often both parties are 
264  Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources & 
Others op.cit., paragraph 16.
asserting constitutional rights – even 
though one party might be extremely 
well resourced (such as a mining 
company) and the other not (such as 
an environmental NGO). In disputes 
between private parties, the Court 
characterises its approach as generally 
having costs follow the result in such 
cases, save for exceptional cases.265
However, discerning in advance what 
those exceptional circumstances 
might be is not always easy – meaning, 
unfortunately, that the risk of an adverse 
costs order continues to figure as a 
major worry for a public interest litigant 
trying to decide whether to embark on a 
case against a private litigant. The Court 
has made clear that it will consider:
[…] the extent to which the pursuit 
of public interest litigation could be 
unduly chilled by an adverse costs 
order [and] the broader implications of 
most constitutional litigation.266
The potential unpredictability of this, 
however, remains a cause for concern.









The term amicus curiae can have a 
variety of meanings. Traditionally, the 
most common form of amicus curiae is 
a person who appears at the request of 
the court to represent an unrepresented 
party or interest.
Another form of amicus is demonstrated 
where the court requests counsel to 
appear before it to advise or assist it on 
difficult or novel questions of law which 
arise in the matter, or (less commonly) 
where a person asks leave to intervene 
for this purpose. In such cases, the amicus 
curiae does not represent a particular 
interest or point of view.
A third common type of amicus curiae 
is the Law Society or Bar Council in an 
application for the admission of a legal 
practitioner. The professional body 
makes submissions to the court, not to 
From the outset, the Constitutional Court has been alive 
to the potential chilling effect of adverse costs orders and 
therefore developed an approach to guard against it.
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represent the interests of the professional 
body’s members, but to assist and advise 
the court in promoting the interests of 
the administration of justice.
However, in the new constitutional 
order of South Africa, a new form of 
amicus curiae has been introduced, 
namely a non-party which contends for 
a particular position which it has itself 
chosen.267 The Constitutional Court has 
emphasised the importance of this role:
[T]he role of an amicus […] is very 
closely linked to the protection of our 
constitutional values and the rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. […] 
[A]lthough friends of the court played 
a variety of roles at common law, the 
new Rule was specifically intended to 
facilitate the role of amici in promoting 
and protecting the public interest. In 
these cases, amici play an important 
role first, by ensuring that courts 
consider a wide range of options and 
are well informed; and second, by 
increasing access to the courts by 
creating space for interested non-
parties to provide input on important 
public interest matters, particularly 
those relating to constitutional issues. 
267 Ibid.
As this Court has noted:
“The role of an amicus is to draw the 
attention of the Court to relevant 
matters of law and fact to which 
attention would not otherwise be 
drawn. In return for the privilege 
of participating in the proceedings 
without having to qualify as a party, 
an amicus has a special duty to the 
Court. That duty is to provide cogent 
and helpful submissions that assist 
the Court.”
The role of a friend of the court can, 
therefore, be characterised as one 
that assists the courts in effectively 
promoting and protecting the rights 
enshrined in our Constitution.268
The rules of the High Court, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
Constitutional Court contain specific 
procedures for the admission of amici 
curiae. These procedures also permit 
amici curiae to seek to adduce evidence 
before the court.269
The Constitutional Court has expressed 
caution about the admission of amici 
268  Children’s Institute v Presiding Officer of the 
Children’s Court, District of Krugersdorp & 
Others [2012] ZACC 25; 2013 (2) SA 620 (CC), 
paragraphs 26-27.
269  Children’s Institute v Presiding Officer of the 
Children’s Court, District of Krugersdorp & Others 
op.cit., paragraphs 28-34.
curiae in criminal matters,270 but even 
this approach is subject to exceptions, 
as is demonstrated by the intervention 
of amici in various criminal cases.271
There is no question that the 
intervention of amici curiae has played 
a critical role in a number of public 
interest cases. In what follows, we focus 
on a largely unexplored question in the 
South African context – what different 
roles can an amicus curiae play in 
assisting public interest litigation?
The radical outlier 
role
A particularly frequent form of amicus 
intervention is to run an argument 
that supports the relief sought by the 
main public interest litigant, but that 
is (perhaps significantly) more radical, 
progressive and/or far-reaching than 
the arguments of the main litigant.
This can have substantial benefits for 
the main litigant. If the more radical 
amicus argument succeeds, then the 
270  Ex Parte Institute for Security Studies, In re S v 
Basson [2005] ZACC 4; 2006 (6) SA 195 (CC), 
paragraph 15.
271  See for example: Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions & Another [2007] ZACC 9; 2007 (5) 
SA 30 (CC); and S v Vilakazi [2008] ZASCA 87; 
2012 (6) SA 353 (SCA).
Children playing in 
portable toilet.
Photograph: Social Justice 
Coalition ©
138 Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Chapter 5
case will almost certainly succeed and 
will likely be even more far-reaching 
than the main litigant may have hoped.
However, even if the court rejects or 
declines to decide the argument raised 
by the amicus, the intervention may 
still have substantial benefit for the 
main litigant. This is because an amicus 
intervention of this sort will often 
change the nature and dynamics of the 
debate before the court and, in doing so, 
cast the arguments raised by the main 
litigant in a more palatable light.
An excellent example of this is the 
TAC’s Constitutional Court case. In 
this case, there was an intervention by 
three amici. Two of these amici were the 
CLC and the Institute for Democracy 
in Africa (IDASA). They sought to 
intervene on the question of the proper 
approach to socio-economic rights.
The Constitutional Court had 
previously decided in Grootboom that 
in adjudicating socio-economic rights 
challenges to government programmes, 
the relevant standard would be 
reasonableness. The TAC was content 
to rely on this standard.
However, the CLC and IDASA took 
a more radical line. They contended 
that the Constitution required and 
permitted a minimum core approach 
to socio-economic rights. This meant 
that in respect of certain key aspects 
of socio-economic rights – the 
minimum core – it was not sufficient 
for government to merely say that 
they had a reasonable programme in 
place. Rather, where an individual 
lacked access to his or her minimum 
core socio-economic rights, he or she 
could claim that his or her rights had 
been violated. The amici were in effect 
suggesting that the Court’s existing 
jurisprudence on socio-economic rights 
was inadequate and would not give full 
effect to the Constitution.
The argument of the CLC and 
IDASA was ultimately rejected by the 
Constitutional Court in its judgment. 
Nevertheless, for a brief but crucial 
part of the hearing, this argument held 
centre stage. Whereas government 
was seeking to debate whether the 
socio-economic rights were properly 
justiciable at all and whether the 
Court could go beyond a mere 
declaratory order, the intervention of 
the amici changed this debate. It meant 
that – contrary to the arguments of 
government that the TAC was running 
a radical, unprecedented case – the 
arguments of the TAC now seemed far 
more measured and limited.
The Court could thus feel quite 
comfortable that, in adopting the 
arguments and relief contended for by 
the TAC, it was doing no more than 
follow a middle ground consistent with 
previous jurisprudence.
While it is difficult to assess precisely 
the extent to which the intervention of 
the amici affected the Court, it is clear 
that the intervention certainly helped 
the TAC, even though the arguments of 
the amici were rejected.
There have been various other examples 
of this type of radical amicus approach.
In the Pillay case,272 for example, the 
Constitutional Court was faced with 
an argument by a Hindu learner that 
a school decision to preclude her 
wearing a nose stud breached the 
right to equality because it unfairly 
discriminated against her. Two amici 
intervened – the Natal Tamil Vedic 
Society and the Freedom of Expression 
Institute. They contended that, in 
addition to breaching her right to 
equality, the decision breached her 
rights to freedom of culture and 
freedom of expression. The Court 
272  MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal & Others v 
Pillay op.cit.
In the new constitutional order of South Africa, a new 
form of amicus curiae has been introduced, namely a 
non-party which contends for a particular position which 
it has itself chosen.
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ultimately declined to decide the 
contentions of the amici, finding it 
unnecessary in light of its decision to 
uphold the main equality contention of 
the applicant.
The Biowatch decision on costs is a 
further example. Two amici – the CCL 
and LHR – intervened and contended 
that public interest litigants deserve 
special protection against adverse 
costs orders. A further amicus – CALS 
– intervened and contended that 
environmental rights litigants deserved 
special protection against adverse 
costs orders. Ultimately, the Court 
rejected these arguments. However, the 
arguments plainly changed the debate 
regarding the matter and, in the end, 
the Court applied the same generous 
standard that the amici had asked for 
to all matters in which a constitutional 
right was asserted in good faith – no 
matter the nature of the litigant or the 
particular right at issue.
There is only one note of caution 
that should be sounded. An amicus 
must ensure that it does not end up 
preventing future viable cases on an 
issue by running the argument too soon 
as an amicus intervention. Before taking 
the radical outlier position, the amicus 
needs to be reasonably sure that:
•  there is unlikely to be a better 
case in the near future to run the 
argument – for example, the TAC or 
Biowatch cases; or that
•  the amicus will likely be able to 
persuade the court to either uphold 
its contentions or leave them open 
for another day – for example, the 
Pillay case.
Providing a route 
through
A second and different role that can be 
played by an amicus is that of providing 
a court with a route through a case filled 
with difficult factual or legal issues or 
where the existing arguments do not 
get to grips with the issues. In this type 
of intervention, the amicus does not 
run a more radical argument than the 
main litigant. Rather, it uses its position 
to stand back and adopt a bird’s eye 
view in order to offer the court an 
appropriate route to decide the case.
Perhaps the best example of this is 
the role of the amici (the SAHRC 
and the CLC, represented by the 
LRC) in the Grootboom case. It was 
the intervention of the LRC that 
demonstrated to the Constitutional 
Court that it could and should decide 
the case in the applicants’ favour on 
the right of access to adequate housing 
(Section 26 of the Constitution), 
which was qualified in various respects 
including a reasonableness standard, 
instead of on children’s right to shelter 
(Section 28), which was unqualified. 
This was critical as it was quite clear 
that the Constitutional Court did not 
want to decide the case on a Section 28 
basis, because it was anxious about the 
repercussions in future.
Had it not been for the intervention of 
the amici, it appears quite possible, and 
even likely, that the Grootboom case 
might have been lost and not produced 
any binding precedent in favour of the 
right to housing or right to shelter.
Moreover, the LRC’s intervention 
managed to analyse government’s 
housing programme with a 
sophistication and nuance that was 
lacking in the plaintiffs’ case. Though a 
number of the LRC’s legal submissions 
were ultimately rejected, its approach 
to and analysis of government’s housing 
programme proved to be the core 
around which the judgment was based.
A further example is the matter of 
S v M273. This matter concerned an 
273 S v M [2007] ZACC 18; 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC).
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appeal by a divorced mother of three 
children aged 16, 12 and 8 years 
against a sentence of four years’ 
imprisonment on charges of fraud. 
While the applicant’s arguments relied 
on the effect that the sentence would 
have on her children, it took an amicus 
intervention by the CCL to analyse the 
case and provide the Constitutional 
Court with a route to decide it. It was 
the amicus that demonstrated to the 
Court that:
•  the matter had to be dealt with as 
one of children’s rights – not the 
rights of the applicant; 
•  international law made it clear that 
children’s rights had to be taken into 
account; and that
•  requiring the consideration of 
children’s rights in sentencing did 
not mean being soft on crime.
This intervention had a profound 
impact on the Court. Indeed, the need 
for the intervention is highlighted by 
the fact that it was the Court itself that 
prompted it. The Chief Justice directed 
the Registrar to serve a copy of the 
directions setting the matter down for 
hearing on the CCL.
Much as in the Grootboom case, it was 
the sophisticated, nuanced argument 
of the amicus that demonstrated to the 
Court how the law could accommodate 
the facts in question, without 
undermining general legal principles 
in future cases, in this case regarding 
sentencing.
A more recent example is the matter 
of Allpay,274 which was about the 
lawfulness of a massive tender award 
concerning the administration and 
disbursement of social grants. The case 
was immensely complicated at the level 
of fact and law, and had potentially 
massive ramifications for the millions of 
beneficiaries receiving social grants, and 
for future tender cases.
The case ultimately saw two different 
amici curiae intervening and adopting 
contrasting positions in an effort to find 
a route through for the Constitutional 
Court. Corruption Watch intervened 
to deal with the relevant legal 
principles, expressing concern that the 
Court should espouse principles of 
administrative law and remedy which 
protected procurement processes 
274  Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd & Others v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency & Others 
[2013] ZACC 42; 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC); and 
Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
& Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency & Others (No. 2) 
op.cit.
and combatted corruption. The CCL 
intervened to focus on the question of 
remedy and the negative ramifications 
for beneficiaries if the tender was set 
aside. A full discussion of the case is 
beyond the scope of this publication, 
but the Court’s judgment made it plain 
that both amici interventions had a 
significant effect.
Filling a gap
The first two types of amicus 
interventions we have dealt with 
concerned attempts by amici to reshape 
or redirect the case as a whole. There 
are, however, other more limited amicus 
interventions that are no less effective 
and can often be crucial to the success 
of a case.
For example, an amicus intervention 
can often cover an issue that the main 
litigant has not covered at all and may 
be unable to cover. Often the issue 
presented by the amicus in this way is 
primarily a legal one.
It happens quite frequently, for instance, 
that the main litigant has not covered 
the foreign and international law 
dimensions of a case. In cases like S v M 
mentioned above and Grootboom, this 
was done by the amici.
A particularly frequent form of amicus intervention is to run 
an argument that supports the relief sought by the main 
public interest litigant, but that is (perhaps significantly) more 
radical, progressive and/or far-reaching than the arguments 
of the main litigant.
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The same approach applies to South 
African legal issues which have received 
inadequate emphasis. In the TAC case, 
for example, the focus of the main 
litigant was the right to health care. An 
effective amicus intervention, however, 
was brought by the Cotlands Baby 
Sanctuary, focusing on children’s rights 
and the effect on children.
On other occasions, the gap filled 
by the amicus is to demonstrate at a 
practical level the effect of a judgment 
or provision. A good example in 
this regard is the case of Brümmer v 
Minister of Social Development.275
This case concerned a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act of 2000, 
which provided that where a request 
for access to information is refused, the 
requester must approach a court within 
30 days to challenge that decision. This 
provision was challenged by a journalist 
as violating the rights of access to 
information and access to courts.
While the journalist’s case was well 
presented and persuasive, it did not 
manage to convey fully the practical 
effect that the 30-day time period had 
275  Brümmer v Minister of Social Development & 
Others [2009] ZACC 21; 2009 (6) SA 323 (CC).
on requesters, and why even reading 
in a condonation provision would not 
solve the problem.
This gap was filled by an amicus 
intervention by SAHA. The amicus 
intervention demonstrated that due 
to the complexities involved, even 
an organisation like SAHA – which 
specialises in access to information – 
had not once managed to approach a 
court within the 30-day time period. 
It also demonstrated that even a 
condonation provision would not solve 
the problem as it would have a chilling 
effect on the running of such litigation.
There is no question that SAHA’s 
intervention substantially strengthened 
the main litigant’s case. The 
Constitutional Court’s judgment 
described SAHA’s account of the 
practical difficulties caused by the time 
bar as:
[…] illuminating […] If an NGO faces 
these difficulties in meeting the 30-day 
limit, I think it is fair to expect that 
individuals will have even greater 
difficulty in complying with this time 
limit.276 
The Court struck down the time bar as 
276  Brümmer v Minister of Social Development & 
Others op.cit., paragraphs 53-54.
an unjustifiable limitation of the right of 
access to courts, and the submissions of 
SAHA made a significant contribution 
in persuading it to make this order.
A further example is the Biowatch 
case referred to earlier, concerning 
the awarding of costs against litigants 
asserting constitutional rights. 
While we have already discussed the 
substantive arguments made by the 
amici (the CCL, LHR and CALS) in 
this case, their intervention served an 
earlier and arguably more important 
purpose: To demonstrate to the 
Constitutional Court that the Biowatch 
matter did not merely concern an 
adverse costs award against one 
organisation but was, in fact, having 
a chilling effect on the entire public 
interest litigation arena.
The purpose was to assist in persuading 
the Court that this was indeed a matter 
where it was appropriate to hear an 
appeal on costs alone, despite the 
general reluctance of courts to do so. 
It was for this reason that the amici 
interventions were launched at a very 
early stage – prior to the Court even 
deciding whether to set the matter 
down.
Finally, although an amicus is largely 
prevented from adducing further 
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evidence, there are exceptions to 
this rule. There are some unusual 
occasions where an amicus can fill the 
gap in respect of missing evidence. An 
example of this is the case of Hoffmann 
v South African Airways mentioned 
earlier.
As noted, this case concerned the 
practice of South African Airways 
to refuse to employ HIV-positive 
individuals as cabin attendants. When 
the case reached the Constitutional 
Court, it appeared to lack certain 
important medical evidence on 
the transmission, progression and 
treatment of HIV, as well as the ability 
of people with HIV to be vaccinated 
against yellow fever, an important issue 
in the case.
This evidence had been adduced in a 
different lower court matter, A v South 
African Airways, and the attorneys in 
this matter – the ALP – successfully 
applied to be an amicus in the 
Hoffmann case and to place the relevant 
evidence before the Constitutional 
Court. Ultimately, the Constitutional 
Court ruled in favour of Hoffmann, 
relying substantially on the evidence 
from the ALP.
In sum
An amicus intervention can be brought 
in at least three ways – playing the 
radical outlier role, providing a route 
through or filling a gap. In many cases, 
there are overlaps between the three 
with the amicus fulfilling more than one 
of these functions.
On some occasions, the amicus 
interventions above were run after 
consultation with the main litigant. 
On other occasions, this did not occur. 
While one cannot be prescriptive on 
this score, it is worth bearing in mind 
that amicus interventions can hinder as 
much as they can help. In particular, it 
may be the case that the main litigant 
has given careful consideration to 
the possible range of arguments and 
has declined to run some of them for 
practical or strategic reasons.
Therefore, before any public interest 
organisation seeks to intervene in a 
case as an amicus, we are of the view 
that there should at least be a full and 
frank exchange of views between the 
potential amicus and the main litigant as 
to the advantages and disadvantages of 
such an intervention.
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I
n Chapter 1 we identified the main 
challenges facing the public interest 
litigation environment in South 
Africa.
We concluded that a major challenge 
is a lack of funding and resources. 
This challenge is also substantially 
responsible for a second major 
challenge – the difficutly faced 
by public interest litigation 
organisations in attracting and 
retaining sufficient quality 
personnel.
These challenges are matters of 
significant concern. As we have 
indicated, international research 
suggests that progressive Constitutions 
and progressive judges – both of 
which South Africa undoubtedly 
possesses – are insufficient to achieve 
substantial progress on human rights 
unless there are sufficient resources 
to sustain support structures (in the 
form of rights advocacy organisations 
and rights advocacy lawyers) for legal 
mobilisation.
Given the massive inequality and 
poverty continuing to face South Africa, 
we are concerned that if organisations 
engaged in this work do not receive 
adequate support, there is a danger that 
the gains of the last few years will be 
undermined.
The remaining challenges discussed in 
this chapter arise from the beginnings 
of a potential backlash to public interest 
litigation – in the form of increased 
hostility by government towards 
public interest litigation, and the use 
of public interest litigation tactics 
by organisations opposed to social 
change.
In Chapter 3, on the basis of the case 
studies presented in Chapter 2 as 
well as other examples, we identified 
four strategies that should be used in 
combination in order to use rights to 
achieve social change.
The first is public information. 
Public campaigns that inform ordinary 
people of their rights are an essential 
Summary of findings
Our key findings may be divided into four parts:
•  the main challenges facing the public interest litigation 
environment in South Africa;
•  four strategies that should be used in combination in order to use 
rights to achieve social change;
•  seven factors that are critical to maximising the prospect that 
public interest litigation succeeds and achieves social change; and
•  three procedural mechanisms which promote effective public 
interest litigation in South Africa.
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component of any effort to achieve 
social change on rights issues. They 
are critical if people are to understand 
the role that law and legal rights 
can play in achieving social justice. 
Moreover, without such campaigns, 
those conducting public interest 
litigation are unlikely to be able to 
obtain the required information to 
launch successful litigation, to generate 
substantial support from ordinary 
people – which plays an important role 
in perceptions of litigation by courts, 
the public and government – or to 
transform any litigation victory into 
concrete progress on the ground.
The second is advice and assistance. 
It is essential that there are intermediary 
organisations which enable people 
to claim their rights, by giving 
advice, directing them to appropriate 
institutions, assisting them with the 
formulation of their claims, and taking 
matters up on their behalf – all of 
which can occur successfully without 
necessarily engaging in litigation. This 
strategy too has substantial benefits 
for litigation, particularly because 
it provides an efficient means of 
identifying the core issues that are 
affecting large numbers of ordinary 
people. It thus allows public interest 
litigation to be designed effectively and 
to target maximum impact, while also 
improving the prospects that a victory 
in a landmark case actually translates 
into tangible benefits for people far 
beyond those directly involved.
The third is social mobilisation and 
advocacy. It is clear from our study 
that the assertion of rights is generally 
most effective when linked to social 
movements. Rights have to be asserted 
both outside and inside the courts. 
Some form of social movement is 
necessary to identify issues, mobilise 
support, apply political pressure, engage 
in litigation where necessary, and 
monitor and enforce favourable orders 
by the courts.
The fourth is litigation. While 
successful litigation must not be seen 
as an end in itself, it can play a pivotal 
role when combined with the three 
strategies set out above. Properly used, 
litigation enables poor or marginalised 
groups to achieve impact and success 
that would not be available to them if 
they were limited only to the strategies 
set out above.
We do not imply that it is vital that a 
single organisation itself be integrally 
involved in each of these four strategies. 
Often this is not possible and we accept 
that specialist litigation organisations 
frequently have an important role 
to play. Indeed, these four strategic 
processes should preferably not be 
directed by lawyers as ‘experts’ or 
outsiders but instead be framed by the 
initiatives and actions of communities 
themselves.
In Chapter 4 we concluded that in 
order to achieve social change via 
litigation, it is critical that litigation 
be properly conceptualised, run 
and followed up. In this regard, we 
identified seven factors that are critical 
to maximising the prospect that public 
interest litigation succeeds and achieves 
social change.
Proper organisation of clients. 
While public interest litigation can 
be run on behalf of a few disparate 
individual clients, we conclude that 
this is usually not an effective way of 
achieving social impact. Generally 
speaking, public interest litigation is 
likely to achieve greater social change 
when the client is an organisation or 
movement with a direct interest in 
the matters being litigated. Moreover, 
public interest litigation is likely to 
achieve greater social change when 
the client plays an active and engaged 
Isolation cells at Section Four at the 
Johannesburg Fort (an apartheid-era 
prison). ANC 1963 treason trialist 
Walter Sisulu, and leader of the 1976 
Soweto Uprising Tsietsi Mashinini 
were held here.
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role, rather than allowing legal 
representatives to make key decisions 
without proper client input.
Overall long-term strategy. Where 
public interest litigation achieves 
maximum social impact, this is 
invariably not by virtue of a single case. 
Rather, it tends to require a series of 
cases brought on different but related 
issues over a substantial period of time. 
It is therefore critical that organisations 
seeking to utilise public interest 
litigation to achieve social impact 
do not attempt to rely on ‘one-shot’ 
success. Instead, they must develop a 
coherent long-term strategy that allows 
them to benefit from the substantial 
advantage that derives from being a 
repeat player in the courts.
Co-ordination and information-
sharing. In virtually any given area 
of public interest litigation, there are 
multiple organisations with similar 
aims, all seeking to achieve success 
via litigation. If there is insufficient 
co-ordination and information-
sharing between these organisations, 
there is a real danger that resources 
will not be used effectively and, even 
more damagingly, viable cases will be 
undermined by other conflicting cases 
being brought by other organisations 
simultaneously or beforehand. 
Successful public interest litigation 
therefore requires co-ordination 
and information-sharing among the 
organisations involved so that they can 
build on each other’s successes.
Timing. Timing is an essential 
element in any public interest litigation 
that is to have meaningful impact. 
Litigation should not commence 
until and unless the climate is right 
and the relevant evidence is in place. 
The effects of running litigation too 
soon can be disastrous – particularly 
as an unsuccessful piece of public 
interest litigation could, in practice, 
permanently foreclose the issue from 
being re-litigated. It is also helpful to be 
able to demonstrate that court action 
has not been the first port of call for 
the litigants involved. Where litigation 
is against government on controversial 
issues, courts will tend to be far more 
receptive and sympathetic where it 
can be demonstrated that the litigants 
have repeatedly sought to engage with 
government to find a solution but that 
none has been achieved.
Research. A critical and often 
neglected facet of successful public 
interest litigation is the need for 
detailed research in advance of and 
during litigation. Legal research, 
including using foreign and 
international law, is essential if public 
interest litigation is to be given a proper 
theoretical foundation. The need 
for access to proper factual research, 
particularly in socio-economic rights 
cases, is just as acute. Those involved in 
running such litigation must have access 
to relevant research capabilities – either 
within their own organisation or via 
alliances with other organisations.
Characterisation. A substantial 
component of any successful case is 
the characterisation debate – that is, 
ensuring that a case is brought under 
the appropriate right and is correctly 
pitched to the court. Any given case can 
be viewed and perceived in multiple 
ways by the courts and by the public. It 
is thus important for those involved in 
public interest litigation to demonstrate 
that the issues at stake are critical, that 
the assertion of fundamental rights is 
being used to redress unfairness and 
inequality rather than perpetuate it, and 
that countless, real people are being 
affected on a daily basis.
Follow-up. Perhaps the most 
important factor of all in ensuring that 
public interest litigation has maximum 
social impact is the need for proper 
South Africa’s Constitution is one of the most progressive 
in the world. Yet, South Africa also continues to face 
massive inequality and poverty. It is therefore essential 
that the Constitution is used in a manner that produces 
tangible and lasting social change.
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follow-up post-litigation. This mainly 
involves ensuring that a litigation 
victory is translated into practical 
benefits for a large number of people 
on the ground, including those not 
directly involved in the litigation. This is 
ideally done by a combination of legal 
and political pressure. While the use of 
innovative and wide-ranging remedial 
powers by the courts is important for 
achieving social impact, it is arguably 
less important than the capacity 
and willingness of the organisations 
involved to properly follow up and 
enforce whatever order is granted.
In Chapter 5 we identified three 
procedural mechanisms which promote 
effective public interest litigation in the 
South African environment.
The first is the broad rules of 
standing contained in South Africa’s 
Constitution and applied by its courts. 
These have been essential in allowing 
effective public interest litigation and 
have recently been developed further 
by courts embracing the idea of class 
actions. While this is a welcome and 
important development, we consider 
that class actions should only be used in 
a relatively narrow category of cases – 
namely where the aim is to seek specific, 
enforceable relief (including awards of 
damages) in respect of large numbers of 
unnamed individuals or entities.
The second is the protective costs 
regime adopted by South African 
courts in relation to constitutional 
litigation. In constitutional litigation 
between private parties and 
government, the courts have adopted 
the principle that if government loses, it 
should pay the costs, and if government 
wins, each party should bear its own 
costs. This has been critical to enabling 
effective public interest litigation.
The third consists of the significant 
opportunities for interventions 
by amici curiae. These interventions 
can play an essential role in seeking to 
achieve social change. They allow public 
interest organisations to influence the 
development of the law without having 
to start litigation themselves and can 
prevent retrogressive judicial decisions 
occurring.
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In closing 
South Africa’s Constitution is one of the most progressive in the world. It 
contains powerful and far-reaching provisions, including in relation to 
socio-economic rights. Yet, South Africa also continues to face massive 
inequality and poverty. It is therefore essential that the Constitution is 
used in a manner that produces tangible and lasting social change. As Judge 
Dennis Davis has pointed out:
A failure by successful litigants to benefit from constitutional litigation […] 
can only contribute to the long-term illegitimacy of the very constitutional 
enterprise with which South Africa engaged in 1994. A right asserted 
successfully by litigants who then wait in vain for any tangible benefit to flow 
from the costly process of litigation, is rapidly transformed into an illusory 
right and hardly represents the kind of conclusion designed to construct a 
practice of constitutional rights so essential to the long-term success of the 
constitutional project.277
277  DM Davis, Adjudicating the Socio-economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards 
‘Deference Lite’?, in South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 22, Part 2: 2006, page 314.
Former President Nelson 
Mandela engaging with HIV-
positive children in Crossroads, 
Cape Town, in 2007.
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Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 108 of 1996, Chapter 2 
(Bill of Rights, Sections 7-39)
7 Rights
(1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. 
It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.
(2) The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill 
of Rights.
(3) The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained 
or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill.
8 Application
(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, 
and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of 
the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic 
person in terms of subsection (2), a court—
(a)  in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if 
necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation 
does not give effect to that right; and
(b)  may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided 
that the limitation is in accordance with section 36 (1).
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the 
extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic 
person.
Appendix A
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9 Equality
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National 
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is 
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.
10 Human dignity
Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected 
and protected.
11 Life
Everyone has the right to life.
12 Freedom and security of the person
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which 
includes the right—
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause;
(b) not to be detained without trial;
(c)  to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private 
sources;
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which 
includes the right—
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction;
(b) to security in and control over their body; and
(c)  not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without 
their informed consent.
13 Slavery, servitude and forced labour
No one may be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour.
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14 Privacy
Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have—
(a) their person or home searched;
(b) their property searched;
(c) their possessions seized; or
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.
15 Freedom of religion, belief and opinion
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, 
belief and opinion.
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided 
institutions, provided that—
(a)  those observances follow rules made by the appropriate public 
authorities;
(b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and
(c) attendance at them is free and voluntary.
(3)(a) This section does not prevent legislation recognising—
(i) marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, 
personal or family law; or
(ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or 
adhered to by persons professing a particular religion.
(b)  Recognition in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this 
section and the other provisions of the Constitution.
16 Freedom of expression
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes—
(a) freedom of the press and other media;
(b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;
(c) freedom of artistic creativity; and
(d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.
(2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to—
(a) propaganda for war;
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or
(c)  advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or 
religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.
17 Assembly, demonstration, picket and petition
Everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, 
to picket and to present petitions.
18 Freedom of association
Everyone has the right to freedom of association.
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19 Political rights
(1) Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right—
(a) to form a political party;
(b)  to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political 
party; and
(c) to campaign for a political party or cause.
(2) Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any 
legislative body established in terms of the Constitution.
(3) Every adult citizen has the right—
(a)  to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of 
the Constitution, and to do so in secret; and
(b) to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office.
20 Citizenship
No citizen may be deprived of citizenship.
21 Freedom of movement and residence
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave the Republic.
(3) Every citizen has the right to enter, to remain in and to reside anywhere 
in, the Republic.
(4) Every citizen has the right to a passport.
22 Freedom of trade, occupation and profession
Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession 
freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by 
law.
23 Labour relations
(1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.
(2) Every worker has the right—
(a) to form and join a trade union;
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and
(c) to strike.
(3) Every employer has the right—
(a) to form and join an employers’ organisation; and
(b)  to participate in the activities and programmes of an employers’ 
organisation.
(4) Every trade union and every employers’ organisation has the right—
(a) to determine its own administration, programmes and activities;
(b) to organise; and
(c) to form and join a federation.
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(5) Every trade union, employers’ organisation and employer has the right 
to engage in collective bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to 
regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that the legislation may limit a 
right in this Chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36 (1).
(6) National legislation may recognise union security arrangements 
contained in collective agreements. To the extent that the legislation may 
limit a right in this Chapter the limitation must comply with section 36 (1).
24 Environment
Everyone has the right—
(a)  to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; 
and
(b)  to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present 
and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures that—
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
(ii) promote conservation; and
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development.
25 Property
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general 
application—
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and
(b)  subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and 
manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those 
affected or decided or approved by a court.
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment 
must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the 
public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all 
relevant circumstances, including—
(a) the current use of the property;
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property;
(c) the market value of the property;
(d)  the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition 
and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and
(e) the purpose of the expropriation.
(4) For the purposes of this section—
(a)  the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, 
and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s 
natural resources; and
(b) property is not limited to land.
159Public interest litigation and social change in South Africa: Strategies, tactics and lessons
Changing trends in the South African public interest litigation environment Appendix A
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain 
access to land on an equitable basis.
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the 
extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally 
secure or to comparable redress.
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 
as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to 
the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that 
property or to equitable redress.
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking 
legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, 
in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that 
any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the 
provisions of section 36 (1).
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6).
26 Housing
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the 
relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.
27 Health care, food, water and social security
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to—
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c)  social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves 
and their dependants, appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within 
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of 
these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.
28 Children
(1) Every child has the right—
(a) to a name and a nationality from birth;
(b)  to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care 
when removed from the family environment;
(c)  to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social 
services;
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(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation;
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices;
(f)  not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services 
that—
(i) are inappropriate for a person of that child’s age; or
(ii) place at risk the child’s well-being, education, physical or mental 
health or spiritual, moral or social development;
(g)  not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, 
in addition to the rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the 
child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of 
time, and has the right to be—
(i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; 
and
(ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of 
the child’s age;
(h)  to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at 
state expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial 
injustice would otherwise result; and
(i)  not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in 
times of armed conflict.
(2) A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child.
(3) In this section ‘child’ means a person under the age of 18 years.
29 Education
(1) Everyone has the right—
(a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and
(b)  to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, 
must make progressively available and accessible.
(2) Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language 
or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where 
that education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective 
access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all 




(c)  the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws 
and practices.
(3) Everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, 
independent educational institutions that—
(a) do not discriminate on the basis of race;
(b) are registered with the state; and
(c)  maintain standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable 
public educational institutions.
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(4) Subsection (3) does not preclude state subsidies for independent 
educational institutions.
30 Language and culture
Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural 
life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner 
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
31 Cultural, religious and linguistic communities
(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may 
not be denied the right, with other members of that community—
(a)  to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; 
and
(b)  to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society.
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner 
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.
32 Access to information
(1) Everyone has the right of access to—
(a) any information held by the state; and
(b)  any information that is held by another person and that is required 
for the exercise or protection of any rights.
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and 
may provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and 
financial burden on the state.
33 Just administrative action
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative 
action has the right to be given written reasons.
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and 
must—
(a)  provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where 
appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal;
(b)  impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections 
(1) and (2); and
(c) promote an efficient administration.
34 Access to courts
Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.
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35 Arrested, detained and accused persons
(1) Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the 
right—
(a) to remain silent;
(b) to be informed promptly—
(i) of the right to remain silent; and
(ii) of the consequences of not remaining silent;
(c)  not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could 
be used in evidence against that person;
(d)  to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible, but not 
later than—
(i) 48 hours after the arrest; or
(ii) the end of the first court day after the expiry of the 48 hours, if 
the 48 hours expire outside ordinary court hours or on a day which is 
not an ordinary court day;
(e)  at the first court appearance after being arrested, to be charged or 
to be informed of the reason for the detention to continue, or to be 
released; and
(f)  to be released from detention if the interests of justice permit, 
subject to reasonable conditions.
(2) Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the 
right—
(a) to be informed promptly of the reason for being detained;
(b)  to choose, and to consult with, a legal practitioner, and to be 
informed of this right promptly;
(c)  to have a legal practitioner assigned to the detained person by the 
state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise 
result, and to be informed of this right promptly;
(d)  to challenge the lawfulness of the detention in person before a court 
and, if the detention is unlawful, to be released;
(e)  to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, 
including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of 
adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical 
treatment; and
(f) to communicate with, and be visited by, that person’s—
(i) spouse or partner;
(ii) next of kin;
(iii) chosen religious counsellor; and
(iv) chosen medical practitioner.
(3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the 
right—
(a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence;
(c) to a public trial before an ordinary court;
(d) to have their trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay;
(e) to be present when being tried;
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(f)  to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be 
informed of this right promptly;
(g)  to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the 
state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise 
result, and to be informed of this right promptly;
(h)  to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during 
the proceedings;
(i) to adduce and challenge evidence;
( j) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence;
(k)  to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if 
that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that 
language;
(l)  not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence 
under either national or international law at the time it was 
committed or omitted;
(m)  not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for 
which that person has previously been either acquitted or convicted;
(n)  to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments 
if the prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed 
between the time that the offence was committed and the time of 
sentencing; and
(o) of appeal to, or review by, a higher court.
(4) Whenever this section requires information to be given to a person, 
that information must be given in a language that the person understands.
(5) Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of 
Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render 
the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.
36 Limitation of rights
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including—
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the 
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
37 States of emergency
(1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of 
Parliament, and only when—
(a)  the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general 
insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency; 
and
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(b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.
38 Enforcement of rights
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, 
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and 
the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The 
persons who may approach a court are—
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b)  anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their 
own name;
(c)  anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class 
of persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.
39 Interpretation of Bill of Rights
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum—
(a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or 
freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law 
or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.
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Organisations & individuals participating 
via personal interview or questionnaire*1
*  This list includes the respondents for both the 2008 report and this publication. Some were respondents on 
both occasions. One City of Johannesburg official agreed to be interviewed on the basis that his identity 
would be kept confidential.
Black Sash Trust
Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 
University of the Witwatersrand
Centre for Criminal Justice, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Education and Training Unit
Freedom of Expression Institute 
Law Clinic
Human Rights Watch
Lawyers for Human Rights
OUT LGBT Well-being
PLAAS - Institute for Poverty, 
Land and Agrarian Studies, 
University of the Western Cape
ProBono.Org
Rhodes University Legal Aid 
Clinic
Rural Legal Trust
Socio-Economic Rights Project 
of the Community Law Centre, 
University of the Western Cape
South African History Archive
Zackie Achmat, co-founder of the 
Treatment Action Campaign
Brad Brockman, General Secretary 
of Equal Education
Geoff Budlender SC, practising 
Advocate and former National 
Director of the Legal Resources 
Centre
Edwin Cameron, Constitutional 
Court Justice
Arthur Chaskalson, former Chief 
Justice of South Africa and former 
National Director of the Legal 
Resources Centre
Matthew Chaskalson SC, practising 
Advocate
Jackie Dugard, co-founder of the 
Socio-Economic Rights Institute of 
South Africa
Adila Hassim, practising Advocate 
and co-founder of Section27
Kallie Kriel, Chief Executive Officer 
of AfriForum
Pius Langa, former Chief Justice of 
South Africa
Janet Love, National Director of the 
Legal Resources Centre
Kate O’Regan, former 
Constitutional Court Justice
Ann Skelton, Director of the Centre 
for Child Law
Wim Trengove SC, practising 
Advocate and former Director 
of the Legal Resources Centre’s 
Constitutional Litigation Unit
Stuart Wilson, practising Advocate 
and co-founder of the Socio-
Economic Rights Institute of South 
Africa
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